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SUMMARY: Petrs contend that a clause in the ~ ~

collective bargaining agreement violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it permits white teachers to be laid oft' even
---

-

though black teachers with less seniority are retained.
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2. FACTS AND HOLDINGS BELOW:
teachers in Jackson, Michigan.

Petrs are public school

The district-wide faculty is

85% white and so is the teachers union membership.

The

~

collective bargaining contract stated that one of its goals
was to have "at least the same percentage of minority racial
representation on each individual staff as is represented by
the student population of the Jackson Public Schools."
~

Pursuant to this policy the master contract between the school
and the union contained the following clause:
"Article XII: In the event that it becomes
necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board,
the teachers with the most seniority in the
district shall be retained, except at no time
will there be a greater percentage of minority
personnel laid off than the current percentage
of minority personnel employed at the time of
the layoff. In no event will the number given
notice of possible layoff be greater than the
number of positions to be eliminated. Each
teacher so affected will be called back in
reverse order for positions for which he is
certified, maintaining the above minority
balance."(emphasis added)

~

The Board followed this provision during a recent layoff,
and white teachers were laid off even though they had more
seniority than black teachers who remained at work.
filed a

~1983

suit in the E.D. Mich. (Joiner).

Petr ~

Although petrs

sought relief on a number of theories including Title VII, the
claim pertinent here is petrs' Sl983 claim alleging violations
~

of the Equal Protection Clause.
The OJ upheld the layoff provision.

He dispensed with

petrs' claim that affirmative action plans could not be
adopted without a judicial finding of job discrimination.
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United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443

u.s.

193 (1979).

Here the

facts showed that in 1953 there were no black teachers in the
Jackson School District.
faculty.

By 1961 they made up 1.8% of the

The faculty was 3.9% black in 1969 even though at

the same time the student population was 15.2% black.

At the

time the collective bargaining agreement was signed the
faculty was 8.5% black and the student population was 15.9%
~

black.

At no time did the DC compare the percentage of black j

j

faculty with the percentage of black certified teachers or
eligible blacks in the workforce.
~

The DC held that Weber and Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n
v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (CA6 1979), cert. denied, 452

u.s.

938
I\

I (

(1981) required a court to find internal racial disparities to
justify the affirmative action plan.

Here the DC found no

evidence of past overt discrimination, but stated that in
looking for discrimination to justify the affirmative action
plan, "it is appropriate to compare the percentage of minority ~ I
..

e

teachers to the percentage of minority students in the student

-

body, rather than with the percentage of minorities in the
relevant teaching market."

Pet Sa.

Although

Weber inquired

into the percentage of minorites in the relevant labor market,
the DC held that it should look at the disparity between
students and teachers, "because teaching is more than just a
job, [t]eachers are role models for their students."

The DC

in entional discrimination, but the disparity between
teachers and students met the CA6's •substantial
\

misrepresentation" standard required by Young, supra •

..
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The DC stated that n[t]he ___....
test is one of reasonableness,
~

Young, supra, at 694, 696.
whether the affirmative action plan is 'substantially related'

J)-c_

to the objective of remedying past discrimination and
correcting 'substantial' . and 'chronic' underrepresentation.
Id. at 696.•

The facts of this case met that test.

The CA affirmed, quoting at length from the DC's opinion,
~

including the passages above.
Local Union No. 1784

The CA added that Firefighters

v~,

104

~~

s. Ct. 2576 (1984) did not ~

require a reconsideration of the DC's holding.

Stotts did not
---~.....:>

involve a voluntary plan entered into by the employer and the
workers • representative.

The majority in Stotts reserved this /

very issue from its holding.

Id. at 2590.

In his concurring opinion Judge Wellford stated that nr
would affirm the decision that this voluntary affirmative
action layoff system, subject to collective bargaining
safeguards, was sufficient to meet the challenge presented by
plaintiffs.n

He argued, however, that underrepresentation of

minority teachers cannot be measured by looking to the
percentage of minority students enrolled in school.

He

advocated finding a disparity by looking to statistics in the
labor market rather than the student body.
3. CONTENTIONS:

Petrs:

This is the very issue left open

by this Court in previous cases: "[t]he line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans.•
2590.

Weber, 443

u.s.

at 208; Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576,

The CA6 erred in a number of respects.

First, there

~

J?
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were no admissions or findings of past discrimination by the
school board.

The only statistical disparity in the record is

the difference between the respective ratios of minorities in
the student body and minorities in the faculty. This is
insufficient to support

~

plan that forces people on layoff

because of their skin color.
Second, the CA6 applied the wrong standard.
"Reasonableness" or "substantial relationship" is not the
test.

The
test, stated time and again by this Court, ..___
is
......_____
strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 s. ct. 1879, 1882
egents v. Bakke, 438
Powell, J.).

--required.

u.s.

at 289-291 (opinion of

The CA6's standard falls way short of that

.,..

Third, there is a split in the CA's.

In Janowiak v. City

of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (1984), the ___.
CA7 per Judge Pell
reversed a DC order which had approved a voluntarily-adopted
hiring practice which gave preference on the basis of race.
The City had preferred as justification for the practice a
statistical disparity between minorities employed and
minorities available.
insufficient.
~disparate

This justification was held

In the instant case, the resps have not shown
impact between minorities employed and

minorities available.
Finally, the decision below conflicts with the
requirement that racial preference must be remedial in nature.

0

In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448

u.s.

448, 487 (1980) the Court

held that a racial preference program "cannot pass muster

..
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unless ••• it provides a reasonable assurance that application
of racial or ethnic criteria will be limited to accomplishing
••• remedial objectives."

Moreover,

Jes;;;~ ~ell,~\

concurring in Fullilove, noted that "this Court has
approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial,
administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional
statutory violations." Id. at 4971 accord, Bushey v. New York
State Civil Service Comm'n, 53 USLW at 3478 (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by two others, dissenting from cert. denial).
contrast, the CA6 dispensed with this requirement.

In
The CA6

requires no finding that racial preferences are limited to
providing relief to victims of past discrimination.

Instead,

the racial preferences here have the same effect as the one
struck down in William v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1569
(CAS 1984) (Higginbotham, concurring) in which the "quota made
no effort to correlate prior victim status to future
advantage1 to be black ipso facto would be to benefit under
this plan."
Resps: The DC noted that minority teachers were
substantially and chronically underrepresented in the
district.

The language negotiated by the union and the board

is a reasonable plan to ensure that minority gains are not
wiped out through layoffs.

The facts of Weber make it clear

that no judicial finding of past discrimination is needed.
Resps do not discuss the CA7 Janowiak case, but argue

that ~totts
~

does not prohibit this result as it involved Title

VII and did not discuss voluntary plans.

-------~

The holding below

- 7 does not contradict Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.
Finally, although the case is not moot, very little is at
stake.

At the time this suit was filed only one white teacher
~

was on layoff that would have been avoided had the layoffs
followed a strict
4.

senior~ty

DISCUSSION:

basis.

Weber is the closest case on the facts
~

because it involved a collective bargaining agreement.

Weber

did not involve state .,action however, and this petn is
predicated solely on the Fourteenth Amendmnt.
(

The

r~
iscrimination present in Weber was more egregious than that
{\
present here;' indeed it is not clear that actual
discrimination ever existed in this case.

See 443

u.s.

at 209

(affirmative action plan under Title VII must rest upon a
finding of "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally
segregated job categories").
It appears clear at the outset that the CA6 applied the
wrong standard in assessing this program.

-------......,

In Fullilove the

-

Chief for himself and Justices White and Powell stated that
"[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
to make sur
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 448

u.s.

at 491.

Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent by Justice

Stewart which urged that •any official actions that treats a
person differently on account of his race ••• is inherently
suspect and presumptively invalid." Id. at 523.

I suggest

that until this Court holds otherwise the minimal level of
~

~

scrutiny should be that stated by the Chief Justice.
'-·

'-~~:---.....-----......

But see
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also Fullilove, 448
judgment)

u.s.

at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in

(benign racial classification must be substantially

related to correcting effects of discrimin tion).
This case is similar to Bushey v. New York State Civil
Service Comm'n, cert. denied 53 USLW 3477 (1/8/85).

Both this

case and Bushey involve a voluntary affirmative action program
by a state.

v' .

.

In Bushey the petrs brought only T1tle VII cla1ms

in their cert. petn while here the petrs bring only an Equal
Protection Clause claim.

This petn is a possible grant for

many of the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist's dissent from

------------

denial in Bushey (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
White).

As the Bushey opinion noted, the issue was left open

in Weber and Stotts and states do not possess enforcement
~

power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [One difference
between this case and Bushey is that here the bargaining
agent, composed of 85% white employees, agreed to the plan.]
This c~~~f the clear and obvious past
(( discrimination found in Weber and Fullilove.

Even if one can

--~

say that the DC and CA6 found a disparate impact, the
disparity was a strange comparison between black faculty size
and black student population.

No attempt was made to

determine whether the percentage of minority faculty mirrore
the percentage of available minority teachers in the job
market.
There is a split between this case and the CA7's
Janowiak.
~

Janowiak held that more was required to uphold a

City's race-conscious hiring program than a statistical

- 9 -

disparity between hired minority workers and available
minority workers.

750 F.2d at 562 -563.

Statistical data, to

the CA7, is only the "first step in assessing whether an
emp ~~s

plan."

properly to institute an affirmative action

See also Bakke,

dissenting) • 1

~38

u.s.

at 369 (Brennan, J.,

According to the CA7 an affirmative action

program must be based upon a finding of past discrimination.
750 F.2d at 564, citing Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 508
(CAS 1981), cert. denied, 454

u.s.

1124 (1981).

Because

additional evidence of discrimination was needed to support
the race-conscious hiring program in Janowiak, the CA7
reversed the DC's summary judgment order which had approved
the hiring program.
~

Janowiak is expecially at odds with this

petn because the CA6 may not have even found a proper
disparate impact, and there is no finding that the disparate
impact was caused by discrimination.

Both the CA7 in

Janowiak and the CA6 below base their conflicting holdings on
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, this case is not moot.

The

b~s of ~~ ~

at least one teacher are still in issue, and the layoff
provision is still in effect.

See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2583.

1Justice Brennan for the four dissenters stated that:
"[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs
if the purpose of such programs is to remove the
disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise
have and if there is reason to believe that the
disparate impact is itself the product of past
discrimination, whether its own or that of society at
large.• (emphasis added) •

..

~
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I recommend grant.

One response.

Op. in Pet.

3/25/85
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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Quotas on Teams
IVE YEARS AGO, the dispute in the Perry
County, Miss., school syst~m was about basketball. The local high school had an enrollment that was half black and ha1f white; there were
.tWo basketball coaches, one of each race. In spite of
this neat and equal arrangement, though, it seemed
the best basketball players were black and the white
boys spent most of the time on the bench. The
school board ordered the coaches to let more white
boys play, but the federal government, finding that
such forced integration of the team would constitute
discrimination against the good black players, cut off
aD the county's federal education money.
A couple of years later, a court-appointed desegregation administrator in Cleveland, Ohio, went
farther. He decided that the school basketball
teams had to be at least 20 percent white while the
baseball teams had to be at least 50 percent black.
:A judge with common sense threw out the plan, but
the idea that school teams requiring a skill of some
·kind must be racially balanced is still around. The
'latest example is in Los Angeles, where the local
school district has just decreed that high school
teams in academic competitions must reflect the
) racial and sexual composition of the student bodies
at schools.
.
All these quotas for competitive school teams are

F

.'

sadly misguided. Some students obviously will be .
better basketball players and aome will excel at
mathematics. The trick is to develop each child's
personal capacities to the fullest. It is nonsense to
put someone on a basketball team because she is
short, fat and white or to choose a boy for the "It's
Academic" team because he represents the tall, Albanian group in the English lit class. Even more
ludicrous than these policies is the contradictory
one in Los Angeles that tolerates racially unbali
anced sports teams but not academic teams because "athletic competition is primarily a question
of physical skill, which is somewhat more inherent
than intellectual skill."
· H~ is a r_y1e that's senSJble and fair: every student is eligible to compete for a place on every
team. Students of all races should be encouraged to
do so by practices that make plain that no racial or
sexual discrimination will work against them. But
p~e t
should o to those who have t e
lameatest ability-w e er 1t's in s e
dunking or Ianfflige and 'terature-and who are
WillUig to put in e Bme and effort to perfect those
skills. That's the way Redskins are chosen, and ~
cancer researchers and opera singers. To teach
children that life offers different standards is to do
them a terrible disservice.

1

~~

iDirSex and Race Goals in Hiring;. ~ah-a-Interview With Morris Abram

~

-~4~

Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Interview With Mayor William Hud'nut
Republican of Indianapolis
~~ ,

Q Mr. Abram, why do you believe we should abolish the use
of mJr fs to increase employment of minorities and women?

Q Mr. Hudnut, why do you think quotas are an appropriate
remedy in job-discrimination cases?

A oppose quotas because they create an ethnic spoi ls
SY.stcm for certain groups to grab more power lor tfi'eir
members-at the expense of individuals outside the group.
That's contrary to our civil-rights laws that guarantee equal
protection of civi l rights for all Americans, not just for
blacks, women and other minorities. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 specifically forbids any mandatory requirement that
employers grant preferential treatment on the basis of race,
( color, religion, sex or national origin.

A I prefer to usc the word "goals" or "guidelines." It
means you're shooting for standards in employment which
reflect roughly the percentage of minorities and women
in the general labor pool. A lot of progress has been made
with affirmative-action goals.
Without them, we would regress into a situation where
overt or covert discrimina- Without them. "we'll
tion against blacks, Hispanics never get close
and women would prevent
them from taking their right- equal treatment lor
ful place in the mainstream minorities"
of community activity.

Q Why not compensate for decades of past discrimination?

-\C I

A Any individual who proves that he or she has been subject to discrimination is entitled to compensation under our
civil-rights laws. But the fact that one black or a hundred
blacks have been discriminated against in the past doesn't
mean that Joe White Man, who didn't discriminate, can be
replaced or prevented from getting a job so that Joe Black
Man, who may never have suffered any discriminatiO!], can
be appointed. I don't kn~,Jial basis f01~ grou plbcing
entitled to COmQensation regardless orwhether or not individuals in that group have
YESsuffered any discrimination.

"Thev create an ethnic
spoils svstem lor
groups to grab more
power"

Q Wouldn 't ending quotas
turn back the clock to the days
when disadvantaged groups
were shut out of many jobs?

A No. It's against the law
to shut anybody out on the
basis of race, creed and gender. I support the vigorous
enforcement of the law. This
is different from the question of group need. I'm
deeply aware of the fact that
there are many blacks and
other minority groups who
are disadvantaged. A growing number are experiencing an employment and
educational crisis. The rise in
female-headed households is
a special problem. But quotas are not going to help people who are not trained to
work. Quotas are not going to help people who are illiterate. Quotas are not going to help people who have not the
motivation to work.
Q Do you conclude that the 1984 Supreme Court decision on
layoffs and seniority bans employment quotas?

A Yes. In that case involving layoffs of Memphis firefighters, the Court ruled that you cannot interfere wit~
seniority system to protect minorities from being laid off.
But the Court didn't stop there. ll said that this principle
applies to hiring people and promotions.
Q Why should quota systems that seemingly have been effective for years suddenly be dismantled?

A Because quota systems are wrong and divisive. We had
white supremacy for years, and cities in the South where I
was raised said that it worked and that the community was
happy. But it was wrong. Just as discrimination done in the
name of white supremacy was wrong, discrimination done
in the name of racial or sexual preference is wrong.
0

50

~

...

NO-

to

Q Hasn't the Supreme Court
outlawed the use of numerical
goals in employment?

A The decision last year involving Memphis firefighters
is susceptible to different interpretations. In our opinion,
it was a narrow case which applied to laying off whites to
hire blacks, and the Court
protected seniority systems
when it comes to layoffs. I'm
not sure it is proper to apply that decision broadly to all affirmative-action plans.
In Indianapolis, we made a commitment in 1976 that 25
percent of recruitme nt classes for police and fire departments be composed of minorities. This goal was subsequently
confirmed by the Justice Department. Things have worked
well , and the white majority has accepted the fact that we're
making a special effort for minoriti es and women. I think it's
a great mistake for the Justice Department to ask us to dismantle the program.
Q But didn't sponsors of the Civil Rights Act oppose the idea
of numerical quotas?

A Well, the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act may have opposed quotas at the time, but subsequent history has shown
that without goals we'll never get close to the dream of equal
treatment for minorities, because that doesn't happen when
nature takes its course. What happens is that the overwhelming majority of job opportunities goes to white males because
they are the majority. Those same sponsors of civil-rights laws
also said that the government has a special role to play as an
advocate for the disadvantaged . I think it's morally obligatory that we make an extra effort for disadvantaged groups.
Q Are minorities or women who would otherwise be unqualified to hold certain jobs being hired under quotas?

A I don't think so. Let's say you have 25 qualified people
for a recruit clas~ of 20 in the police department. Among the
20 selected are five minorities or women to help achieve affirmative-action goals. The point is they are all qualified.
Q Aren't quotas just another form of discrimination that harms
whites or males who are innocent of any wrongdoing?

A I'm not sure that's true. It's a very tough, complex legal
issue. But I don't think that the white male is being discriminated against when he's getting 80 percent of the jobs in police and fire departments-as he is now in most cities even
with affirmative-action goals.
0
o

J

~~

Copyright @ 1985, U.S.News & World Report, Inc.

Banle Heats Up
over sex,.Race
Biasindobs
Hiring goals are widening
the rift between the White
House and coalitions of
civil-rights groups.
Spurred by recent federal efforts to
roll back affirmative-action plans in 50
cities, civil-rights groups and their allies are gearing up for a counterattack.
At a two-day conference in Washington, D.C., representatives of 91 groups,
Assistant Atty. Gen. William Bradincluding the AFL-CIO, the National
ford Reynolds contends that the adCommittee Against D{scrilnm.:Lticm
ministration is following "colorblind
Housing and the N
and sex-neutral principles" and has
for Women, formed a task force to
compiled an "unprecedented record of
tle the Reagan administration over the
civil-rights enforcement."
rights of women and minorities in emMoreover, as the administration sees
ployment, housing and education.
it, leaders of many civil-rights groups
As part of that effort, the National
no longer represent the bulk of womAssociation for the Advancement of Colen, blacks and other minorities.
ored People has sued the Justice DepartIn a
strategy to woo
ment in an attempt to bar the
ms- more, Los P-''1".'"._"'""
tration from dismantling hiring g~ve
ul"'~ ""~~I'-J'"""~' President Reagan
based on sex and race. The NAAC
· on
~~~~~~~U:ntdiltiOJrral civil-rights leadopened his doors to a fledgling
plans suits to block administr 10n efbtfl'M~an group called the Council for
forts to discard affirmative-action proa Black
Agenda that stresses
grams in Indianapolis and Los Angeles.
The Mexican American Legal Decenter o the rift etween civil- self-help en
al solutions inent aid to imfense and Educational Fund, too, is
ts groups an ~.J.d.min_i§!ra!i_9n is iF stead of massive
question: s~~rove the economic
considering suits against the Justice
of blacks.
protect classes of people who allegedly
A GOP coup. This
scored its
Department to protect quotas
women and minorities in San
o the laws bi es~
ccess on May 8 when William
suffer discriminatio~
apply to all indiv
a
as, the opular black chief executive
San Francisco and Los Angeles.
o Wayne ounty, Mich., and potential
race, creed, sex or national origin?
"It used to be that the J
andidate for governor,
partment used its prestige
resources for the
Seeking support of middle-class blacks, President Reagan
switched his allegiance to the
welcomes Michigan politician William Lucas to the GOP.
Republican Party. Lucas said
and poor who needed he
blacks have been "taken for
says Richard Fajardo of
Mexican-American Legal
&ranted" by Democrats.
GOP strategist Lee Atwater
fense and Educational
predicts Lucas will be the first
"Now, the resources of
Jusof "many switches of substantice Department
being
tial black leaders who underused against them
employstand that it is time to change."
ment, education
housing."
Yet as the rift widens beThe problem
civil-rights
tween the administration and
groups escalated when the
civil-rights groups, a number
Justice Department asked a
of leading Republicans remain
court to overturn quotas in Inwary of the federal governdianapolis over the city's obment's hard-line approach.
jection-the first time the fed"You've got to talk to blacks,
eral government has taken a
and you can't just talk to the
city to court to dissolve an afones who voted for you," says
firmative-action plan.
The government argues that
Representative Jack Kemp (RN.Y.). "You cannot be connumerical goals amount to
scious of the problems facing
preferential treatment forcerblacks in America today withtain groups at the expense of
out talking to the people who
individuals outside the grouprepresent them."
0
in most cases, white males.
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The Aff1 mat1ve ct1on e ate
A draft executive order would rescind rules that require major
government contractors to set numerical goals for hiring minorities and
women. We print here some opinions on the issue.
The Draft Proposal

The Supreme Court

From a draft executive order on nondiscrimination requirements
for government contractors:
Each government contractor and subcontractor shall engage in
affirmative recruitment and employment-related training programs
designed to ensure that minorities and women receive full consider·
ation for hiring and promotion. Such affirmative programs shall be
developed pursuant to regulations promulgated by the secretary of
labor', and shall describe the actions to be taken, including time
frames for taking such actions, to accomplish the objective of expanding the number of qualified minorities and women who receive
full consideration for hiring and promotion.
Nothing in this executive order shall be interpreted to require or
to provide a legal basis for a government contractor or subcontractor to utilize any numerical quota, goal or ratio, or otherwise to discriminate against, or grant any preference to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
with respect to any aspect of employment, including but not limited
to recruitment, hiring, promotion, upgrading, demotion, transfer,
layafi, termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation,
and selection for training, including apprenticeship. Nor shall any
government contractor or subcontractor be determined to have violated this order due to a failure to adopt or attain any statistical
measures. Further, nothing in this order shall be interpreted to re·
quire or provide a legal basis for any government contractor or subcontractor to exclude or in any respect limit the participation of any
individual in any recruitment or training program on the basis of
race , color, religion, sex, or national origin.

A Civil Rights Lawyer
From a statement by Richard Seymour
of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law:
Under the present executive order, the
government can look at the same kinds of
evidence a court would examine to deter·
mine if a contractor is in violation of the
law. The draft [order] would bar the government from looking at any statistical
proof, no matter how compelling, and no
matter how great the weight a court
would give to such proof. . . . The draft
would leave nothing but the facade of the
present enforcement program, and would
gut everything of value in the program.
If the draft order is signed, it would be
the most extreme action the administra·
tion has yet taken in the civil rights area.
It would effectively limit the executive
order to rare cases in which direct proof
of intentional discrimination is available.
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the justice Department,
combined, file only a couple of hundred
fair employment lawsuits a year (out of al·
most 10,000 new cases filed under the
fair employment laws by private citizens.
each year), and the Labor Department's
monitoring of thousands of government
contractors each year under the present
executive order has been the govern·
ment's main weapon in combating job dis·
crimination. Dismantling it will be a great
comfort to bigots everywhere.

L-----------------

The National

As the debate on affirmative ac·
tion has emerged in recent years,
much attention has focused on
goals and. ti!n~s Ym!!5 quo.ta,s.
~not believe that nu·
merical goals for minority inclusion
in the workforce, by themselves,
constitute quotas. Business, partic·
ularly big business, sets goals and
timetables for every aspect of its
operations-profits, capital invest·
ment, productivity increases and
promotional potential for individu·
als. Setting goals and timetables
for minority and female participation is a way of measuring progress

~1\

Labor Secretary Brock
From an address by Labor Secretary
William E. Brock before the NAACP
convPntion in Dallas June 24:
I think this country is going to have
some form of affirmative action for a
considerable period of time into the fu.
ture. There is a distinction which you}'
can make between absolute numbers
and quotas and so-caJ.led goals approaches.
But we as a country have lived for
200 years with a major part of our
population in remarkable disadvantage.
And it takes some time to recover from
that. Maybe we [the generation of white
Americans] were not here then. Bu~ ·
that does not change the obligation we
have as citizens to respond to that situation.

Associ~tion

From congressional testimony
on July 10 on behalf of the National Association of Manufactur·
ers by William S. McEwen, director of equal opportunity affairs for
Monsanto Company:

yt

From the Supreme Court decision in
Teamsters v. United States (1977):
... [O]ur cases make it unmistak·
ably clear that "[s]tatistical analyses
have served and will continue to serve
an important role" in cases in which
the existence of discrimination is a dis·
puted issue .... We have repeatedly
approved the use of statistical proof,
where it reached proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima fa cie case of racial discrimination in jury selection cases . ...
Statistics are equally competent in
proving employment discrimination.

of Manufacturers

and focusing on potential discrimination.
· Industry recognizes, however
that goals and timetables can become masks for rigid quotas. We
oppose any regulations that turn
positive programs for measuring
progress into unwielding rules On
the number of minorities and
women who must encompass the
workplace. Yet, vQhm~s set
by corporations lOrworkforce par·
ticipation should not be viewed as
eroding equal opportunity objec·
tive.s. These goals are merely a
recognition that ~eju
dices remain in our soctety. A:ssur·
ing eqWlr oppo uruty, at least for
the next few years to come, means
we must be ever vigilant in facing
these prejudices and overcoming
them ....

'l

\

II

.....

'

_

T
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Gzant 8tep Backward

HE REAGAN administration has under study
what could be its most regressive step on civil
rights in five years in office. Circulating within
the justice Department and the White House is a proposed revision of the executive order on which is
based the government's least known but possibly
most important civil rights enforcement program.
This is the ~tive a£_tion program quietly om py
tM_~~ent for federal contractors. It
covers l>erhapsarourth~ork force,
and extends to ahnost every major company and industry. T!l dQ...business with the government a._comh
·v
·
s. A large company must show there is a reasonable relationship between the racial and other characteristics of its work
force and the makeup of the work force at large from
which it draws.
Opponents within the administration, said to include the attorney general, Edwin Meese, and the
assistant attorney general for civil rights, William
Bradford Reynolds, would eviscerate the order by
stripping out the racial and other statistics now
used as reference points. An excerpt from their ·
proposed rewording is on the op-ed page today. So
are some very different views of the matter; one is
the view of the Supreme Court.
Those arguing for the more detached approach
say it is the only correct one for the government to
take: the governme
ust be colorblind. We sym-

' ~

.11~

pathize with that. We a ee as well that affiunative
et1mes has been taken too r,
action can ~nd
to the w!nt. of stri&t r~jal an<i...Qtber: QI.!Q!jls. But
the proposed position goes too far as well, in the
opposite direction. It places ideology above reality;
it pretends as if there is no past.
This proposal, which would effectively destroy the
government's ability to stop discrimination in taxpayer-financed jobs, was not sought by industry. "We've
gotten used to it, frankly," a spokeswoman for the
National Association of Manufacturers said of the
present rule. From the other side of the table, the executive council of the AFL-CIO has said a weakening
of the rule would be "a giant step backward in the
fight against employment discrmination."
Twenty years of affirmative action by the government, unions and private employers have
brought about dramatic improvement in the lot of
minorities and women in the work force. T~
er~quirem._ents hav
ver involve
uo sthat IS a str w an-and ey ave en accepted
in every segment of the economy, even by those
most resistant at the start. The objective has been
a level of fair employment that will make all goals
and timetables unnecessary. But that day has not
yet come. The proposed new order would gratuitously disturb a program that, for now, is doing
more to unify society than divide it. The program
should be left alone.

lfp/ss 09/17/85

CLERKS SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

My Clerks

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Sept. 16, 1985

Affirmative Action

We have granted the Cleveland affirmative action
case, and probably will grant another one (I do not recall
the name)

at the September

Conference.

30

The

issue

is

another one of national importance that we will consider
during the 1985 Term.

As I dictate this, I do not recall whether one of
you

has

been

assigned

If one

the Cleveland case.

read

everything that has been written on the subject, it could
well take the entire Term.

There must be a score or more

of lower court decisions, as well as law review articles.
The most relevant decisions of
their names believe

the

are Bakke,
lower

this Court -

as I

recall

Fullilove, Weber and Stotts.

courts

have

been

reading

Stotts

I
as

~

limited to situations where a quota plan was
collective

bargaining

agreement,

although

applied~

there

a
is

language in Stotts a good deal broader than this.
In general, a distinction has been drawn between
affirmative

action

programs

and

quotas

or

mathematical

In many situations the distinction is far

"goals".
clear.

Most

of

what

haphazard reading)
the

Post

-

management

have

read

(and

it

I

wrote

program

achieve

in

could

arbitrary

been

that non-mandatory goals adopted by
a

more

representative

work

consisting of women and minorities are valid.
what

has

- even including a recent editorial in

suggests
to

I

from

Bakke,

have

quotas,

my

and

said

in

In view of

Fullilove,

support

unless

particularly

those

it

such

a

camouflaged

that

persons innocent of any discrimination.

force

displaced

I would find

it

difficult to say that the Equal Protection Clause does not
- as its plain language states in

the

absence of

invalidate a quota plan

proof of discrimination against those

employed to displace innocent persons.
A

difficult

area

is

the

extent

to

which

discrimination by an employer generally affects the type
of plan adopted.

The easiest case is where there has been

a pattern of not hiring qualified women and minorities who
have sought employment.

Those discriminated against have

a

d iff icul t

strong

particular

case.

A more

individual

can

be

case

identified

arises
as

where

having

no

been

discriminated against, and yet it may be deduced from the
population mix and the composition of the work force that

there was a discriminatory intent with respect to women or
minorities.
I suggest that it may be desirable for two clerks
to work together on this problem.

Consideration should be

given to obtaining assistance from the library.
request

it

to

identify

the

best

law

review

We could
and

other

periodical discussion of the issues that are likely to be
decisive
elaborate
the

in these cases.
hearings

library

can

I

before
be

believe there also have been

congressional

committees,

and

in

identifying

the

quite

helpful

relevant portions of such hearings.
Perhaps the four of you could set aside a hour to
discuss this question,

and define more sharply than this

memo what needs to be examined carefully

an~ ,

exactly how

the library may be able to help.
As

difficult

I

have

problem,

not
and

thought
have

read

carefully
nothing

thoughts expressed above are quite tentative.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

about
recently,

this
the

September 23, 1985
WYGANT DOCOUT-POW
84-1340

WYGANT, etal v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION, etal.

MEMO TO MIKE
I

note that this

is your case, and assume that you

are doing a bench memo.
four

of

the most

memo to you I
possibly
The

It may well be one of three or

important cases of this Term.

In this

will share some general thoughts that may

sharpen

collective

the

focus

bargaining

of your more
agreement

thorough study.

between

respondent

School Board and its teachers union (in effect since 1972)
provides that white teachers may be laid off even though
certain

I

minority

teachers

retained.

There had

Minorities

are

Black,

American

decendency."

with

less

seniority

are

been no history of discrimination.

defined

to

Indians,

include

"employees

Orientals,

or

of

who

are

Spanish

The agreement further provides:

"The goal of [the School Board policy]
shall be to have at least the same perce~ tage of
minority
racial
representat i on
on
each
individual [teaching] staff as is represented by
the {i~ po~tion of the Jackson Public
Schoo s."

Ci....'J/.. {

'~

The petitioners are white teachers who initially were laid
off under this CBA provision.

The briefs state that all

L..

of

the petitioners have

been reemployed except one,

but

that the case is not moot because back pay is - or maybe involved,
~ogram")

and

the

program

remains in effect.

(called

"affirmative

action

I understand that injunctive

relief is sought.
At the outset, Mike, I make this comment:
four

categories

of

minorities.

Apparently

There are
these

four

would be added together, when the total number of teachers
correspond
Orientals

to
or

the

total

persons

of

number
Spanish

of

Blacks,

decent

in

population, the "goals" would be realized.

the

Indians,
student

I would think

there would be considerable argument as who are Orientals
and

particularly who are persons of

Dan Ortiz's
father

)_,vV' ~
ljl f?"t' 'f>t;
A ~r
trl

~~

~

father

being

from

was

a

Spa in.

Spanish decendency.

first generation American,
Moreover,

as we

saw

from

his
the

statistics in the Bakke case, Orientals (and there is no
ref ini tion as

to who is an Oriental)

often are brighter

than a majority of Whites with whom they may compete.

But

I do not think this senseless provision in the CBA merits

~) ::eca::anasai;a~:n:::~entTehde t::u::r:r::::::l w~::u::in::d::

l~

~jr"'

programs designed to benefit Blacks at the expense of
Whites ..

~~
~

~.

we do not write on a clean slate, although I do not
~lieve

a majority of the Court in any of our cases - or

perhaps

even

adding

up

votes

in

different

cases

-

has

on the proper standard of analysis in this type of

~reed

Nor

case.
program

have

or

mentioned

we

had

quota

before

program

us

an affirmative action

exactly

in my general memorandum,

like

this.

As

apparently

I

the most

relevant cases

(apart from many cases that state general

~inciples

of

equal

Fullilove,

and

amici,

differ

Bakke

The

Stotts.
as

to which of

and

Fullilove

true that Weber did not
Title VII case
racial
~reed

are

parties,

Bakke,

and

these cases

the

Weber,
numerous

is closest or

are

the most

It

relevant.

involve state action.

is

It was a

in which there had been a long record of

discrimination,

and

the

company

and

its

union

in

this

case

on an affirmative action program.

The

DC

and

distinguished
had

law)

As I read the SG's amicus brief, he thinks

most relevant.
that

protection

been

a

the

Court

of

Appeals

Stotts primarily on

--court

order

enforcing

the ground
a

that

discrimatory

there
layoff

plan, whereas here there was a voluntary agreement between
,...-

the

_____..,_..;:_

School

Board

and

the

labor

union.

The

petitioners

assert a denial of equal protection by state action, and I

.....

think it clear that a school board and a union could not
agree to deprive employees of constitutional rights.
~

The

courts

below

~easonableness",

of

Appeals

was

"substantial"
on

a

standard

of

Pet. P. lOA, relying primarily on Court

decisions.

discrimination

minorities

applied

Although

made,

and
the

the

of

there

was

under representation"

of

DC

"chronic
school

finding

no

found

faculties,

that

and

therefore

-

it

reasoned that "the Fourteenth Amendment would permit" the
voluntary
protect

adoption
minority

'!he CA largely
was

called

comparable
teachers

"an

affirmative

teachers

adopted

an
to

of

from

the

were

the effects of

the DC' s

affirmative

opinion.

action

quota

system

off

without

laid

action

in

plan

to

layoffs."

Although

this

plan,

it

was

quite

Bakke

because

white

regard

to

seniority or

comparative ability simply because they were white.
Identifying
type

of

case.

the proper
I

am

standard is critical in this

inclined

to agree

with

the

SG and

petitioners that the "reasonableness" standard adopted by
the

DC

and

CA6

is

discrimination.
have

ever

standard.

..

where

there

is

racial

Yet, I am not at all sure that five of us

agreed
As

inappropriate

on

stated

the
in

phraseology

of

Bakke,

reiterated

and

an

applicable
in

my

5.

concurring

opinion

discrimination

is

in

Fullilove,

based

solely

I

on

think
race

that

the

traditonal

"strict scrutiny" standard should be applicable.
not always used precisely these words.
Justice's

opinion

dissatisfaction with
identify

the

standard

in

Fullilove

the Chief's
he

I

was

failure

applying.

where

We have

joined the Chief
despite

some

specifically to
The

closest

he

came to doing this was as follows:
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria
must
necessarily
receive
a
most
searchin~xam tn~tion to make sure that it dOes
not conflict with constitutional guarantees."
448 u.s. 448 at 491.
Only Justice White and I joined the Chief's opinion.
~stices

Stewart and Rehnquist dissented in Fullilove, in

which Justice Stewart quoted from Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy as follows:

I

"Our
Constitution
is color
blind,
and
neither
knows
nor
tolerates
classes
among
citizens....
The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or his
color •.• ".
Justice Stewart then stated that the
"equ
=
a.;;.
l__.P
.;;.;r;;..o
~
te
.;:..g.U,o n stan ~ ard of the Constitution
has
one
clear
and
central
meaning
it
absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by
governme~ t.
Tnaf sta ndara mus t be met by e very
state under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Any official action
that treats a person differently on account of
his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect
and presumptively invalid."

Vo

Although I did not join Justice Stewart's opinion in
FUllilove for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion,
I

view his

standard

as

substantially similar

I simply agreed in Ful~that the findings

s::::rutiny".

by the Congress and the general ap
statute

to "strict

demonstrated

a

compelling

1cation of a federal
governmental

interest

that met the test.
In

view

Blackmun

of

have

Mirshall's

what

said

opinion

in
in

Justices
Bakke

Brennan,

and

Fullilove),

other
it

Marshall

cases

is

and

(but

likely

CF.

that

at

least these three Justices will vote to affirm CA6 in this
case.

I would guess that the Chief Justice, Rehnquist and

O'Connor will be inclined to share my tentative view that
at least a high level of scrutiny
as

"heightened

oourts

scrutiny")

must

below gr ieviously erred

reasonableness

Justice

test.

(sometimes referred to

be applied,

and

that the

in the applying

simply a

White

joined

the

Chief

Justice in Fullilove, but he was with the Brennan group in
Bakke.
Justices

Justice

Stevens,

Stewart

and

with

the

Rehnquist,

Chief

Justice,

avoided

any

and
clear

identification of a standard in their Bakke opinion.
did

not

reach

the

constitutional

question.

Thus,

They
the

outcome of this case is likely to depend on the votes of

..

7.

In your review

either Justice White or Justice Stevens.

of the cases, Mike, you might bear this in mind.
I would have some doubt as to whether the plan before
us

(actually

normal

it

is

closer

affirmative

to

quota

action

type

attention

reasonableness

test.

No

implementation

of

plan

Black

available

teachers

a

the

to

as

system

plan)

the

was

even

to

of

the

in

objective

teachers
this

with

was

the

in part on a

to

equate

number

the

number

of

of minority pupils,

"role model"

theory.

a
the

qualified
number

qualified White teachers available in the community.
plan's

the

meets

given

number

compared

than

of
The

minority
justifying

-

But there is no

evidence in the record to support the role model theory,
and one can argue that intelligent minority students would
prefer to have the ablest teachers without regard to race
or

color.

In

this

case,

the

discrimination

was

with

respect to seniority - not other qualifications.

It

probably

will

be

clear,

from

the

foregoi~

rambling comments, that I am inclined to reverse CA6.
is

critically

important

to

consider

carefully

Justices White and Stevens have either written or
in the past.

It
what

joined

I would like to be able to anticipate their

Uo

arguments.

I could live with the Chief's rather off-hand

articulation in Fullilove of a standard, though I probably
~uld

explain -

this

a

as I did in that case -

heightened

level

of

scrutiny

why I considered
applicable

to

any

racial discrimination.
I would not join an opinion that forecloses approval
of the type of affirmative action plan that is so typical
in

both

public

and private

employment.

pursuant to which general goals -

...

stated,

and minorities and women -

This

is

a

not fixed quotas - are
if qualified -

may be

given priority in filling vacancies or new positions.
purpose

is

employees.

to

plan

The

increase the number of women and minority

There

are

a

good

many

variations

of

such

plans, but the type I would approve involves no layoff of
Whites simply because they are White.
My views are tentative, and I will welcome your more
carefully considered analysis and recommendations.
I add that I have not read any of the numerous amici
briefs.

You may find one or two on each side of this case

helpful and worth reading carefully.
LFP, JR •

.. .

1b:

Justice Powell

From:
~=

Mike
83-1340

Wygant et al. v. Jackson Board of Education

Set to be argued:

Wed. Nov. 6th

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
This memo is in response to questions raised during

yo~

conversation with Justice Stevens.
(1)

Justice Stevens stated that the layoff provision of tre

collective bargaining agreement was a form of "tenure" granted to
minority teachers.

That term does not appear in reference to

minority teachers in any relevant provision of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
~essing

Although I am now a little "gun-shy" about

at Justice Stevens' reasoning, the "tenure" theory is

probably his characterization of the argument made by resps in
fueir brief at p.l9 that without layoff protection for new
minority hires, no progress could be made toward increasing the
percentage of minority faculty, because they would be hired one
year only to be laid off the next spring.

That contention is

hlghly disputed by petrs, see Petrs' Reply Brief at 7-10.
The main reference to "layoffs" is found in the
Cbllective Bargaining Agreement at Article XII.

That provision

states that layoff shall be according to seniority, "except that
at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority

.'

,~

._ (

personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority
personnel employed at the time of the layoff."

The effect of

kticle XII is to place a cap on the number of minority teachers
that can be laid off.
~fore

the layoff, then only 10% of those laid off can be

minorities.
·~hall

If 10% of the faculty are minorities

Article IX also notes that recall from layoffs

be accomplished maintaining the minority ratio of teachers

which existed prior to the layoff."
~)

See J.A. at 13, 27.

Justice Stevens maintained that although "minority" was

defined broadly, this case actually only involves blacks.

At

J.A. 108 a chart displays the number of minority hires according
to race.
~anish

Because the American Indians, Asians and those of

descent were among the last hired, presumably they were

protected by the layoff provision.
(3)

There are four cases that involve one or more of these same

parties.

I will list them chronologically.
A.

Jackson Education Ass'n v. Jackson Board of

.Etlucation, No. 4-72340 (ED Mich Dec. 15, 1976)
J .A.

30)

(mem op found at

In the spring of 1974, when the Board saw that adhering

to the layoff provision would result in firing tenured teachers
if favor of retaining minority teachers still on probation, it
declined to follow the layoff provision.

Black teachers sued.

-

The Fed DC (ED Mich) held that the minority plaintiffs had not

---.

I I

~

,....--..

.... "'r

established any purposeful discrimination as required by
washington v. Davis, 426 us 229 (1976) sufficient to vest the
court with jurisdiction over its equal protection claim, and that
it lacked jurisdiction over their Title VII claims for failure to

tc

file a claim first with the EEOC.

Having determined that it

lacked jurisdiction over the federal claims, the court declined
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state contract claims.

a

Jackson Education Ass'n v. Jackson Board of

ffiucation, No. 77-0011484
August 31, 1979)

cz

(J.A. 40).

(Jackson County Circuit Court,
Plaintiffs in case A, supra, took

their state contract claims to state court.
~at

That court stated

it "has not been established that the board had

discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices.
minority representation on the faculty was the result of
racj_g1_..9.i~.~>~-~.~!J on."
~eir

J.A. at 43.

The
s ~tal

--

Plaintiffs prevailed on

argument that the layoff provision was not in conflict with

Michigan's Teacher Tenure Act.

c.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 546 F.Supp.

1195 (ED Mich 1982)

(App. to Cert. Pet. at 20a).

opinion below in this case.
memo.

This is the DC

It is fully described in the bench

The DC made no

discrimination, reasoning

that no such finding was necessary.
D.
(CA6 1984)

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F.2d 1152
(App. to Cert. Pet. at 2a).

The Ca decision below.

It adopted the reasoning of the DC, and made no finding of prior
discrimination.
~

DIE

wASUINGTON PosT .

TOTAL ASIAN-AMERICAN POPULAliO!..INCREASE
APRIL
. l, 1980-SEpt. 30, t-..1. . · ~
I

·a.lan Americana ,...,.....t 2.1 ~nt of the ·

.

aranta is ~• • "

transform .the
U.S. im#an1 population therei · Asian Am~ricans, in rece~t years port aafd. From 1980 to i9a.., 48
r the f~est..rowin_g segment of the
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

October 30, 1985

Mike

/~

No. 84-1340

~et+ 

Wygant, et al. v. Jackson Board of Education
Argued November 6, 1985

Cert to CA6

QUESTION PRESENTED
Does
school

the Equal Protection Clause permit a public

district

layoffs

to

adopt

Before

for

teacher

c::2-- ~ ;PC...-£.::~..,....-...to(....j~t,.c..-~
~~0uNrf7:~~ ~

the 1972-1973 school year,

bargaining agreement

( "CBA")

Education

Teachers

Michigan,
(Pet.

preferences

in the absence of findings by a qualified body of

prior disc rim ina t ion?

'·

racial

App.

and
called
2la) •

the
for

between the Jackson Board of
Association

layoffs on a

At about

f" •

~ •

the collective

that

of

Jackson,

strict seniority basis

time,

the Jackson School

2.

District began to experience racial tension; some fighting
broke

out.

As

part

of

the

School

Roard's

voluntary

efforts to integrate the entire school system,
Committee was formed.
and

from

student

other

a Citizens

Recommendations from this Committee

sources

integration.

dealt

The

with

School

faculty

Board

as

felt

well
that

as
its

efforts to integrate the faculty to the extent it desired
were

hampered

under

a

by

strict

some minority

layoff

lack

seniority

of

rejected

Eventually,
provision

job

security

system.

job protection

overwhelmingly
layoffs.

the

a

for

new hires

It sought to

into the CBA.
straight

·---------

implement

The teachers

freeze

on

minority

agreement was reached on a modified

that

protected

new

minority

hires

by

placing a percentage cap on the number of minority faculty
"-------~----~-------------

that could be laid off.

Specifically, the agreement stated

- -· - - ----- ---........._

that

"at

no

time

will

there

be

a

greater

percentage

of

minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of
minority
(Pet.
have

personnel

App.
at

3a,

least

employed

same

representation on each

percentage

as

at 13a,
those

S~sh

who

time

of

the

of

minority

individual staff as_i. s

by ~ t ~:...,~~on of
(id.

the

layoff"

The ~ go~ of the CBA was

23a).
the

at

the

"to

racial

repr:.esented

Jackson Public Schools"

23a,

32a) •

The agreement defined minorities

are

Black,

Arner ican

descendancy.

the 1972 school year,

It was

Indian,

Oriental or

implemented at

of

~

the start of

and has been in effect ever since.

-u..ol-.£.u~?

~~?

a-,~~~~~?

3.

The current version of

the agreement

is set to expire in

1988.
Petitioners are Jackson teachers who were laid off
in

accordance

with

the

layoff

provision

while

teachers with less seniority were retained.
suit

in

ED Mich.

claiming

that

the

minority

Petrs brought

layoffs violated

&jual Protection Clause and Title Vll. 1

the

motions~

On cross

for summary judgment the DC dismissed all of petrs claims. ~
A.

The Opinion in the District Court
The

America

v.

Officers'

DC opinion
Weber,

US

Association v.

cert. denied,
Kaiser

443

hinges on United

Young,

452 US 938

Aluminum

preferential

Co.

entry

193

(1981).

that
into

a

(1979)

Steelworkers of

and

608 F.2d

Detroit
671

Police

(CA6 1979),

Weber involved a plan by

granted

certain

skilled

job

minorities

training

a

program.

The Court held that Title VII does not prohibit a private
'--

employer

-

from voluntarily adopting

a plan that granted a

------------------------- ___________ _

limited preference to minorities
in job advancement,
__ _____......__---

absent a
the DC' s

--

-

even

judicial finding of employer discrimination.
In
""'- ~ ~,
view, Detroit Police extended the reasoning and
I\

holding of Weber to public employers and to constitutional
violations.

In the DC's view,

Detroit Police established

the threshold proposition that an affirmative action plan

1 The Title VII claims are not pursued on appeal here.
In fact
the SG offers that petrs were barred from suing under Title VII
for failure to file administrative claims with EEOC, and thus are
completely relegated to their constitutional claims.

I

4.

by a public employer may grant preferences based on race,
even

in

the

absence

without violating
DC

analysis,

of

finding

of

discrimination,

the Equal Protection Clause.

there

objective of

any

were

two

(1)

issues:

Under the

whether

the plan was constitutional and

(2)

the

whether

the plan was reasonably related to that objective.
1.

6?~~ve

The

of the Layoff Provision:

The DC

held that a plan that prefers minorities can satisfy the
Equal

Protection

Clause

if

"there

is

a

sound

basis

for

concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial
and

chronic,"

White,

438 us at

Bakke,

Marshall

and

362

Blackmun) •

Brennan, ~1-

(opinion of

While

in most employment

discrimination cases the evidence of underrepresentation is
based on a comparison of

the percentage of m.inor i ties

in

the employer's work force with the percentage of minorities
in

the

relevant

labor

pool,

see,

~,

EEOC

v.

United

Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (CA4 1980), the DC thought that
approach was too limiting for

the present case.

Instead,

the DC determined that it was "appropriate to compare the
percentage

of

minority

minority~dents

percentage of
Pet.

App.

clear

3la-34a.
the

Only
fact

in

the

percentage

minority

the

relevant

labor

such an approach,
that

that highly unusual

that

to

of

.SLL£,

in the student body, rather than with the

minorities

takes account of
Applying

teachers

teachers are

standard,

teachers

were

said
role

market."
the DC,

t2..h.c

models. ~

the DC thought it
substantially

and

chronically underrepresented on the Jackson faculty in the

5.

years prior to the adoption of the racial preference.

The

DC also reasoned that a finding of specific discrimination
was not necessary,
Bakke

(stating

citing the Brennan,
that

.. it

is enough

[of a preferential benefit]

et al.

opinion in

that each recipient

is within a general class of

persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination, ..
438 us at 363).
the

objective

faculty

with

For these reasons,
of

the

matching

the

percentage

of

the DC concluded that

percentage
minority

of

minority

students

was

a

constitutionally permissible objective.
2.
Objective:
a

The

Relationship

of

the

Preference

to

the

The DC also reasoned that any plan that granted

preference

to

one

race

for

a

permissible

objective

satisfies the Equal Protection Clause if it is reasonably
related
listed

to

the

accomplishment of

several

factors

why

it

that objective.
thought

passed this test of .. reasonableness ..

the

The DC

layoff

plan

(Pet. App. 28a, 3la),

including the fact that it was a temporary measure, that it
was

collectively

bargained

and

that

it

did

not

.. unnecessarily trammel .. the interests of white teachers.
B.

from

The Decision of the Court of Appeals (

~ /i-C~~~

u.-...
. A-_,
·"' ~---~1
r'_...,.
"""-" '-""~
~.
.- ......--~
The CA6 adopted the reasoning of the DC and quoted

it

extensively.

The

only

addition

it

made

was

an

attempt to distinguish Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts,
opinion.
Stotts

104
The

S.Ct.

2576

(1984),

CA distinguished

involved

a

court

decided

Stotts

ordered

plan

on

after
the

while

the

basis
the

DC
that

plan

at

6.

issue in this case was the product of a voluntary agreement
between the School Board and the teachers' union.
II. DISCUSSION

standard
facts.

Both opinions

below applied

and

wrong

came

to

legal

the

incorrect

conclusions

legal

from

the

Because the facts of this case make it likely that

a majority can be formed for reversal,

~

~~
this case takes on ~

added importance as a vehicle to formulate an authoritative

--

'--""---~

majority opinion that clearly sets out the governing legal

---

standards in reverse discrimination.

By doing so the Court

may avoid opinions like those below, where the judges were
literally pulling

legal

principles out of

dissents and concurrences.

a

grab-bag of

The Court also could position

itself articulately to deal with the more complex reverse
discrimination issues later

this term.

Because this case

--

is important both as an opportunity to establish a general
---------~--

framework for deciding reverse discrimination cases and as
an opportunity to decide the specific issues in this case,
I have divided the discussion into two major parts.

In the

first part I describe a general framework of analysis that
can be used
second

part,

specific

in all reverse discrimination cases.
I

issues

unusually long,

apply
in

that

this

framework

case.

complex memo,

While
I

of

analysis

that

makes

In the
to

the

for

an

believe it is helpful to

set out at the start of the term the principles that will
govern in all f QYL rey erse discrimination cases this year :
q~
A. The Proper Analysis of Reverse Discrimination Cases ~ ~

7.

The

proper

analysis

of

reverse

discrimination

cases is no mystery; it was first set forth in your opinion
in

Bakke. 2

In

that

opinion,

you

subjected

reverse

discrimination to traditional equal protection analysis and
applied

strict

sensible,
wherein

it

was

this

That

scrutiny.
compelled

Court

made

by

"race"

result

the
a

vast

suspect

not

only

body

of

was
cases

category.

But

while your opinion in Bakke recognized that discrimination
against whites fits within the rubric of race as a suspect
classification,

it

did

not

engage

in

the

theoretical

illusion that government action that grants a preference to
minorities
favors

is always equivalent to government action that

whites

recognized

over

the

blacks

possibility

or

other

that

some

minorities.
government

It

action

favoring certain minorities could pass strict scrutiny.

-

Strict

scrutiny

review

under

traditional

equal ~~

~

protection analysis is now a well-established framework of
analysis.

I

When

racial

classifications

impinge

upon

2 I will refer to four leading opinions on reverse
discrimination, Re~ent s of t fi e University of California v. Bakke,
438 US 265 (1978) (Bakke); United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 US 193 (1979) v (Weber); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 us
448 (1980) vfFullilove); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984) ~ (Stotts).
In deriving a proper
method of analysis, I will attempt to reflect the views of the
Justices over time, with the idea that some movement can be
d ~tected.
For that reason, I have prepared a short statement of
each c ase, with the votes of the Justices.
It may be helpful to
refer to that paper from time to time, located in Appendix A •.
Appendix B, per your request, is an attempt to predict the votes
of the various Justices, with an eye to determining who will be a
swing vote.

.

..

8.

individual

rights,

the

individual

"is

entitled

to

a

judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear

Lr-~

on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental
Powell,

interest."

0 1oo k s

.
.
.
f lrst
1nqu1ry
making

the

t~o

There are

J.).

438 US at 299

Bakke,

basic

lines of

(opinion of

i119uiry.

The

to t h e purpose t h e government h as f or ..,............ /-

.k

classification;

under

strict

scrutiny

,the

~

~4U.•-r

purpose

must

cases,

it

government

be
is

possible

to

have

classification,
been

an

compelling.

but

a

under

reverse
this

compelling

only

in

those

discrimination

analysis

purpose
cases

for

for

a

where

.

racial

----=

cl~§si f ication

---3

remedying that discrimination.
The
remedial

____

ability

context

is

constitutional
distinction

-

to take
____..........
strictly

..__

or

between

serves

-- --

race

into

premised

the

racial

there

actual ....t} ndi,!1.9_ of_y r i c:_r ,..,9. iscr imination,

government's

the

In

and

the puJpose

has

~.J

the '"

of P~··'
~

~

~ ... -c..,... .... "... «.-

account

on

a

statutory

viol ~ions:

permissible

remedial

in

finding

the
of

action

impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of a
constitutional

or

statutory

violation,

the

legitimate

3 In employment discrimination cases, without taking race into
account it would not be possible "to make [the victims] whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination," Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 us 405, 418
(1975).
In the school desegregation cases the Court has
realistically determined that without taking race into account in
the remedy, a plan that simply enjoined future discrimination
without dismantling ·the discriminatory superstructure would
"render illusory the promise of [Brown I]," North Carolina Board
of Education v. Swann, 402 US at 45-46.

~

9.

interest

in

creating

a

race-conscious

remedy

is

not

compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has
found that such a violation has occurred."

us at 498 (Powell, J., concurring)

Fullilove, 448

(emphasis added).

Thus,

one of the key issues in any reverse discrimination case
whether

there

has

been

a

proper

finding

of

~s ~

prior ~
&..c.-

discrimination.

Without such a

-

finding,

the government's

~

.e:.-)

interest is not compelling.

sd2

~4~

There are two requirements for a proper finding of ot/
-~
First, the government body that~prior discrimination.
~
attempts to impose a race-conscious remedy must have the
authority to act in response to identified discrimination.
Second,

the

government

body

must

make

findings

that ~-

demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination by the
persons or entity against whom the remedy runs.

~.s

~

Fullilove, -~-

448 us at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
There
foreshadowed

is

another
consideration
not
re-atly
~~-------------------------------------rior cases that is essential to

in

establishing a compelling government purpose.
justification for
that

they

are

a4-o

The entire

race-based government classifications is

an attempt

to remedy prior discrimination.

What the earlier cases do not discuss is that at some point
the

entity

that

accomplished
discrimination.

has discriminated

its
The

goal

of

in

the past will

remedying

its

important principle is that the

-

have
prior

B

I

is achieving the rough equivalency, not forever ma in taining
it.

If it can be determined that at some point in the past

~ .

10.
~~

~~··-~

the entity accomplished this goal, then, absent a finding a ~
further

discrimination,

its

power

to

engage

.,C . - <.I .. race- ~

in

~

conscious remedial action has come to an end.
If accomplishment of the goal
then~licies

~

is not focused on,

~,4~~

that were originally instituted to

remedy prior discrimination will entrench
after the remedy has been accomplished.
"reinforce

habitual ways

of

thinking

thems...e.J....ves _long

Such policies will
in terms of classes

instead of individuals," Fullilove, 448 us at 547 (Stevens,
J. dissenting, paraphrasing Powell, J. in Bakke) and "delay
the

time when race wili become a truly irrelevant, or at

least

insignificant,
are

classifications

factor,"
enforced

accomplishment of the remedy,
as at tempts
the
The

id.

at

past

545.

When

the

date

purpose

of

the

they are no longer justified

to remedy prior d i scr imina tion,

government's

racial

is

no

and therefore

longer

compelling. ~

sec'-o_ n_d__l_i_n_e__o_ f __a_n_a_l_y_s.........is___
u_n_d_e_r__s_t_r_ i _c _t __s_c_r_u_t_ i ny

is

~~-

4.,

given a compelling purpose, the method used
,,
4~
"The means
accomplish the goal is harrowly tailored.

whether,

to"h..~-

1

selected must be narrowly drawn to fulfill
purpose," Fullilove at

498,

the government

and only "when effectuating a

limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of
prior discrimination" is it possible for the government to
require
remedy.

innocent
!d.

propositions

at

persons
484.

"share

There

are

that can be said about

strict scrutiny analysis;

--

to

the

burden"

very
this

few

of

the

general

second prong of

it is necessarily case-specific.

11.

For

example,

improving

in

Bakke you

suggested

the delivery of

that

health-care

the purpose of

services

to poorer

communities might be legitimate, but that there was simply
insufficient

proof

that

preferential

admission

of

minorities into medical school was directly related to the
accomplishment of
in

Fullilove

prong;

he

minority
the

that purpose.

also

felt

was

that

based
the

dissen ~p

Justice Stevens'

on

10%

the

"narrowly

set-aside

$

tailored"

provision

for

business enterprises was not closely related to

stated

goals

of

eliminating

discrimination

in

government contracting.
These examples simply demonstrate that the Court
takes seriously the requirement that the means used by the
government

to

accomplish

a

........

compelling

... ~

purpose

1'[\U g.A<.
-

~

be ~-

purpose.
Because

in

many

classification

at

issue,

discrimination

classification

the

government
interest

compelling

a

articulate

reverse

cases

is

it
cases

narrowly

is

my

will

tailored.

two general principles under

be

in

the

impression
turn

able

will

on

to

~
~~-

racial

that

most

whether

There are

~

at

the
least

"narrowly tailored" analysis

that help distinguish proper race-conscious classifications
from improper ones:
(1)

[ airing goals versus
the

layoff ~ .

logical

______

......
The "narrowly tailored"

prong

provides

principle

that

cases

involving preferential hiring or advancement

tt

-

explains
\'

_

why

m~e

-

allowed, while cases involving layoffs will seldom if _eyer l.J4Lt
~

---------~.:..:::.:........:.:..:.;::.;:_;;.;..;;..::.-~------

)1~/.1;~~

12.

pass

strict

Hiring

scrutiny.

goals

are

a

much

narrower

means of accomplishing the government's anti-discrimination
purpose than a program that requires an innocent person to

--------..,

be fired.

I

by

a

which

think that is one of the cardinal principles
affirmative

proper

distinguished

from

an

improper

action
plan,

plan

for

the

can

be

reasons

explained below.
In

Weber

the

Court

justified

its

position

affirming a race-based job training program by noting that J

~ , ~ the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of

0

the white employees," arid that the plan was a job training
program that did not require any existing employees to lose
their jobs.

That consideration makes sense.

The burden on

innocent whites is much greater when one is deprived of an
existing

job

than

it

is

when

one

is

deprived

of

one

particular employment opportunity or chance to advance in
an existing career.
v.

Odegaard,

opportunity
School.
Idaho,

94
to

For example, petr DeFunis in DeFunis

S.Ct.
attend

1704
the

(1974)

temporarily

University

of

lost

the

Washington

Law

Yet he had already been accepted at the Oregon,
Gonzaga and Willamette

Law Schools.

At worst,

would have lost only one opportunity among many.
certainly
layoff

not

the

provision

case
causes

when

a

minority

someone,

usually

That is

preference
a

he

junior

in

a

union

member with limited opportunities and completely dependent
on his or her wages, to lose a job.

Because the harm to an

innocent individual race is so much greater when he or she

13.

is

fired

from a

income,

dignity

require

the

present
and

state

job,

with the consequent loss of

fulfillment,
to

I

demonstrate

would
that

at

it

a

minimum

would

not

be

possible to achieve the same result, even if on a slightly
slower

timetable,

exception

to

by

that

is

hiring

goals

alone.

The

only

the already accepted principle

that

innocent whites can be displaced in order to provide "makewhole

relief"

to

the

actual,

individuai

victims

of

discrimination, cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 us 717 (1974);
Fullilove,
(no

448 US at

relief

should

530 n.
be

12

(Stewart,

allowed

that

dissenting)

J.,

operates

"against

innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their
own race" except to "make whole the identified victims of
racial discrimination").

(2)

Who is benefited by the racial preference?

principle

under

determining
examines

the

whether

who

"narrowly

a

racial

benefits

from

tailored"

A second
prong

classification

the

racial

is

for

proper

preference.

The

important principle is that the racial preference, in order
to be narrowly tailored, must only benefit those groups for
whom there is a finding that they have suffered from prior
discrimination.

That

discrimination

against

classification
preference
that

it

benefits

is

not

is,

if

there

blacks,

narrowly

to blacks and Asians.

is
to

is a

common

for

a

a

random

then

tailored

the
if

it

racial classification

...

racial
grants

a

Prior cases demonstrate

selection

~.

finding of prior

of

this

to extend
country's

14.

minorities,

see

admissions

for

Bakke,
Blacks,

438

us

at

Chicanos,

274

Asians

(preferential
and

American

Indians): Fullilove, 448 US at 535, 546 (racial preference
for Negroes, Spanish speakers, Orientals,

When racial classifications seek to benefit

and Aleuts)
groups

that

are

not

discrimination,
tailored enough
extent

that

Fullilove,
why a

Indians, Eskimos

the

such

of

a

classifications

finding
are

to pass strict scrutiny,

they

benefit

448 US at 546

* * *

subject

those

(Stevens,

of

not

narrowly

at least

groups.

prior

to the

See,

~,

J., dissenting)

("Just

Negro or Spanish-speaking investor should have

a preferred status in bidding on a construction contract in
Alaska--or

a

preference

citizen
in

of

Miami

Eskimo
or

ancestry

Detroit--is

should

have

difficult

a
to

understand").
The principle that racial classifications can only
benefit groups that are

the object of a finding of prior

discrimination falls

in the middle of Justice Brennan, et

al. 's

the

based,

position

that

class-wide

identifiable,
benefited.

relief

government
and

can engage

the SG' s

in

broad-

position that only

individual victims of discrimination can be

You ha ~ previou~ rejec ~ stice Br ~ nan's

position as untenable

in the

light of strict scrutiny:

recommend that you also reject the SG's position.

I

I

For all SG-

its citations, the SG's brief actually boils down to a bald ~~~
assertion:
'the government's interest in remedying the
effects of prior discrimination is only compelling when it

15.

benefits
see

the

actual

nothing

about

intrinsically true.
case

law.

Instead,

the results of
effect of
past
39,

system

that

the

See,
(merely

following

a

discrimination.'
that

I

makes

it

It certainly is not supported by the
Court has consistently looked

its decisions

(1971)

prior

proposition

its remedies:

violations.
41

victims of

has

it has examined whether
resulted

e.g.,

McDaniel v.

maintaining

history

in

of

an

a

the

remedy of

Barresi,

to

the

402 US

anti-discriminatory

violations

would

leave

in

place "the status quo that is the very target" of the antidiscrimination effort).

When there has been an authorized

finding of prior discrimination, the government's interest
goes

beyond

victims--it

just
also

reconstructing

ensuring
has

things

as

reparations

a
they

to

compelling
would

have

wrong never occurred--a traditional remedial
is

an

1nterest

wrongdoer

-------------------------~
that
is not vindicated by

identifiable
in

interest
been

had

task. 4
allowing

the
That
the

to escape any responsibility simply because the

victims cannot be found, since many of the effects of their
wrongdoing are still in place.
III.

APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE

4

'.

done the same thing in securities cases when the
of fraud or insider trading cannot be found--the
e stockholde s, some of whom may not be have
is vastly different,
equitable remedial powers go

16.

In
framework

the

for

above

analysis

setting

out

reverse discrimination cases,

a

the

general
following

points were made:
(1)

Reverse

equal

discrimination cases

protection

are

to

regular
any

that

requires

which

analysis,

subject

classification based on race be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest.
(a)

The

government 1 s

interest

-<-.

in

remedying

prior discrimination, when it is based on an actual finding

-------------------------------

of prior discrimination, is compelling.
(b)
prior
that
has

The

discrimination
the

been

remedy

has

government 1 s
is

only

interest

compelling

been accomplished.

accomplished,

the

government

in

up

to

Once
has

no

remedying
the

point

that remedy
compelling

interest in maintaining a system of racial preferences that
discriminate

against

persons

innocent

any

of

discrimination.
(2)

In

order

to

survive

strict

scrutiny,

the

racial

classification must be narrowly tailored.
(a) A classification designed to remedy prior
discrimination that involves layoffs of innocent whites, as
opposed to a mere hiring preference, can only be narrowly

----

tailored if it benefits the actual,
prior discrimination
(b)

requires

that

the

--in the form of

The

8

narrowly

racial

individual victims of
8

make-whole relief.

tailored 8

preference

only

8

prong

also

benefit

those

17.

of

victims

actual

the

as

identified

groups

prior

discrimination.
When these principles are applied to the facts of
the

present

case,

I

think

it

is

clear

that

the

layoff

provision at issue cannot pass the test of strict scrutiny.
In this section, I conclude that only one characterization
of the School Board's interest in the layoff provision can
possibly be compelling, and that even assuming a compelling
purpose,

the provision is not narrowly tailored enough to

pass strict scrutiny.
A.

Is the Asserted State Interest Compelling?
The

School

Board

briefs
in

differ

support

on

of

the

the

exact

layoff

interest of

provision.

the

Petrs

note that Article VII of the CBA sets forth the policy of
actively seeking - minority personnel.

In that same article,

it is stated that the "goal of such policy shall be to have
at

least

the

same

percentage

of

minority

racial

representation on each individual staff as is represented
by the student population of the Jackson Public Schools."
Later,

in the layoff provision

(Article XII)

it is stated

that layoff shall be according to seniority,

"except that

at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority
personnel employed at the time of the layoff."

From the

relationship

conclude

between

the

two

provisions,

petrs

that the goal of the layoff provision is the same as the
general goal of the CBA,

.. .
~-

that is, eventual accomplishment

18.

of a ratio of minority faculty equal to the percentage of
minority students.
On the other

- --

hand,

resp argues

that

the goal of

~

the layoff provision is different from the general

hiring ~

goal

layoff

stated

provision

in

is

integrating

Article
simply

the

VII.

to

faculty,

The

goal

preserve
by

of

the

limiting

the

gains

made

layoffs of

in

minority

personnel so that the percentage level prior to layoffs is
maintained.
against

a

"The

language

'Catch-22'

would be hired,

only

was

designed

as

to

protect

situation wherein minority
to be

teachers

immediately laid off,

thereby

continuing a pattern of racial exclusion of blacks from the
previously segregated Jackson Public Schools," Resp. Br. at
23.
a

Viewed in this light, the layoff provision is part of

remedy

for

the prior practice of discrimination

in the

hiring of teachers.
~

There
positions.
that

the

As

is
in

evidence
Bakke,

classification
The

purpose.

first

it
was

to

support

both

is probably

safer

motivated

by

(that

purpose

percentage of minority students)

of

justifying

a

racial

because

of
it

----

is

discrimination.

analysis,

classification,

this

matching

one
the

addition,

the

As a basis
"role-model

In terms of the general

purpose

not even intended
In

than

is admittedly based on the

theory" clearly is not compelling.
framework

these

to assume

more

concept of "role-models" for minority students.
for

of

is

to be a
this

not

compelling

remedy for

particular

past

theory

19.

rejects

the

need

for

a

finding

of

prior

discrimination,

since it focuses on the existing need of minority students
for

same-race role models.

reasonable
colorable

While it may or may not be a

sociological/pedagogical
teaching

theory,

theory can pass

not

every

strict scrutiny.

The

burden is on the state to demonstrate that this interest is
compelling.
forth

In

any

this

evidence

case,

the

School

whatsoever

that

Board has
could

not put

support

a

determination that this interest is compelling, nor does it

------------------------------------to be compelling on its face.

readily appear

The School

Board has done nothing to show that it is essential to the
state • s

mission of educating

its children that

it have a

certain percentage of minority role models.
In
role

addition,

model

haphazard

an

by,

for

that

chosen

narrowly

minority,

to effectuate
tailored.

the

School

of

absurdity

into

example,

providing

Asian

its

the

By

its

Roard

has

role

students

model
with

and by attempting to provide any same

role models at all

sub-groups

not

of

element

Indian role models,
race

are

definition

introduced
theory,

theory

the means

fall

to the disparate and

within

the

category

of

ill-defined
persons

of

Spanish descent.

~

~
~

~

Resp contends

-

the layoff provision can also

be viewed as an attempt to protect minority hiring gains

v..,Jw during

times

of

layoff

-----------

as

empl_o_y_m_e_n_t___d_i_s_c_ r _i _m_i_n_a_t.....ion
applicants.

..

that

part

of

against

a

remedy

for

prior

---------------~~~~~~

minority

teacher

Viewed in that light, the question of whether

20.

the state's purpose is compelling is much more difficult.
Because of unresolved factual dis utes, the Court is not in
a position to make a determination whether resp's theory of
the government's interest is compelling.

However, I later

conclude that even assuming arguendo that this purpose is
compelling,

it

is

strict scrutiny.

not

narrowly

Therefore,

tailored

enough

to

pass

it will not be necessary to

remand this case for determination of these factual issues.
Even
deciding

though

whether

the

resp

case
has

can

be

resolved

articulated

a

without

compelling

government interest, most of the contentions of the parties
and amici
briefly
first

focus

on

subject
prong

this

the

of

issue.

For

contentions

strict

of

scrutiny

that
the

reason,
parties

analysis.

I will
to

this

There

are

basically two considerations.
A

(1}

racial

classification

only

can

constitute

a

compelling government interest if it is based on a proper
finding

of

prior

discrimination.

In

Bakke,

two

requirements for proper findings were set out: "First, the
government
remedy

body

must

that attempts

have

the

authority

identified discrimination."
of

prior

Board.

-

discrimination,
If

the

to

Regents of

impose a
to

act

race-conscious
in

response

to

In this case, the only finding
if any,
a

was made Qy. the School

University are

incapable of

making a proper finding, it might seem that the same result
would

apply

to a

School Board.

But

I

conclude that the

language in Bakke refers to the Regents attempts to make a

21.

finding

of

general

conceded

that

Medical

School

societal discrimination,

there

was

no
I

itself.

since

discrimination

do

not

think

at

the

it was
UC-Davis

language

in

Bakke forbids a School Board from making a finding that it

--itself

has

society

the

has

as

of

Board

remedying

was

opposed

I

discriminated.

context

School
...,_

discriminated,

to

a

finding

therefore conclude

that

its Q!'!!l discrimination,

competent

to

- ---------

make

a

proper

that
in

Jackson

finding

of

prior discrimination by the Jackson School District.
The second requirement for a proper finding is that
"the

government

------

must

make

findings

that

demonstrate

the

--------~~~

existence of illegal discrimination," 448 us at 498.

Petrs

argue that no such finding was ever made and that there is
no evidence to support such a

finding.

Resp asserts that

while the pre-Bakke evidence in this case may not speak in
terms of "findings," it is clear that the School Board came
to the considered conclusion that there had been a pattern
and

practice

evidence

to

of

discrimination.

support

the

School

While
Board's

there

is

some

assertion,

this

hotly-disputed factual question was not decided by th
--~---~------~
below,
since it reasoned

Without

a

DC

finding,

that
and

findings
with

the

were

C

unnecessary·

scanty,

disputed

evidence on appeal, this Court is simply not in a position
to

resolve

actually

the

made

faculty hiring .

..

question

the

a

of

finding

whether
of

prior

the

School

Board

discrimination

in

22.

(2)

The second unanswerable question that goes to whether

there is a compelling interest is whether the School Board
has

already

accomplished

discrimination.

its

purpose

of

remedying

prior

To the extent that it has, then its race-

conscious layoffs are no longer in furtherance of the goal
of

remedying

government's
layoff

the

in

is

section,

in

discrimination,

interest

provision)

framework
point

prior

not

if

past

the

racial

and

therefore

the

classification

(the

compelling.

As

stated

it can be determined

the School Board has

in

the

that at some

accomplished

its

goal, then, absent a finding of further discrimination, its
power to engage in race-conscious remedial action has come
to an end.
The
the

when

simply:

issue

remedy

accomplished.
this one,

-----

thorny

for

in

this

prior

regard

is

determining

discrimination

has

been

In employment discrimination cases such as

.

the answer can be stated in the abstract fairly

the

remedy

is

achieved

when

the

percentage

of

minority employees is roughly equivalent to the percentage
of minorities in the relevant labor pool.

Hazelwood School

District v. United States, 433 us 299 (1977)

(establishing

the relevant labor market as the proper basis of comparison
~

in employment discrimination cases, without defining that
term) •

But

questions
market?

in

and

that general proposition raises
this
(b)

case:

has

(a)

what

is

the

two specific

relevant

the percentage of minorities

labor
in

the

23.

relevant labor market in fact been matched?

I will briefly

consider each in turn.
(a)

What is the relevant labor market?

This

issue was not decided below, and is hotly contested in the
briefs.
the

Petrs contend

percentage

that

the

relevant labor market

is

lc

--------~-----minority graduates awarded teaching ~

of

in Michigan
'---___
_______..,

degrees

-=-

(app.

Resp

11. 6%).

argues

that

existing market conditions require the School District to
hire

minority

faculty

relevant

market

relevant

labor

trial.

is

from

not

market

out-of-state,
The

just Michigan.
is

normally

so

raised

the ~~

that

issue of

and

the

decided

at

The Court cannot resolve this factual dispute.
(b)

Has the percentage of minorities in the

relevant labor market in fact been matched?

The answer to

--

this question depends on the answer to question (a), supra.
From 1972 to 1981, 25%

Petr certainly makes a strong case
of

---------------~--

the

new

teachers

hired

were

minorities.

The

....____

present

....________~-......-__.._,

percentage

of

minority

teachers

in

the

Jackson

School

District, according to a Mich. Dep't of Education Report,
is

Those

16.1%.

figures

are

probably

relevant labor market.

However,

have

on

a

factual

finding

the

in

excess

of

any

since the Court does not
relevant labor market,

it

cannot determine with surety whether the goal of achieving
a

rough

faculty

equivalency
and

between

the

the percentage of minorities

labor market has been accomplished.

,;.

.

percentage

of

minority

in the relevant

24.

Are

The Means

Selected

Narrowly

Tailored

to

the

Accomplishment of the Purpose?
Section

III.A.

examined

whether

any

interest

that the School Board has in its race-conscious layoff plan
is compelling.

In that section I

examined two versions of

the School Board's interest in this racial classification.
Petrs'
not

version,

amount

depends

the
a

to

for

"role model

its

compelling
resolution

theory," on its face does
interest.

on

factual

Resp's
issues

version

that

this

Court is incapable of resolving.
This section examines whether the burden borne by
innocent whites because of the layoff provision is narrowly
tailored
Even

to

the

assuming

interest,
action

arguendo

an

"is

burden he

accomplishment

individual

entitled

tailored

interest."

Bakke,
in

a

affected

to a

by

a

the

compelling

School

Board's

[the basis of his race]

serve

a

438

us at

299.

to

of

purpose.

judicial determination that the

to

order

compelling

existence

is asked to bear on

precisely

satisfied

the

of

pass

compelling

strict

Both

is

governmental

prongs

scrutiny.

must

The

be

School

Board has completely failed to demonstrate that the means
is

has

selected

are

narrowly

tailored,

for

at

discussion

in

the

least

two

major reasons.
First,

based

on

the

framework

section, a racial classification is narrowly tailored only
when

it

proper

seeks
findings

to
by

benefit
a

those

government

persons
body

who

fall

authorized

within
to make

25.

such

findings

that

a

certain

discriminated against.

group

or

groups

have

been

In the present case, even assuming

arguendo that the School Board made proper findings that it
had engaged in prior discrimination,
only

establish prior

those findings would

discrimination against

Blacks.

Yet

the School Board's definition of minority includes Blacks,
American Indians, Orientals and persons of Spanish descent.
There is no evidence to explain why innocent whites should
lose

their

descent.

jobs
The

in

order

only

to

possible

benefit persons of

Spanish

justification

such

for

a

provision must stem from a desire of the School Board to
remedy,

for

example,

what

it

perceives

to

be

general

societal discrimination against persons of Spanish descent,
a

task

of

authorized

dubious

value

to perform.

that

Because

the

School

there

is

Aoard
no

is

evidence

not
or

findings to demonstrate that Indians, Orientals, or persons
of Spanish descent have suffered any harm in Jackson School
District,

there

is

nothing

to

justify

the

loss

of

employment by whites in order to benefit members of those
groups.

Because

persons

partially

the
in

layoff
order

provision
to

benefit

harms

innocent

groups

never

identified as victims of discrimination by the government
body

in question,

it

is not

pass strict scrutiny.
plan involves firing

narrowly

tailored enough
Second,

the layoff

innocent persons from their existing

jobs instead of mere hiring preferences.
the framework

to

section,

As explained in

such a plan can only be

justified

26.

under "narrowly tailored" analysis if it grants a remedy to
individual

victims

of

discrimination,

or

possibly

if

it

would be impossible to accomplish an otherwise legitimate
hiring

goal

without

exception applies
School Board • s
provision

is

some

in

an

protections.

is an admission that

attempt

Neither

The very nature of

this case.

arguments
not

layoff

to

"make

the layoff

whole"

identified

victims of prior discrimination by the School Board.
School

Board

demonstrates
arguably

has

not

that

produced

it

legitimate

could
(non-role

any

not

evidence
have

model

the

all

that

accomplished

any

based)

at

The

hiring

goals

without the layoff provision. 5
Based on the above analysis, I conclude that none
of

the means

purposes
scrutiny.
the

need

provision

are

used

to accomplish even arguably legitimate

narrowly

tailored

enough

to

pass

strict

For that reason, under any analysis, and without
to

decide

violates

disputed
the

Equal

factual

issues,

Protection

the

Clause

layoff
of

the

Fourteenth Amendment.
IV.

Conclusion

5 In fact, petr has put forth strong evidence indicating that
even if the layoff provision had never been instituted, any
legitimate hiring goal of matching the relevant labor market
would have been achieved some time ago. See Reply Brief, pp. 710. While the School Board attempts to refute this evidence, the
point remains that the School Board has not satisfied its own
burden of establishing the necessit of the la off revision for
t~ complishment of some legitimate goal.

27.

The

layoff

provision

in

the

CBA between Jackson

School Board and its teachers constitutes state action.

It

---~

is a racial classification, and is subject to traditional

-----...

strict scrutiny analysis for classifications based on race.
Strict scrutiny requires that the classification at issue
be

narrowly

tailored

to

meet

a

compelling

government
/

interest.
To the extent that the government interest in the
layoff provision is the "role model theory," that does not
state a compelling interest.

To the extent that the government interest in the
layoff

provision

employment

is

part

discrimination

of

a

against

plan

to

remedy

minorities

in

prior
Jackson

School District, the Court does not have the information it
needs to decide if that interest is compelling.
Even assuming arguendo that there is a compelling
interest,

the ~

accomplish that interest are

not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny.

.,

November 5, 1985

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Mike

Re:

83-1340

Wygant et al. v. Jackson Board of Education

Set to be argued:

Wed. Nov. 6th

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
There are four cases that involve one or more of
fuese same parties.

I will list them chronologically.
~.
Jackson Educa t 1on Ass' n v. Jackson Board of

A.

ffiucation,

No.

found at J.A.

4-72340
30)

(ED Mich

Dec.

15,

1976)

(mem op

In the spring of 1974, when the Board

saw that adhering to the layoff provision would result in
~

firing

tenured

teachers

teachers

still

on

ayoff provision.
ich)

held

~

favor

probation,

it

retaining

declined

Black

teachers

the

minority

that

of

sued.

to

follow

the

The Fed DC

(ED

the

court

claim,
VII

and

claims

EEOC.

with
that
for

426 us 229

jurisdiction
it

lacked

failure

to

(1976)

over

its

a

not

required by

sufficient to vest
equal

jurisdiction over
file

had

plaintiffs

established any purposeful discrimination as
veshington v. Davis,

minority

claim

protection
their Title

first

with

the

Having determined that it lacked jurisdiction over

2.

the federal claims, the court declined to exercise pendent
~risdiction
t..~·

:J~

B.

Jackson Education Ass 'n v.

.Erlucation,

~:

over the state contract claims.

No.

77-0011484

Court, August 31,

1/tl

rupra,

took

cz

~ (J.A.
~

their

Jackson Board of

(Jackson

40).

County

Circuit

Plaintiffs in case A,

state contract claims

to state court.

~ That court stated that it "has not been established that

vJ

vj~~~~·
~· .

the

rr.. /); J ~
~~

hiring

;tv

~·

~

'- ~

board

had

practices.

~

The

against

minority

minorities

representation

in
on

its
the

faculty was the result of societal racial discrimination."
J.A.

at 43.

----

Plaintiffs prevailed on their argument that

the layoff provision was not in conflict with Michigan's
'leacher Tenure Act.

c.

~
~~_,I

discriminated

F.Supp.
This

Wygant

1195

is

v.

Jackson

(ED Mich 1982)

Board

(App.

of

Education,

to Cert.

546

Pet. at 20a).

the DC opinion below in this case.

It is fully

~~ eescr ibed in the bench memo. The DC made no finding of
~----f pri_:'_~scrimination, reasoning that no such finding was
recessary.

~-

Cit{,-~
ft'- c)~

/.~

v

~p/

F.2d 1152

D.

Wygant
(CA6 1984)

decision below.

v.

Jackson

(App.

Board

to Cert.

Education,

Pet. at 2a).

746

The Ca

It adopted the reasoning of the DC, and

nade no finding of prior discrimination.

)?Ji#"

of

.....
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84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Miscellaneous

notes

on

opinion

of

CA6

that

largely adopted the DC's opinion:
1.

The CBA provided that the:

"Goal of such policy [of preferential treatme~
of-rnrnorities] shall be to have at least the
same
percentage
of
minority
racial
representation on each individual staff as is
represented by the student population of the
Jackson public schools."

('

In
299

Hazelwood

(308),

"teacher

work

we

School District v.

rejected

force

to

a

its

comparison
student

u.s.,
of

434

u.s.

Hazelwood's

population",

saying

that this comparison "misconceived the role of statistics
in employment discrimination cases".

We went on to say:

"That a proper comparison was between the racial
composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and
the racial composition of the qualified public
~hool teacher population in the relevant labor
market."
Despite

our

decision

in

Hazelwood,

CA6

agreed

with the District Court that:
"In the setting of this case, it is appropriate
to compare the percentage of minority teachers

2.

the
student body rather than with
minorities in the relevant
teachers
This is
societal
n
prived
minority
models." (underlining

2.

c:L~

It is conceded in the opinion that "there has

~

been no___p
_r_i_o_r~ judicial

tl

mgag- ed

&f

L"'"~~

r _::::.:::_:. .. ,

in

racial

dete ~ ina ~on

that the defendants

discrimination".

- -----

P.

~

6 (a) •

In

an

~ lier case involving these same parties, decided by the

~
~?'~:z:~

I)'

Jackson

~:::::SU~that
-4, 4.- y----- - I
~

it

County
"has

Circuit
not

Court

been

in

1979,

established

the

that

Court
the

stated

board

has

discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices.
inority representation on the faculty was the result

~ ~

of societal racial discrimination."

~

~~
~~~

Although there has never been a finding of racial
discrimination by the board (of which I am aware), the DC

~d

the

Court

of

Appeals

discrimination" generally and
justifying affirmative action
off of whites.

both

~"

st

s

3.

3.

In

discrimination,
is

one

fuis

of

test

this

equal

protection

case

of

reverse

the Court of Appeals said that the

reasonableness",

and

is

affirmative

"whether

the

that

the

"test

question
action

under

plan

is

substantially related to the objectives of remedying past
discrimination

and

correcting

substantial

and

chronic

underrepresentation".
I
involving

know

of

no

In

strict

that

scrutiny

the

and

Equal

the

or

quotas

case

applied such unconventional equal protection analysis.
said

goals

protection

has

I

action

equal

that

Bakke

affirmative

other

Protection

showing

of

a

Clause

requires

compelling

interest that is served by the classification.

state

This was

mY reading of the Court's opinion in Fullilove.

4.
Chief's
~cause

The

decision

opinion despite

in

its

Fullilove.

vagueness

in

I

joined

some

the

respects,

he said:

"Any
preference
based
on
racial
or
ethnic
criteria
must
necessarily
receive
a
most
~archin
x mination to make sure that it does
not conflict with constitutional guarantees".

4.

The

Chief's opinion also

analysis

demonstrates

survive

judicial

~ticulated

in

review

the

fullilove opinion,

that

the
under

several

said

that

federal
either

Bakke

the Court's

statute
of

"would

the

opinions".

tests
In

my

1 read the Chief's opinion as applying

an analysis like mine in Bakke, namely the strict strutiny
applied

to

classification

racial
is

classification,

prohibited

"unless

and
it

is

that

such

a

a

necessary

means of advancing a compelling governmental interest".
Moreover, 1 stated:
''!'his Court has never approved race conscious
remedies absent judicial, administrative, or
regislative
findings
of
constitutional
or
~atutory violations".
Bakke, 438 u.s., at 307.
~amsters v. u.s., 431 u.s. 324, 367-376, United
Jewish
Organization,
430
U.S.
144,
155-159
(opinion of Justice White); South Carolina v.
~tzenbach, 383 u.s. 301, 308-315.
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-----------------Chal'llfifll Lobor Marlt,t:

Women and 1llinOridea will be '15
percent of labor force·growth between
1~ and 2000. Employm without plana to
eJiminate barriers to 1JMrui or Pr'OitlotfnB
groups wtU be eut' dlt from a ~
part of America'• labor force.
· ·:
C. W~ Parry, dUet ~ecutive officer at

those

AI~, recently aent a mem9 to aD~

"?tine that Alcoa's "beat prospects for

Why Bosses
Like to Be
Told To ·Hire'

.

By Peter C. 'Robertson

2

Mini.miziTI(! Rilk of Reverse Discrimi-

nation Suits:

.
In a retent survey of chief executive
offtcers by the management consulting firni
for w~ 1 work, 95 percent indicated that
they will use numbera aa a management tool
to measure COl'porate progress whether the
government requires them or not. However,
once the government requirements are.
gone, there would be a risk of so-called "re~
verse discrimination" suits aUe~ that emplorers have gone too far with affirmative
\act10n.
See AFFIRM, D2, CoL 1

REAGA~ is being nrged
to weaken enforcement of .affirmative
action programs for federal contractors. The proposition has divided the Cabinet, stalling, action. But if Reagan still is
trying to make .up his mind, here's a message from the business community: Go slow.
Although business has major problems
with the program, it now supports the basic
principles of affirmative action as · implemented under Presidents Kennedy, johnson,
Nixon, Ford and Carter.
The r~sons corporations are ·not inter·
ested in seeing those principles weakened
have more to do with business than with ciVil
rights. Business - Jed by the National Aaaociation of ManufactUl"O{I - aees that ita
own aeH-interest reqUire& affumative action.
And if the lUqan adrqinistratioa ~
American ~ Jri11 tblnk it for we~ ·
ing affirmative action enforcement, then th~
administration isn't lis~nina to what bust,pessmen 'OUtside the Beltway are uying. . ·
Thet penuneat'a .......X lffinoatM.~ •

P

&ur·
vwal and growth lie in our skillful selection
of the best individuals" from a "broad-based
~lent pool that includes women and minontJes."

RESIDENT

tioo program
-with
written lffitmldwt
. . . md ··t..w~~~Mie
JDellt ,. . . . . . . . . .

.....

Peter Robertson, a former senior official with the Equal Employment Opportunity
.
Commission, is a management consultant
with Organizalion Resources Counselors, Im.
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goab and timetables

wrll make it less likely that such

suits will be successful, according to pleading states' rights. However,
National Association of Mapufaetur· t~ay they pre,fer the .uniformit¥ of a
ers President Alexander Trow- , smgle f~deral regulation, ~ven if the
bridge
compantea don't•afwaya like all the
·
· details, to havina to meet a multipli·
CompatibiUty with Mar&G(!e· '' eity of state
regjdation11. ·
tnent: •'·. '
One national t~Qancla! !etVices
The use of pis and timeta· · company ~ hae . affirmativ~
bles and other numerlcaf me88Ute& lction
with 60 local jurift.
to track the emploYft*t oiiQfnoriit.
tiel and women I* . . . .
bow corporatiolil ...
... im-' .
portlnt areat.

3

tion program. We have been well
served by that program, including
the setting of internal hiring and
promotion goals for minorities and
women•• • .' ''
·

a. n d l o
.
cal

"'*

.i:s,..=- ~·-JI!

.••,
canwe
.If
•.'!0 can't meuure, how can 'fie~
~.@l~t .
·
;
. . · ..

cost moi1J

.te.

effecti~ .,prolflms." T~ow · whose 'time had come" and helped
bridge bas calleq~f,or reforms in ~he. achieve Kennedy's dream of getting
.~a.a....al program without amending
the problem out' of the' streets and
· Jii"Wld.erlying ~ecutive or~er. The into the CQUrts. ''Employer6 ' ·m~y'
NA.ttt believe. ~ auch ame~ . ar~ With hOw f.bV'ernment regula·
.· QM!Ilts WOUld b4l .,Ul-tdVised.'' io ,ti~ ant· applie41 b.. ·
rather have these <>NI•Im'<>nt,c>
11Jirt., . because they might trigger
·in' a -legal framework
~state and l~al action. "
,' .·
A .....:.t: ... · 1-nA '.b·le
.d -' str~ts. ··

u.J!

~~;
.. wpuam ~E~w~i~at

:· tO

~ 0.

• in St.' '

=

~·

· ~~~- clvil' rifhta under.
lit,e RepUblican· Sen. ~Everett · M•
imd te.u1t Jn · Ditlcaen (R·DL) lpOke of "an idea

~

and ~

h..... . ~ .~

pup of tile HAM.·to¥1 Jlolae ~

,.Jtepteaentativee ~~~~~ iJl
JUly that ''busirieel ; . . leta jiaJS
~ and timetables for every aspect of
i£8 operations - profit$, capital in·
~II! . ,.,..,x,
re ef.lU
; vestment, productivity increases and
· UgJSlahon: .
Third Party Pressures:
:promotional potential for individuals.
· Employe!s are concerned . ,
If faith in the ability of the
. ~tting goals and tirom.~ for on..
that Congress.~ght freeze thepreJegal .,ystem to increase em'nortty and female parijclpation is 1
sent ~r:ogram mto law and thus ~eny ployment opportunities were to
way of ~ ~rogresa abd / fJ~xibiltty to a,lter the .r~gulat1ons. . fade, we may not see marches in the .·
focusing on . potential · dilcriinina·., Re~. Augustus F. HaWkins (D- streets again, but ~· will certaiply
tion."
·
. .r
Calif.), . chairman of the ~ouse see increasing pressure on employSenior corporate officiall clearly · Educat1on and. La~ot ~mmtttee, .ers from. outside the legal system.
~ f!C()gnize that Jl1anagen must be
has pledge~ leg1slat1ve act1on should , ~~eady, private civil rights organi·
measUred on all of the thinp they th~ executive order be w~ake~ed. zations have. substantially increased
:are expected to do. •
He WOQ~d probably get blparttsan their demands for afffrmative action
• A survey of more than 200 major
support m both houses. Sen. R~bert . plans QJ:' fai( share agreements out~
companies found 76 percent saying
Dole (R-Kan.) urged the prestd~nt side the context of government re. they used "voluntary internal nunot to weaken the new executive quirements. Most employers would
merical objectives to assess, (equal
order and con~ressmen an~ senat~rs prefer to deal with the government,
employment opportunity) performof both parties have .wntte~ ~1m even when perceived as slightly mis-ance." One-fourth of the companies
str~~g letters supportmg a s1m!lar guided, than to negotiate 'the details
·. said that incentive ' compensation
position.
of how they do business wit!Ni wide
-p.),ans for managers include equal
E_m:ploye Morale and Produc-~ variety of competing private groups
eJ!!PI~tobjectives and that per- ttmty:
whose standards are not subject 'to
::fQ.rmance against those objectives
Companies who have made judicial review.
~ can affect incentive payments posisignificant progress in hiring minori·.tiv.ely or negatively. By 1988 mqre
ties and women would have morale
Management Flexibility
than half the companies predict they and productiv~t~ problems if their
The . DeregulatorY
-l'lill be basing iricentive pay in part employes believe that the federal
Issue:
·on EEO performance.
government ia redueing its commit·
This is Perhaps the most imporUse of Numbel't (If 0 Defeni,e.: .
ment to affirmative action, particu- tant reason employers favor contin·
...
One proposal might elltni·
larly if they 'believe that business ·ued use of voluntary goals and
timetables and even support appro'
nate the poSsibility tbat busi·
pressure led to such a change.
nesses could ~ foals and timetaFor example, IBM now has priately crafted mandatory ones.
~ Illes even voluntarily or point· to pro30,000 minority . employes and NAM president Trowbridge made
. ~ ~ess in minority and female em30,000 women who would not be the point when he pointed out that
ployment as part of the evidence in
there if the company's percentage of retaining. flexible goals and timetadefending against diicrin1ination
minority and female employment bles as a measure of good faith com·
..charges, although the Supl"$1le : was the same aa it had been in the pliance to ensure progress · would
.Court has emphasized the al)propri~
early '60s. Such a company needs ita "give business the necessary guide- '
ateness of such a defenae. Etnploy·
~mployes to think affirmative action Jines to ensure compliance with feders clearly want to use their prO"
is being eliminated like it nee~ a eral mandatea," and pointed out that
· -gress as a defenae and ·to~ able·tu, corporate hole in the head. In fact, "absent such guidelines, individual.·
f
1........
.IDM's chief executive officer, John ¢nforcement officers will be left witlt
avoid urther government u•vaatiga~
Akers, J·ust issued an IBM-style, 16- decisions as to what comprises comtions of their aetivitiee if they have
•done well, lJI measured by the niitn·
page report on ita afftrmative action pliance with affirmative action." , . :
The present rules· mandating
be of minorf•1-A nd fe 1e8 be
program witb statiatica and a ders
.._ a
rna t'I y scnption of the CODl"""'Y'S
programs goals and timetables were adopted
velJlploy.
......
· At the same time, the pro8J'am
to achieve these gains. Similar re- by the Nixon administration, in part
does not require IDf qQOtas. The
ports have been issued ·by otJters: at the request of business, in es- ·
..... 1 nd •._.....
.
Schering-Plowm.
PhUip Morrla, sence as a deregulatory 'move in th~
. goa s a ........Uiblet program· ia 8 EXxon, AT&f, · Westinghoust and area of employment diserimihation
.
~~~~le.:~ ~~ t;).~~an~ Chemical Bank to mention just a · and affirmative action. •
~chairman of Time, Inc. told Con-· lew.
. · .·
· · ~- Under pre-NIXon programa, tbife
-gress that at "no timll [Wif hia com·
The Alcoa memo noted that Alcoa were major confrontations. with aov·
pany) subject to anythirtJ reaemblmg would continue its programs ernment investigators concerning
•
• [and that t"'-•)
't
"whatever the ~nt's even· the adequacy of. specific detalla in
quotas
....., weren pretual fV\.<Iitlon.'' . In a aimilar vein, corporate affirmative action pro- .
sented with rigid, predetermint!d
..<~tatis
' tt' s for the &.l..,... J , _ _
Davidson, ol Time, Inc., told a grams. The Nixon pro-busine88,
•K
c
.....
ut. ......._.
House Judiciary subcommittee thia deregulatory approach was tQ adopt
ynd mlnorftiea." He said that the
week that "when pre. re&lorts indi-. goals and timetables as an objecti~
go rnment never tried "to dictate csted th•t the presidendal order on measure of corporate p~ogress nd
a al, inflexible reault." , ·
aff~
. . . .
&ide tmd Loctrl Oa , .. . • . 1~¥e. action] might be weak· thus elimlnate many o the ar •
Progro
~ . ~ or watered down, Tjme, the. ments about the adequacy of spec ic
Hist:'
.~n... Jar- ~pa- ' t ,.sued ' a statement [that) ' 'should . programs. In fact, i" the lead Su.,..,.,.., •
8"" .......
this happen, we want to as8ure you preme .C~urt dec.ision approving
nies oppoee<~ . federal reMtiQna
we will
maintain our affihriative ac- race-consc1ous affirmative action
/'

.
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SOC M1CHM-POW

84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Dear Sandra:
The Chief has assigned this case to me to write.
While this case by no means presents us with the
q>portunity to resolve all of the intractable "affirmative
action" issues that will continue to require the guidance
of the Court, 1 consider it an important opportunity to

.
. .
"
' t h'1s area
begin to establish some muc h -needed sta b 1l1ty
~

of the law.

My notes show that the Chief, Bill Rehnquist

and 1 voted simply to reverse; Byron's vote was to "remand
or reverse"; and you expressed a preference to vacate and
remand to permit the School Board to make more specific
findings •

..

2.

My notes also indicate that we share substantial
~eas

of agreement.

First, neither of us would accept

general societal discrimination as a justification for

rev:rs~ d~~c~imin~ To

the extent that the court

elow relied on societal discrimination to uphold th
constitutionality of these layoffs, they ought to b

Second, 1 understood you to say that the Court
ought to articulate a standard of review for affirmative
action cases.

One of the more important results of this

case may be to get a majority of the Court to agree on
such a standard.

In Bakke, 1 applied the "strict

scrutiny" standard that

consisten~

has been applied by

the Court in equal protection cases involving alleged

~

. .

.

~cr1m1nat1on
~

against minorities.

1 see no principled

3.

basis for a different standard under the Equal Protection
Clause when there is reverse discrimination.

1 would

welcome your views as to a proper articulation of a
standard.

a...~/-{)
Although you indicated ~~ remand to
~

allow the School District another opportunity to establish
a finding of prior discrimination, 1 think ~t we are in
agreement on the fundamental principle behind the idea of
proper findings.

The need for findings flows from the

requirement that these layoffs, or any other state action
that discriminates on the basis of race alone, be put into
effect in order to remedy prior discrimination in that
unit, and not as an attempt to cure the effects of general
societal discrimination.

At some point, then, it is

necessary that an authorized body answer in the

)

;,

.

4.

affirmative the question whether there has been prior
discrimination.

Here, the School Board itself could have

done so at any of several points in the past, but did not.
&en in the District Court below, the School Board could
have established that its actions were intended to remedy
prior discrimination, but instead supported its plan with
the "role model" theory and with reference to societal
discrimination.

In my view, the requirement that state

action that discriminates on the basis of race be remedial
to prior discrimination necessarily requires at some point
that prior discrimination be established.

I welcome your

views.
I should add that I am disturbed by the fact that
the state action at issue here involved layoffs as opposed
to mere hiring goals.

While my view of strict scrutiny

5.

''"~Ol:e"'t f"'~ ties

allows some burden on nonmino£ities in order to remedy
prior discrimination, such a burden must be no greater
than necessary to accomplish the purpose.

In my view, in

most cases firing someone who is not guilty of
discrimination imposes too great a burden.

The actual

harm that an innocent person is asked to bear can be so
much greater when they are deprived of existing
employment, often where the individual involved is heavily
dependent on wages, than the harm that occurs when someone
is deprived of an employment or advancement opportunity
they are not presently

dependen~

o •

1 would prefer simply to reverse outright, as 1
think the courts below were dead wrong in every respect.
1 would be content, however, in order to obtain a clear
majority to reverse and add the language we frequently use

6.

to the effect that the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with our opinion.

I see no reason

expressly to give the School Board a second opportunity to
adopt resolutions that would correct or change its
position.

Indeed, in none of the four cases involving the

validity of the Board's action, has there been any finding
that the Board had discriminated.

In the 1976 District

Court litigation the Board expressly denied that there had
been any past discrimination.

Moreover, this case was

argued and decided by both courts below on the theory that
the discrimination against white teachers was justified by
(i) the need for "role models"

(as to which there is no

support in the record), and (ii)
discrimination".

"societal

7.

It may be possible, I suppose, to write this case
so narrowly that we would do no more than reject the
reasoning of the courts below.

This would merely delay

the "day of reckoning" as we have the more difficult
affirmative action cases that lie ahead.
I am, of course, happy to discuss this with you
at any convenient time.
Sincerely,
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

To: Justice Powell
From:
Re:

Mike
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, No. 84-1340

Date:

Nov. 21, 1985

The language you asked for from Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448

u.s.

448 (1979) appears on p. 491:
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination to make sure that it doVes not conflict
with constitutional guarantees." 448 u.s. 448 at 491.

Earlier in the opinion the C.J. also wrote:
"We recognize the need for careful judicial
~aluation to assure that any congressional program
that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish
e objective of remedying the effects of past
discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement
of that goal." 448 u.s. at 480.
Finally, the opinion expressly states that it does not
either formulation of the standard of review in Bakke, but
issue in Fullilove could pass either level

Jo f~J tA)(No~ ~
~ CQ~t~{lb~

1J_ol
1b: Justice Powell
From: Mike
Re: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
No. 84-1340

Draft Opinion

Date: November 26, 1985

Attached is a rough draft of the opi,nion in Wygant.

I

am giving it to you well in advance of the time I would normally
ask you to look at a draft because I do not want to polish up
entire arguments that you would just as soon not make.

For that

reason, I do not think it would be productive actually to "edit"
this draft; rather, I think it would be more helpful simply to
read it to see if it makes the arguments you had in mind.

_____

suggest that you skip pages
1-7, the fact
---.._,...,.

I

section.~

begins on page 7, and it attempts to describe a level of review
that will both sweep in Justice White and retain Justice
Rehnquist.

Fortunately, I also think that it is the appropriate

standard of review in this case.

Without saying so in so many

words, it establishes a "modified strict scrutiny" adapted to
school desegregation cases.

~~starting
model theory.

on p. 11, debunks the role

It does so in a way that allows the opinion to

restate your views on societal discrimination.
consider whether those views will lose Justice

l~ iscusses

You may want to

White ~~n

the state interest in diversity.

I am of the

opinion that to come right out and recognize a state interest in

racial diversity in public schools sufficient to support
affirmative action would not be prudent.

For that reason, 1

discuss the interest but reserve the question of its validity.
1f you believe at the end of the discussion that it would be
better simply to recognize the validity of the interest, rather
than reserving the question, then 1 can rewrite that section and
make it much shorter. ~ti ~ l.

3

discusses the interest in

remedying prior discrim1nation, in a way that allows the opinion
to make the point that one eye must be focused on whether the
legitimate remedial goals have been accomplished.

1f that point

does not seem important to you, the section can be shortened
considerably.

this section ends by

~t

answering the question whether the interest is sufficient,
because of key unanswered factual questions.

~ecti ~

turns to the question whether the means

chosen to accomplish any of the asserted interests is narrowly
tailored enough to pass equal protection scrutiny.

1t expressly

applies the nnarrowly tailoredn language of strict scrutiny,
because Justice White previously has agreed to that half of
strict scrutiny analysis.

1t concludes that because the chosen

means for achieving the asserted purposes involved layoffs, none
of them can pass this second prong of equal protection analysis.
You will notice that because of the resolution of the
nnarrowly tailored" prong of analysis, it is not necessary to the
decision to say anything at all about whether the asserted state
interests are sufficiently important.

You may choose to say

nothing about the various interests, and simply state your

----- --------~-:>--

position that layoffs are an unacceptable means to accomplish any
of the asserted purposes.

·~

Subject:
From:

No.

ti4-1J4U,

wygant: v.

..;acK::;ou noa.L·u u.L .c.u.u.~.,;c:~.~.,...c..uu

L.F.P., Jr.

I am sending this memo, together with your draft of
November 26, to you by Federal Express in the event that you
may want to do some work on it on Saturday.

I am not sug-

gesting that I expect you - or any of my clerks - to work
all of Thanksgiving week-end.
Your draft reflects skill in "tip-toeing" around the
delicate issues that makes it so difficult for us to get a
Court in this case.

At least for now, I like your organization

and approach through Section III(B).

I have concerns about

Section III(C), and its discussion of the state interest in
remedying prior discrimination.

As you suggest, try shortening

this part considerably, making as few commitments for the
future as you can.
Section IV in some respects at least, is the most
important section as it will decide the case if its analysis
is accepted by four other Justices.
editing (tentatively in the margin).

~

have done considerably
The distinction made

between employment "goals" and layoffs is a critical one, and
I think you made this distinction quite well.

I am not sure

that we have said as clearly as I would like that except where
identified individuals who are discriminated against are
involved (Bowman), this Court has never approved the laying off
of innocent employees as a legitimate means of remedying prior
discrimination .

..it

i~·

'

. ,,

No. 84-1340

2.

I appreciate that this preliminary draft does not
have the citations that will be included in the next draft.
Citations are clearly needed at a number of places.

I

believe it is in Part II that you rely primarily on rather
old Equal Protection Clause cases.

There must be some

equally good statements in our more recent decisions.
In sum, Mike, it has been very helpful to have a
look at your first draft.

~Vhen

you have a second draft,

I suggest that you give a copy of it to your editing clerk
at the same time you give it to me.

It will not be easy for

me to find very much time early next week.

L.F.P.

November 19, 1985

84-1340

~~1gant

v. Jackson

Boar~

of Education

Dear Sandra:
The Chief has assigned this case to me to write.
My notes show that the Chief, Bill Rehnquist and I voted
simply to reverse; Byron's vote was to "remand or reverse"1
and you expressed a preference to vacate and remand to permit the School Board to make more specific findinqs.
I would prefer simply to reverse outright, as I
think the courts below were dead wrong in every respect. I
would be content, however, in order. to obtain a clear majority to reverse, tc a~d t~~ language we frequently use to the
effect that the case is remanded for further proceedinqs
consistent wi.th our opinion. I see no reason expressly to
give the School Board a second opportunity to adopt resolutions that would change its position. Indeed, in none of
the four cases involving the validity of the Board's action,
has there be~n any ftn~ino that th~ Board had discriminated.
In the 1976 District Court litigation the Board expresslv
denied that there had been any past discrimination. Moreover, in this case the Board again had a clear chance to
establish a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, it
chose to justify its discrimination against white teachers
by (1) the need for "role models" (as to which there is no
support in the record), and (ii) "societal discrimination".
This case was argued and d~c!ded by both courts below on
these nebulous justifications.
My Conference notes make clear that you would not
accept societal di.scrimination as a justification for reverse discrimination. I also understood you to say that the
Court should articulate a standard of analysis in "affirmative actlon" cases. Moreover, I believe you stated that the
"means" adopted by the Board--discrimination against innocent teachers--was impermissible under equal protection
analysis. I agree with everything you said at Conference
with the sole exception that it may be desirable to give the
School Board a fifth chance to make findings of discrimination.

........

2.

The difficult question is the standard of analysis,
as I do not believe five Justices have ever agreed. In
Bakke, Bill Brennan, Thurgood and Harry apparently relied on
some intermediate level of equal protection analysis adequate to justify reverse discrimination. Byron joined that
view in Bakke, but it is not clear that he 'ltOuld adhere to
it in a case like this where--in effect--societal discrimination is the only justification. Byron did vote to reverse. My understanding from what John said at Conference
is that he would accept the Rreasonableness" standard relied
on by the Court of Appeals.
In Bakke, I applied the "strict scrutiny" standard
that consistently has heen applied by the Court in equal
protection cases involving alleged discrimination against
minorities. I see no principled basis for a different
standard under the Equal Protection Clause \>lhen there is
reverse discrimination.
I nevertheless would welcome your views as to a
proper articulation of a standard, and whether we should try
for it in this case. It may be possibl~, I suppose, to
write it so narrowly that we would do no more th~n reject
the reasoni.ng of the courts below . This would merely delay
the "day of reckoning" as we have the more difficult affirmative action cases that lie ahead.

Perhaps we could discuss this at a convenient time .
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

.

lfp/ss 12/09/85

WYGANT SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
Dec. 9, 1985

DATE:

TO:

Mike

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
After reviewing your second draft of December 8,

1 have some second thoughts as to whether we may be trying
to say too much in a case that best may be disposed of by
saying

less.

tentatively,
merit.

1 make
as

1

the

following

think

all

that

suggestions
you

have

somewhat

written

has

But 1 am not even sure that Justice O'Connor, much

less Justice White, would agree.
1.
public

Despite

schools

are

your
in

a

sound

idea

special

of

implying

category,

that

think

1

we

should leave this suggestion until we see what is said in
dissent.

1 therefore would omit from the full paragraph

beginning

on

page 11.

This omission will leave the remainder of Part

page

9 through

the paragraph

that

ends on

11 without requiring substantial change.

2.
prongs"

to

prong,

and

we

end

Part

affirmative
the

"means"

11

by

action
prong.

stating

analysis:
1

find

there
The
Part

are

"two

"purpose"
111

a

bit

confusing because the two prongs are not clearly discussed
separately.
Part
prong.

Ill-A

initially

addresses

the

"purpose"

Perhaps it would be clearer if the first paragraph

commencing on page 12 stated

that

the Court of Appeals,

relying on the reasoning of the District Court, identified
two

state

prong:

interests

(i)

the

thought

need

for

remedying

to

satisfy

the

role

models,

and

interest

in

addition,

respondents argue for

an additional state
faculty".

Would

societal

interest
it

be

is

"purpose"
(ii)

discrimination.

the
In

the first time here that
the

clearer,

need

for

Mike,

if

"a diverse
Part

Ill

addressed separately but consecutively each of these three
alleged

state

interests?

You have excellent answers for

each one but my impression is that the draft does not deal
with

each

separately

and

in

turn.

For

example,

after

talking about the role model justification on pages 12-16,
the

first

full

paragraph

on

page

16

primarily on "societal discrimination",

seems

to

focus

but again on page

17 we go back to the role model theory.
I am dictating this as I read.
the draft a
the

role

second time,

model

theory

as

I
a

As I now reread

see that you are not viewing
different or

separate

state

interest

from

the

discrimination.
that

because

perceived

need

to

remedy

Although not clearly stated,
of

this

discrimination

deprived of role models.

societal

the idea is

students

had

been

Indeed, you say this in the last

sentence beginning on page 13.

When read in this light,

perhaps my initial reaction as to the organization of Part
Ill is not justified.
3.
the

As I continue to read the draft, you conclude

discussion

of

the

"purpose"

prong

on page

20.

The

last paragraph on that page is an incomplete introduction
to

a

means

discussion
are

not

of

the

narrowly

second

tailored.

commence Part IV at this point.
state

in

substance

that

prong,

even

if

I

namely,

that

the

suggest

that

we

The first sentence could
there

were

evidence or

persuasive argument that a substantial state interest was
served by the reverse racial classification in this case,
respondents are not entitled to prevail because the means
chosen

to

achieve

the

asserted

state

interests

appropriate under constitutional standards.

are

not

(I would like

to avoid repetitious use of the word "tailored").
After an introductory paragraph, we would move to
the first full paragraph on page 23.

This would eliminate

at this point what you now have on pages 21 and 22 .

.. .

4.

If we leave the paragraph on page 21 in the

cpinion,

we

invite at least

two Justices to argue for

a

remand.

I am inclined to omit the paragraph from the text

and put something like the following in a foonote:
"Respondent's

belatedly

argue

that

the

layoff

provision was necessary to remedy prior faculty
employment discrimination in the Jackson School
District.
can

Before a remedial government purpose

attain

constitutional

significance,

a

factual determination must have been made by the
appropriate governmental entity
purposeful

discrimination.

that

In

there was

this

case,

despite the fact that Article XII has spawned a
full

decade

separate

law

been made.
Board

of

litigation

suits,

no

and

such

On the contrary,

expressly

denied

employment discrimination.
circumstances,

at

least

finding

three

ever

has

in Jackson II the
the

existence

J.A.

33.

In

of

these

we can give no credence to this

belated and unsupported argument."

5.

Also, I suggest that the first full paragraph

on page 22 be put in a footnote earlier in the opinion at

It seems to me to be misplaced

some appropriate place.

near the end of our opinion, and disrupts the flow of our
analysis.

I

certainly

want

to

use

John

Stevens'

quote

from his Fullilove dissent.
6.

I think your discussion of the

pp. 23-29, is excellent.
single sentence

I

suggest on page

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

..

t

~

issue,

I would end the opinion with the

for further repetition.

,;.

~means~

..

29.

There is no need
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Asian-American Political Muscle
By JoANNE JAcoBS
cans traditionally have tended to register
when you see the Vietnamese visibility in
Hard-working and family-oriented, as Democrats, the political balance is the Republican Party."
Asians have been very successful .in the . shifting. Asian-Americans in California are
Democrats emphasize what they see as
u.s. in a very quiet way. They are called, now evenly split between the two major the problems of Asian-Americans: Japansomewhat patronizingly, the "model mi- parties, and 67% say they voted for Ronald bashing that creates hostility against Japanority"-seen in elite colleges and scien· Reagan in 1984, according to a study by nese-Americans; attacks on Vietnamese·
tific professions, but not heard from .
two California Institute of Technology po- American fishermen; shortages of bilin·
Now, as their numbers are growing, litical-science professors. Co-author Bruce gual teachers; discriminatory college-ad·
Asian-Americans are beginning to build Cain has some advice for the Republican mission policies; employers who hire but
and flex their political muscles. And, un- Party : "Go after the Asian community."
fail to promote Asian-Americans.
like other ethnic groups who lean to the
In particular, Republicans (and worried
Inevitably, they bring up the murder of
Democrats, the right arm may be as pow- Democrats) see more than 700,000 South· Vincent Chin, a young Chinese-American
erful as the left.
east Asian refugees, most of them fer· beaten to death in Detroit in 1982 by two
Except in Hawaii, Asian-Americans vently anti-Communist, as the "new CU· unemployed auto workers who thought he
have not been very important politically, bans." (Cuban voters in Miamr showed was Japanese. The killers received suseven in cities with large Asian populations. their growing political clout this year by pended sentences and fines, . outraging
However, that may be changing:
electing the city's first Cuban mayor.)
Asian-Americans and others.
• Last spring Michael Woo became _the . __ "We are_ an open ~a_rty, ~~e natural
Some Japanese-Americans think politi·
first Asian-American to win a seat on the · party for Vietnamese Citizens, says Bob · cians flirt with racism when they use mili·
Los Angeles City Council, representing a Walker, the executive director for theRe· tant protectionist rhetoric ("trade war,"
predominantly white "Yuppie" district.
publican Party in San Jose and surround· "economic Pearl Harbor") . Rep. Mineta
• Next year, Thomas Hsieh has a good ing Santa Clara County. Republicans have protested strongly last year when Walter Mondale told union members, "We don't
chance of becoming only the second Asian·
American ever elected to the San Fran·
.
want our kids sweeping up under Japanese
cisco Board of Supervisors __ . ___ . ____ ________ _frograms for low-~ncomputers." Mr. Mineta says he told Mr.
• Philippine-born · Irene Natividad
. p
l d
d ·
Mondale that kind of talk was "not good--- - .
come, oor y e ucate m~trade policy, not good foreign policy, not
'
scored another kind of first this year when
nority groups ·don't make
good domestic or ethnic politics." ..
she was elected president of the National
Women's Political Caucus.
S
ful G
• Tiep D. Nguyen, a Republican lawyer
much sense for a group
uccess
roups
The Republican Party offers little to
from San Jose, rna~ become the first Vietwith a higher median jamthose who believe they are victims of dis·
namese-born Amencan to run for Congress
if he decides to challenge Democratic Rep.
ily income than whites
crimination. But the victimized minority
Don Edwards in 1986.
'
model may not appeal to many Asian·
lower unemployment and
Americans. Programs designed to help
I More important, Asian-Americans have
low-income, poorly educated minority
.... .;ce the pe~rcenta:ge of
groups don't make much sense for a mibecome a force in ~ampaign financing in
the past 10 years, gmng money far out of
~u.r•
'
nority group that boasts a higher median
CO llege graduates.
family income than whites, lower rates of
proportion to their numbers. As an ethnic
group, Asians rank second only to Jews as
unemployment and a higher percentage of
contributors to the Democratic Party. Now
they want to turn money into power.
had considerable success in registering college graduates. Affirmative-action
new citizens of Asian ancestry as they "goals" 'for college admission or employRecognition Wanted
leave swearing· in ceremonies.
ment in high-status jobs are likely to back·
"We tend to be bigger· givers on aver·
Democrats are concerned. Thomas fire against Asian-Americans, since they
age than any other .group, but we cancel Hsieh, a member of the Democratic Na· are over-represented. Special preferences
each other out because we give to all can· tional Committee, went to the 1984 GOP for under-represented minorities-blacks
dictates," says Landy Eng, a San Fran· convention and didn't like what he saw. and Hispanics-will mean fewer places for
cisco entrepreneur and head of the Bay "In Dallas, I saw tremendous efforts by Asians, including refugee kids from genu·
Area Committee,.a.new...nonpartisan fund· .. Republicans -to-COw1- Southeast. Asian inely disadvantaged backgrounds. (While
raising group. "Our overall objective is to groups. They had receptions, all sorts of ·many ·of the Vietnamese immigrants are .
get Asian-Americans elected into political special attention. Our party takes for living in poverty, their children are doing
granted a lot of things. Asian traditions are astonishingly well in school.)
office," he says.
In the past, Asians put their energies
very close to the Republican Party's, very
The more relevant models are the Cu·
into hard work and education, retaining an similar. The only reason Asians join the bans and theJeWs, both groups that turned
Eastern contempt for politics and a desire Democratic Party is because they're sym- self-sufficiency, business acumen, strong
to keep a low profile in a frequently hostile pathetic to minority people...
families and devotion to education into
society. The new generation is more as·
In trying to shed the party's special-in- ec~~omic suc~ess and political power . .
sertive and assimilated, willing to raise its terest image, the Democrats have sent
If we ach1eve ~hat the Jews nave 1~
voice and demand the recognition other mixed signals to Asian-Americans. The _ the last 20 years, we II be very.~uccessful,
minority groups have received.
party instituted an Asian Pacific Caucus at sa~s . fund-raiser ~dy Eng. Our lack of
In addition, the enormous tide of immi· the 1984 convention then "de-instituted" political clout 1s hke [haVIng] a team Withgrants has more than tripled the Asian· the-{;aucus in May. in a speech last month out an offensiv_e line." .
American population-from 1.4 million in in San Francisco, nationaJ Democratic
What do _Aslan·Amencans hope t? _ac1970 to 5.1 million today. It is expected to Chairman Paul G. Kirk Jr.- the man who complish With any newly won political
reach 10 million by the year 2000. By 2010, took away the caucus-proposed the for· clou~? Elec~ngmore_Asian ·Americans and
some 12.5% of California's population is mation of a National Federation of Asian· making rac1sm politically unpalatable are
Pacific Americans to give them "an oppor- the ?nly goals that all can agree on. U_nlike
expected to be of Asian ancestry.
Both parties are therefore wooing tunity to play a role in this party and to Je~sh or Cuban voters, AsJan·Amenc~ns
Asians, offering different visions of their pursue a political agenda of importance don t have a common set of foreJgn·pohcy
role in U.S. society. Republicans see them to their communities."
goals. Mr. Eng says h1s committee had to
as middle-class Americans-small·busiAsian Democrats remain upset that a~ee no_t to discuss the issue of China vs.
· ness men, professionals and engineers- their caucus lost its official status while Ta1wan m order to get anywhere.
with conservative family values and a caucuses for blacks, Hispanics and women
Asian -~ericans have plenty of ecostrong tradition of self-help. Democrats remained in the party's bylaws. It showed norruc. weight to throw ~round, ~~d 1hey
still cast Asian-Americans as members of who had clout and who didn 't.
have JUSt begun to use It m politics.
"I fe-el it was a shortsighted, regressive
a minority gro.up needing special protec·
tion from discrimination.
move, " says Democratic Congressman
Ms. Jacobs is an editorial-page writer
While Chinese· and Japanese·Ameri·
Norm Mineta of San Jose, "especially for the San Jose Mercury News.

I

;iupunu <lfltltrl of Ur~ ~niub ;ihtt~g

Jfu'ltinghtn. ~. <If.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 13, 1985

Re:

84-1340 - Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education

Dear Lewis:
I shall await Thurgood's dissent.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

..

December 30, 1985

84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board

Dear Sandra:
Your letter of December 19 - though di.squieting
when I first received it - is in fact quite helpful. This
is to supplement our telephone talk in which I think some of
the points were clarified.
The first paragraph of your letter identifies areas
of agreement, and it seems to me that these are at the heart
of a proper analysis in an affirmative action case. I write
now to comment on specific concerns that you identified. I
agree that faculty diversity (mentioned in Section III-B)
well may be a legitimate state interest. In this particular
case the type of diversity approved in the 1972 agreement
makes little sense. The diversity argument apparently was
not raised below, and was not considered by the DC or CA6.
Accordingly, I think ""e need not address it, and I will omit
discussion of it.
You express concern about some of 'fhat I said in
Section III-C in which I considered respondent's argument
that the layoffs were part of a plan to remedy prior discrimination by the Board. As I noted in Section III-A, remedying prior discrimination by the Board could be a sufficiently important government interest to justify a proper
affirmative action plan.
Confusion arises because there are many different
types of plans for increasing the number of minority employees in a work force, whether of a private or public employer. All of these tend to be called "affirmative action
plans". [See enclosed Post editorial of 8/16/85]. It is
entirely appropriate - and I so advised clients - to adopt a
goal that in effect would give prior consideration to minorities in filling vacancies or as new positions open up.
Adoption of a "goal" or purpose of attaini.ng a more balanced
workforce should not invariably exclude whites. Special
skills may be needed or other reasons may properly require
deviation from the plan. I have reservations about arbitrary "fixed quotas" - even when there are no forced layoffs. But we need not get into this. The central point - as
you have observed - is that under a "goal" type plan no one

2.

is laid off to provide jobs for minorities or is otherwise
directly discriminated against.
Where a plan is adopted that does penalize existing
employees or that requires that they be laid off, as in this
case, the plan must be ju~tified as a means of remedying
prior discrimination by the employer - not merely general
societal discrimination. tlllhen such a plan is challenged in
court it is necessary that such discrimination be proved
unless it has been found to exist tn some other authoritative way.
Where there i.s a determination of prior discri.m1.nation, the queRtion then becomes whether the remedy adopted
is legitimate. As we have discussed, the language in prior
equal protection cases (usually cases not involving affirmative action plans) has been framed i.n t(,lrms of "narrowly
tailored." This language is not as descriptively accurate
in this case as in some others. nut th~ term has acquired a
"secondary meaning," anrl I would hesitate to abandon its use
entirely. What we really intend is that the means employed
ln this case are 5mpermissible e'1en to accnmolish a legitimate state int~rest.
What I ha~1e said ahove does not specifically address each of the points made in your letter. I have focused on my understanding of your primary concerns. I enclose a revised draft that I believe will accord with your
views. The draft has a number of err.ors that I have marked.
The Atex system i.s partially down.
Although you sent copies of your letter of the 19th
to Byron and Bill, I am inclined to make the clarifying
changes in my opinion before going <Hrectly to either of.
them. It is particularly important to have Byron with us,
as his "join" is essential to the Court ooinion that is so
highly desirable.
If you have further suggestions I will be glad to
consider them. I will not recirculate until I hear from
you.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

,.

~U:Vt"tutt

<!fond of tqt 'Jtnittb ~tatts
'Daeftington, ~. QT. 2!T.;i'!..;t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 13, 1985

Re:

No. 84-1340-Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Education

Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in
this one.
Sincerely,

~·

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

C HAMBERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 16, 1985

Re:

84-1340 - Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~~mu~omrtof~t~b~mug
JruJri:ngt~ J. <!f. 2!1~'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

December 17, 1985

No. 84-1340
Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education

Dear Lewis,
I'll await the dissent.
Sincerely,

""

!4J
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

arottri .of tqt ~nitt~ ,jbdts
~asJringht~ 10. ar. 20p~~

.iu.prmtt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 19, 1985
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Re: 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis:

I have reviewed your thorough and well-crafted draft in this
case and fi ·.1d myself generally in agreement with your reasoning.
I agree that Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
which you quoted from at Slip op. 6, undermines the Board's "role
model" justification for maintaining a racial balance of minority
teachers directly proportional to minority students.

But isn't

other language in Swann even more directly on. point, such as the
following passage?
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to
require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right,
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to
reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools
does not mean that every school in every community must
always reflect the racial composition of the school system
as a whole. 402 u.s., at 24.
Regards ,l

_,'

Justice Powell

..

LUt~

,jn.vrtntt <!}.ourt ttf
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2.ll.;t~~

CHAMBERS OF

J U STICE SANDRA DAY O' CONNOR

December 19, 1985

Dear Lewis,
I have read your draft in Wygant with great
interest. It is an important and challenging case.
I am in
agreement with you on a number of aspects of your opinion,
although we may differ in some important respects.
I agree
with you that the strict standard of review set forth in
Part II is the proper one for review of all types of race
based action by the state, including affirmative action.
I
also agree that "societal" discrimination is a concept which
is incapable of definition or limitation, and, thus,
remediation. A state's interest in remedying such societal
discrimination therefore cannot be deemed sufficiently
important to pass constitutional muster under strict
scrutiny.
I also agree with you that the use of a rolemodel theory to justify a hiring goal based on the number of
minority students in the school population was improper.
Lastly, I agree that the layoff plan in this case imposes
disproportionate harm on the rights and interests of some of
the nonminority employees and fails to pass muster under the
requirement that the employer's plan be narrowly tailored to
effectuate its remedial purpose.
Let me now mention some areas of possible
difficulty which I have with your approach. First is the
diversity interest discussion in Part IIIB.
I am not at
rest on this but ' am inclined to think there is a legitimate
state interest in promoting racial d i ver"si ty in public
school ' faculties. The point was raised belatedly by the
respondents in this case and need not be addressed or
resolved in this case, and I am not prepared. to join an
opinion which rejects that goal as not sufficiently
important to meet the test you propose. Your draft states
that this question is left open, but footnote ~ interprets
Bakke in such a way that it may preclude reliance on such an
1nterest.
Second, and more importantly, Part IIIC concludes
that if the Board's purpose in adopting th~ layoff provision
was to remedy prior discrimination, "a factual determination

C',.

I

must have been made, either by the Board or by a court, that
the Board engaged in purposeful discrimination." I suppose
that for the same reason you leave open the previous
question, yo~d l~a-~ . ~pef.l the quest~OI) of what findings
ar~ec~s~.~ry.
I do not think Hazelwood School District, "
which was concerned with the proper basis of comparison for
purposes of statistical evaluation of a Title VII "pattern
or
practice" employment discrimination suit, embodies a
)
. holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that past
discrimination be proven before a state employer ~ may
institute ai1voluntary affirmative action program. Such a
J:~uirement may""put us in the anomalous position of creating
, a severe disincentive to voluntary compliance by public
employers with Title VII and the civil rights laws. Also,
the Court would be saying that what private employers may do
voluntarily to comply with Title VII, public employers are
constitutionally forbidden to do.
Congress itself has made findings concerning the
problem of employment discrimination in public employment to
justify imposition of Title VII requirements on public
employers. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971).
In enacting
the 1972 amendments, Congress intended that the same Title
VII principles be applied to public and private employers
alike. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 u.s. 321, 331 n. 14 (1977)
The Court has Indicated In the past that the constitutional
requirements congressional action must meet to pass muster
under the Fourteenth Amendment are more tolerant than those
controlling in cases where the actions of other governmental
actors are at issue. Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 u.s. 448
(1980). Perhaps, in ligfit of Congress' findings and its
enactment of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, it is
appropriate to conclude that a public employer's voluntary
undertaking to correct a racial disparity in its work force,
which it has a substantial, demonstrable basis for believing
constitutes a prima facie violation of Title VII, is in fact
a remedial measure.
My inclinatJon, then, is to bel~e~~at if a
state employ,er. has. a substantial basi~ ' for - believing that it
is in p?l~a la~ie ~ihlati~n of 1itle VII, either by virtue
of its own investigation or that of some other public agency
charged with enforcement of such laws, its efforts to remedy
the problem will constitute an important state interest.
Regardless of any differences of opinion we may have
regarding the magnitude of the state's interest in this
context, or regarding what findings must be made and by
whom, I think we are in accord concerning the requirement
that the state employer's plan be narrowly tailored to
effectuate its remedial purpose. To pass muster, the plan
must be a temporary measure clearly intended to eliminate

.
'

the violation, not to maintain racial balance. The plan
also cannot impose disproportionate harm on the interests
of, or unnecessarily trammel the rights of nonminority
employees.
I'm not quite sure where this leaves us.
I intend
to continue to work on the problem and to try to articulate
my views more fully if necessary.
I can at least concur in
the judgment and perhaps join parts of the opinion as well.
Byron may have other ideas about all of this and I am sure
we all want to reach as much common agreement as we can.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Rehnquist

~nvttmt <!fourt of tlrt ,-mttb .itatt.ll'

~lfittgtttn. ~.

Qt. 2llbf~'

C HAMB ERS OF

J U S TI C E BYRON R . WHIT E

December 19 , 19 8 5

8 4-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis ,
I doubt that I shall join your proposed
opinion

in

its

present

form

and

as

of

now

intend to wr i te separately concurring in the
judgment.

Mea nwhile , I await the dissent.
Sincerely yours ,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

«routt ltf t!r~ ~uitt~ ~hdts
Jlu£ringbm:. ~. ar. 20.?,.~

,hvttm:t

C HAMBERS OF"

December 20, 1985

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 84-1340, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis :
I shall , of course, await the dissent in this case .
Sincerely ,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

December 20, 1985

84-1340 wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your note, and suggestion.
I am finding it difficult to put a Court together
in this case, as could have been anticipated from the Conference discussion. You have seen Byron's note saying he
will await the dissent. There is no possibility of a Court
without him.

Also, I have had extended discussions, and an exchange of letters, with Sandra. Even she and I are not yet
together. But I am still working on the case, as I think it
is of vital importance for thi~ Court to afford some guidance with respect to affirmative action programs.
I will keep you advised.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

).
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CHAMBERS OF

.J U STICE SANDRA DAY O'CON N OR

January 2, 1986

No. 84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your letter and revised draft in
this case.
I think it is helpful to either omit the faculty
diversity discussion, as you have done, or to point out it
was not raised below.
The other changes you have ~ e seem to me to be
generally helpful.
I continue to ha ~ eservations
concerning the proposed requirement tnat the Board or a
court must have found "purposeful discrimination" (p. 8 of
draft) in order to justify remedial action. And I am still
uncertain how a Title VII discriminatory effects case would
fit under your analysis.
I am still hoping Byron will address his concerns
in the hope a reconciliation is possible.
If you want to
circulate the revised draft it seems to me you should do so.
I am not prepared yet to join quite all of it and think it
could be useful to wait and see what Byron proposes.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

•

~lqfrtntt Qfl11lri llf t4t ~Utb

.ttatt.s'
Jhurlfittgtltn, ~. ([f. 21lt?,.t?

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 2, 1986

\

J~

~~-

{Jj&) ~
No. 84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

~ ~

~

~- 9~

Dear Lewis,

~J

Thank you for your letter and revised draft in
this case.
I think it is helpful to either omit the faculty ~ j 1
diversity discussion, as you have done, or to point out it
~~
was not raised below.
The other changes you have made seem to me to be
generally helpful.
I continue to have reservations
concerning the proposed requirement that the Board or a
court must have found "purposeful discrimination" (p. 8 of
draft) in order to justify remedial action. And I am still
uncertain how a Title VII discriminatory effects case would
fit under your analysis.
I am still hoping Byron will address his concerns
in the hope a reconciliation is possible. If you want to
circulate the revised draft it seems to me you should do so.
I am not prepared yet to join quite all of it and think it
could be useful to wait and see what Byron proposes.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

.;:.·

~-~

~

1

~~~ ·
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January 3, 1986

84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Sandra,
Thank you for your letter of the 2d of January. I
have made certain changes that more accurately state that
the findings necessary to justify remedial action can be of
a statutory or constitutional violation. I also have trf.ed
to make clearer that these findings do not have to he contemporaneous with the instigation of an affirmative action
program. As you agree that societal discrimination is not a
legitimate basis for remedial action, there must be a finding of discrimination by the state agency.
Also, as I have said, the typical "affirmative action plan" so prevalent today is what I have described as
the adoption of a "goal"--a plan to make employment decisions [as vacancies occur or as the work forcl:l! increases]
with the purpose of attaining a work force more representative of the community. No finding of prior discrimination
is required where enlightened management a~opts and implements such a plan. (See opinion p. 8)
Sincerely,

L.F.P., Jr..
Justice O'Connor

~u.prnnt

<!Jllltrl of tqt ,-mu~ ~btfts
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CHAMBERS Or

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 8, 1986

Re:

No. 84-1340 - Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

..
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C!Iouri d

tlft ~b .Shttt•

•a•ftingtott. ~- <!I· 211~_,.,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

I
February 10, 1986

No. 84-1340, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your dissent •

....

Sincerely,

·'

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE

w.. . ..1 .

BRENNAN, .JR .

February 6, 1986

No. 84-1340
Wygant, et al. v. Jackson Board
of Education, etc., et al.

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me in your dissent in
the above.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

·'

January 8, 1986
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board
Dear Byron:

My notes at Conference, and recollection of what
you said, caused me to think that we were in accord as to
how this case should be written. I recall parti.cularly your
statement that you would not foreclose reliance upon "soci.etal discrimination" in all instances, but that it could not
justify a race-based classification that required the layoff of innocent employees such as occurred in thi.s case.
A majority of this Court never has agreed upon the
exact formulation of a standard of equal protection analysis
in an •affirmative action" case. Apart from affirmative
action cases, equal protection analysis of race based classifications has been fai.rly consistent: the state must show
a "compelling" interest and the m@an8 emnloyed must be "narrowly tailored". !tloreover, the showing of the requisite
state interest requires a determination by an appropriate
body of prior purposeful discrimination. (E.g., Conqress in
Fullilove).
The Chief Justice in his Fullilove opinion - that
you and I joined - used somewhat less specific language, and
I have tried to follow it.
Moreover, in Ful.~ilove - and
also in Weber - the means employed ~id not require the depriving of innocent employees of their jobs. In Bowman
there had been dtscrimination against pa~ticular job applicants.
It is certainly desirable -in view of the uncertainty that now exists as to where this Court stands on affirmative action - that we try to put a majority together.
I have made a number of changes in my 2nd draft,
circulated on the 7th. My purpose is to write as narrowly
as possible, and yet articulate a general framework of equal
protection analysis for affirmative action plans adopted by
public agencies or bodies.
As I have discussed this case with Sandra, I am
sending a copy of this letter to her. I am open to suggestions.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cca Justice O'Connor

;inpuuu Qf1rurl1tf t4e ~niub ~hrles
Jl'aslfinghm. ~. <If. 2ll~'!."
C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 27, 1986

Re:

84-1340 - wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education

Dear Lewis:
Although I agree with much of Thurgood's
dissent, I will be writing separately.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,,

March 19, 1986
PERSONAL

84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear .Sandra:
After a lona interlude, in which we focused on
Local 28 and Local 93, I am taking another look at my opinion in Wygant. As therP has been no response of any kind
from Byron, it is oDvious that 1 nee~ your vote rather badly. 1 therefore would welcome any suqaestions vou m3y care
to make.
My .9...~ is t'1at Byrot'l, '"ith his quite positive
view about Title Vll, will write ~en?rately in thiA equal
protection case - despite his anparent aqreement with us at
Conference. Mv hope is that we can et least come out of
this case with a plurality for a jungment.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

--

1 /!)
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

-~;A~~(~

~~~~~ ~
March 21, 1986

Re:

84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis,
Thanks for your letter.
I fear I have
fallen behind in getting out some of the writing I
intend to do.
I am presently trying to put my
thoughts in this case in written form.
I will give
you a "preview" and we can talk about it to see
whether there is anything you might v1ant to incorporate in your draft.
If all qoes well, it will
be ready next week.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

,,

TM

March 28, 1986

84-1340 Wygant

Dear Sandra:
Here are two copies of a proposed third draft of my
opinion in this case.
For the most part, the chanqes are footnotes that
respond to Thurgood's dissent. 1 do think, however, that
his dissent afforded me the opportunity to clarify some of
the basic analysis of my opinion.
I will not circulate this until you have had an
opportunity to take a look at it. As thi~ case presently is
"dead in the waterft, please feel free to put this draft on
the back of your desk until we qet throuqh next week.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

~uttrttttt

Qiltllrt .ttf t4t 'Jnittb ~hdt~

~a.slfingt.ttn, ~ .

QI. 2llgt.l!~

CHAMBERS OF

.J U STICE SA N DRA DAY O'CON N OR

•
March 28, 1986

No. 84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis,
I am enclosing an unpublished draft opinion
concurring in part in your opinion in Wygant. I have shown
it as joining Part I, II, III A, and V although I think what
I say is not consisten_!: with pa.E..t__o f your Part III A. I
want to jo"in as mucn of""yoi:ir opinion as rpossi6ly can. If
you believe we can reach common ground to a greater extent,
I will welcome your sug estions. These affirmative action
cases are v ry 1 1cu e, at least for me. Please let me
know if you would like to discuss any of this.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Enclosure
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CHAMI!IERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

April 7, 1986

84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

MEMORANDUN TO JUSTICE O'CONNOR
From:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Now that I have had an opportunity to read the

draft of your opinion (delivered privately to me several
days ago), I say first that it is exceptionally well written.

I particularly appreciate your willingness to join in

Parts I, II, III-A and V of my opinion, and concur in the
judgment.

As you suggest, there may be shades of difference

- though not enough to make your "join" inappropriate.
In view of your invitation, I make the following
comments for your consideration:
1.
(p. 1).

You accept Thurgood's framing of the question

I do not think his statement is accurate.

firmative hiring policy• before us is challenged.

The "afCould you

not frame the question in your own words, or accept a revision of my question as follows:
"This case presents the question whether a
school board, pursuant to an affirmative action plan adopted by the board and its union,
may extend - consistently with the Equal Protection Clause - preferential protection
against layoff to some of its employees solely because of their race or national origin?"

2.

2.

In describing the various ways in which a

standard of analysis has been framed, I have these suggestions:

(i) After quoting my "standard", you could cite the

Fullilove standard that can be viewed as being
ly in accord with mine.

substantial-

Possibly at this point you also

could quote John Stevens to the effect that "racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classification", Stevens, J., Fullilove, at 537.

(ii)

Since we hope

(faintlyl) that Byron will join at least some part of my
opinion, is it necessary to describe Justice Marshall's position in a way that identifies Byron with the Bakke language, especially since he subsequently joined Fullilove?

I

note, however, that you subscribe to my formulation, and
perhaps I should not ask for more.

I like your quote from

Mississippi University for Women, an opinion I probably
should have joined.
3.

On p. 3, you rephrase Thurgood's position that

there must be a legitimate "remedial purpose" and the means
must not impose "unnecessary hardships on affected persons".
In doing so, you speak of persons "not benefited."

Would it

not be more consistent with the facts of this case to say
that the rights of innocent persons are directly and adversely affected?
4.

The last sentence in your footnote 1 refers to

the "apparent prior employment discrimination by the school

· ~

3.

district•.

I do not think we fairly can say, on the record

before us, that prior discrimination is •apparent.•

One

point of your discussion--and mine--on •findings• is that
this Court cannot make a determination for itself whether
there has been prior discrimination.

Moreover, the state

court in Jackson II expressly found there had been no prior
employment discrimination during the relevant period.
5.

This brings us to your discussion of findings,

beginning on p. 5.

If I understand your position correctly,

I find it persuasive.

It is a thoughtful refinement on the

need for some kind of evidentiary record to justify remedial
race-conscious state action.

I do not think that it is, at

bottom, inconsistent with my views.

If I understand your

position correctly, I could perhaps adopt your reasoning on
the subject.
As I read it, your opinion recognizes (i) the need
for remedial race-conscious state action to be premised on
prior discrimination, and (ii) the need for some determination by the trial court of the legitimacy of that premise if
it is challenged by nonminorities.

You are rightly con-

cerned, however, that a requirement that the trial court
actually make an express finding of prior discrimination
would inhibit voluntary compliance with public employers'
civil rights obligations.

In order to initiate an affirma-

tive action program, you reason that public employers need
only have •information which gives them a sufficient basis

.

.

~

\

4.

for concluding that remedial action is necessary," slip op.
at 9, or, rephrased slightly, "a firm basis for determining
that affirmative action is warranted."

Slip op. at 10.

1

have no trouble agreeing with that as a sufficient basis for
initiating an affirmative action program.
Implicit in your statement of the burdens of proof
and production at trial is the recognition that the trial
court will

have to make some determination whether the em-

ployer had a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial
action is necessary (unless the plan fails for some other
reason).

I read your opinion as stating that the trial

court must determine that the employer had sufficient evidence to support an inference of prior discrimination, or,
as you state elsewhere in the opinion, "a firm basis for
determining that affimrative action is warranted."
at 10.

Slip op.

If I am correct in describing your position in this

way, I will include similar language in my opinion.
6.

You agree that the courts below failed to iden-

tify a sufficiently important governmental purpose, and also
that the "layoff provision" in its operation is not "narrowly tailored" to achieve its asserted remedial purpose because "it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal."

With

these views, of course, I am very much in agreement.

* * *
I am not unaware that I am imposing a burden on you
(when we already are overburdened) to consider the foregoing

5.
comments.

I am grateful for your thoughtful contributions

to my own views in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

MEMORANOUN
From:

TO

JUSTICE O'CONNOR

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Now that l have had an opportunity to read the

draft of your opinion (delivered privately to me several
days ago), 1 say first that it is exceptionally well written.

1 particularly appreciate your willingness to join in

Parts 1, 11, 111-A and V of my opinion, and concur in the
judgment.

As you suggest, there may be shades of difference

- though not enough to make your "ioin" inappropriate.
In view of your invitation, 1 make the following
comments for your consideration:
1.
(p. 1).

You accept Thurgood's framing of the question

1 do not think his statement is accurate.

firmative hiring policy" before us is challenged.

The "afCould you

not frame the question in your own words, or accept a revision of my question as follows:
"This case presents the question whether a
school board, pursuant to an affirmative actlon plan adopted by the board and its union,
may extend - consistently with the Equal Protection Clause - preferential protection
agai.nst layoff to some of its employees solely because of their race or national origin?"

',';''

2.

2.

ln describing the various ways in which a

standard of analysis has been framed, 1 have these suggestions:

(i) After quoting my •standard", you could cite the

Fullilove standard that can be viewed as being
ly in accord with mine.

substantial-

Possibly at this point you also

could quote John Stevens to the effect that "racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classification", Stevens, J., Fullilove, at 537.

(ii)

Since we hope

(faintly!) that Byron will join at least some part of my
opinion, ia it

nece~sary

to describe Justice Marshall's po-

sition in a way that identifies Byron with the Bakke language, especially since he subsequently joined Fullilove?

1

note, however, that you subscribe to my formulation, and
perhaps 1 should not ask for more.

1 like your quote from

Mississippi University for Women, an opinion 1 probably
should have joined.
3.

On p. 3, you rephrase Thurgood's position that

there must be a legitimate •remedial purpose" and the means
must not impose "unnecessary hardships on affected persons".
ln doing so, you speak of persons •not benefited."

Would it

not be more consistent with the facts of this case to say
that the rights of innocent persons are directly and adversely affected?
4.

The last sentence in your footnote 1 refers to

the "apparent prior employment discrimination by the school

..

.

.

3.

district".

I do not think we fairly can say, on the record

before us, that prior discrimination is "apparent."

One

point of your discussion--and mine--on "findings" is that
this Court cannot make a oetermination for itself whether
there has been prior discrimination.

Moreover, the state

court in Jackson II expressly found there had been no prior
employment discrimination during the relevant period.
5.

~his

beginning on p. 5.

brings us to your discussion of findings,
1f 1 understand your position correctly,

1 find it persuasive.

It is a thoughtful refinement on the

need for some kind of evidentiary
race-conscious state action.

reco~~

to

ju~tify

1 do not think that it

bottom, inconsistent wi.th my views.

I~

remedial
i~,

at

1 understant3 your

position correctly, I could perhaps adopt your reasoning on
the subject.
As

1

read it, your opinion recognizes (i) the need

for remedial race-conscious state action to be premised on
prior discrimination, and (ii) the need for some determination by the trial court of the legitimacy of that premise if
it is challenged by nonminorities.

You are rightly con-

cerned, however, that a requirement that the trial court
actually make an express finding of prior discrimination
would inhibit voluntary compliance with public employers'
civil rights obligations.

In order to initiate an affirma-

tive action program, you reason that public employers need
only have "information which gives them a sufficient basis

4.

for concluding that remedial action is necessary," slip op.
at 9, or, rephrased slightly, "a firm basis for determining
that affirmative action is warranted."

Slip op. at 10.

1

have no trouble agreeing with that as a sufficient basis for
initiating an affirmative action program.
Implicit in your statement of the burdens of proof
and pronuction at trial is the recognition that the trial
court will

have to make some determination whether the em-

ployer had a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial
action is necessary (unJPss the plan fails for some other
reason).

1 read your opinion as stating that the trial

court must determine that the employer had sufficient evidence to support an inference of prior discrimination, or,
as you state elsewhere in the opinion, "a firm basis for
determining that affimrative action is warranted."
at 10.

Slip op.

lf 1 am correct in describing your position in this

way, I will include similar language in my opinion.
6.

You agree that the courts below failed to iden-

tify a sufficiently important governmental purpose, and also
that the "layoff provision" in its operation is not "narrowly tailored" to achieve its asserted remedial purpose because "it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal."

With

these views, of course, 1 am very much in agreement.

- * *
1 am not unaware that 1 am imposing a burden on you
(when we already are overburdened) to consider the foregoing

~··

.'

5.

comments.

1 am grateful for your thoughtful contributions

to my own views in this case.

L• .F.P., Jr.
ss

April 12, 1986

84-1340 Wygant

Dear Sandra:
Here is a revised 3rd draft that contains changes
made - in significant part - as a result of your proposed
concurring opinion.
1 will not circulate this until you have had an
opportunity to look at it. Your comments are welcome. 1
think the circulation of vour opinion will be quite helpful.

Sincer.:ely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
Enc.

~nvrttttt

arltltrlttf tqt ~uittb ~tatt~
J'a:$lthtgtou, ~.
2llbi~~

ar.

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 14, 1986

Re:

84-1340

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis,
Your changes in Wygant are most welcome
as far as I am concerned.
I have sent my concurring
opinion to the printer and will be ready to circulate
it when you circulate your 3rd draft. Let's hope
we see some useful action from the one remaining
vote.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

j;tqtrtmt Qf4tu.d llf tqt 'Jitnitt~ j;ta±tg

11ht1lfrittgron. ~. <!f. 2ll&l"';l

/

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 17, 1986

Re:

No. 84-1340-Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Dear Lewis:
I will shortly be circulating a revised version of
my dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

May 6, 1986

84-1340 Wygant

Dear Sandra:
1 have thought a good deal about your suggestion
that 1 return to the earlier version of my Wygant opinion
that did not specifically mention strict scrutiny. Let me
explain briefly why 1 am inclined to stay with the latest
draft of the opinion.
The difference between the third draft (strict scrutiny not specifically mentioned) and the fourth draft is not
really a change in the overall analysis. The third draft
was strict scrutiny in ever.ythinq but name. The fourth
draft in reality represents a more accurate statement of
what the opinion was holding all along, and thus it also
"fits• into the general body of equal protection cases. lt
also conforms with what 1 have written in prior cases.
lf 1 thought there were a chance to obtain a Court
for a standard of scrutiny - something that has eluded us 1 woul~ gladly go along unless it w~re thP. WJB/TM ~tandard
in race cases. But as Byron has declined to join either
your or my opinion, 1 see no real benefit to be gained going
back to language that, as Thurgood's dissent pointed out,
does not have a solid reference point in our earli~r opinions.
In my view, the first prong of equal protection
scrutiny - the strength of the state's interest - is of
minor importance in affirmative action cases. We both believe that the state interest in remedying established prior
discrimination can satisfy even the strict scrutiny standard. Most of these cases will be won or lost on the "narrowly tailored" prong. See footnote seven of my fourth
draft (commentators agreeing that the "means" prong of equal
protection analysis is more important than the wstate interestw prong). Every draft of our opinions has required that
the means chosen to accomplish a valid state interest be
narrowly framed. ~he fourth draft does not change the

2.

standard of analysis on this crucial aspect of this case and
of future affirmative action cases.
Thank you again for your help with this case. 1 am
sure that my opinion is better because of our conversations.
Sincerely

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

·i".

.,.

..

.

lfp/ss 05/16/86
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84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
This is an affirmative action case~that comes
to us from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
An affirmative action

~~n

was adopted in

1972~as

a

part of a collective bargaining agreemen)fbetween the
school board j and its union.

The agreement has been

renewed from time to time, and remains in effect.
Its stated purpose was to employ -and pr-e'&e:z::k""'
enough minority faculty

member ~o

r

equal the percentage

of minority students in the student body.

It also

~

provided for preferential treatment of minority

teacher ~hen layoffs became necessary.
Over the decade following adoption of the
plan, there was litigation in both federal and state
courts.

Although neither court found the existence of

past discriminatory conduct by the

board,~the

state

court approved the layoff preference as justified by
societal discrimination •
. -="""

Petitioner Wendy Wygant~nd other non-minority

teachers; 'ubsequently were laid-off while minority
teachers with less sen.~:_ityjwere retained.
minority teachers ;Jpetitioners here/

The ~n

brought this suit

2.

ain federal District

Court ) alleging ~violation

Equal Protection Clause.

of the

Both the District Court and

the Court of . Appeals, j upheld the minority preference, /
finding it valid as a means of remedying societal
discrimination.
Today, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

There is, however ~no majority opinion for

analy~is. ~~pinion~ ·~~ined
Justice jand Justice Rehnquist,~ a~

the standard of
by the Chief

customary equal protection

standard~pursuant

to which

governmental distinctions based on race;fare inherently
suspect.

This standard also calls for strict scrutiny.
Such a racial classification may be justified~

by a compelling governmental purpose,j provided the
means chosen to accomplish this purpos ~are narrowly
tailored.

.

Justice O'Connor,

t:;';:~~~.J

1\
s-.-0_
concurs in my opinion / except for Part IV thereof, ~&ftd
joins in the judgment of reversal.
in a separate opinion,

---~

concur~
....

in

Justice White, also

the ~·

The plan involved in this case is to be

distinguishe~from

the more customary type of voluntary

affirmative action plans - plans adopted to serve a

,,

3.
compelling or substantial/ governmental interest, and
that do not

di ~ tJY

penalize

Justice Marshall
opinio~

~-minority

employees.

has ~~~~ issenting
~

joined by Justices Brennan}\ Blackmun.,

Y"s tevens ~ .r--

~~

et/t .

~

7

.,

'

~

~)

'
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(Slip Opinion)

United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

WYGANT ET AL. v. JACKSON BOARD OF
EDUCATION ET AL.

Argued November 6, 1985---Decided May 19, 1986

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 84-1340.

u

~ ~¥-..;.,r •'

The collective-bargaining agreement between respondent Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union provided that if it became necessary to
lay off teachers, those with the most seniority would be retained, except
that at no time would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed
at the time of the layoff. After this layoff provision was upheld in litigation arising from the Board's noncompliance with the provision, the
Board adhered to it, with the result that, during certain school years,
nonmino~ity teachers were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were retained. Petitioners, displaced nonnlinority teachers,
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging violations of the Equal
Protection Clause and certain federal and state statutes. Dismissing
the suit on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision, holding that the racial
preferences granted by the Board need not be grounded on a finding of
prior discrimination but were permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination by providing
"role models" for minority schoolchildren. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed.
746 F. 2d 1152, reversed.
JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CmEF JusTICE, JusTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concluded that the layoff provision violates the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 4-12.
(a) In the context of affirmative action, racial classifications must be
justified by a compelling state purpose, and the means chosen by the
state to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored. Pp. 4-5.
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

WYGANT ET AL. v. JACKSON BOARD OF
EDUCATION ET AL.

Argued November 6, 1985-Decided May 19, 1986

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-1340.
The collective-bargaining agreement between respondent Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union provided that if it became necessary to
lay off teachers, those with the most seniority would be retained, except
that at no time would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed
at the time of the layoff. After this layoff provision was upheld in litigation arising from the Board's noncompliance with the provision, the
Board adhered to it, with the result that, during certain school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were retained. Petitioners, displaced nonminority teachers,
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging violations of the Equal
Protection Clause and certain federal and state statutes. Dismissing
the suit on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision, holding that the racial
preferences granted by the Board need not be grounded on a finding of
prior discrimination but were permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination by providing
"role models" for minority schoolchildren. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed.
746 F. 2d 1152, reversed.
JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CmEF JuSTICE, JusTICE REHNQUIST, and JusTICE O'CO:li.'NOR, concluded that the layoff provision violates the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 4-12.
(a) In the context of affirmative action, racial classifications must be
justified by a compelling state purpose, and the means chosen by the
state to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored. Pp. 4-5.
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WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they
do not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The
Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it
implements a layoff plan based on race.
11
The "school admission" cases, which involve the same basic concepts as
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint

Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U. S. 561, 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9,
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.
Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58.
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the

14
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1st draft 12/13/85
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TM dissenting
1st draft 2/5/86
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HAB 2/10/86
JPS dissenting
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JPS will write separately 2/27/86

1

----

,.
If

William Raspberry

, r,
. IP

Common Sense in Court
The U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing the
tricky little case of the Jackson, Mich.,
schoolteachers, decided Monday that it
sometimes makes sense to do a little
race-specific tilting when it comes to· hiring, but that it is usually a good idea to be
race-neutral when it comes to layoffs.
That is not how the court put it, of course.
The opening line of Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr.'s majority o&)inion described the case ·
before the court as "whether a school board,
consistent with the eqUal protection clause,
may extend preferential protection against
layoffs to some of its employees because of
their race or national origin."
But after laying out an acceptable constitutiona! basis for hearing the case, the justices
proceeded to deal with it as human beings:
on the basis of simple fairness and what, to
their minds, makes sense.
Their conclusion-that hiring is one thing,
layoffs another-is probably as good as you
could hope for, unless you're one of those
"strict constructionist" who believe that if
the Framers didn't mention television or
computers or affirmative action, then the
court shouldn't read these things into the
Constitution.
In 1972, the ,Jackson school board, reacting to racial tension in the corrununity,
hammered out an agreement with the Jocal
education association that called for bringing
the percentage of minority teachers in line
with the percentage of minority students. In
order to protect the newly instituted faculty
integration against layoffs, it added a provision calling for proportional layoffs. rather
than a simple seniority system, in case staff
reductions became necessary.
A few years later, it became necessary to
lay cit some teachers. In keeping with the
carefuDy constructed agreement, some black
teachers were retained while some whites
with more seniority were laid cit. Some ci
the whites sued • and on Monday they won.
The Supreme Court majority, writing like
lawyers but reasoning like wise human beings. determined that it makes sense for a
govenunental unit to practice some degree
of race preference in order to correct earlier
racial discrimination by that same unit, but
that generalized "societar discrimination is
"too amorphous a basis" for awarding race
preference•.There had, been no ~ that

··n
if'

the jackson Board of Education 'had ew!
discriminated on the basis of tact;:: ~
;;>
But, no doubt to the dismay of the Reagan
Justice Department, .the court rnjtde cle@r
that it would eowttenance PJ:e{erential ~
to correct past discrimination, ev~n withoUt
the necessity of proving that indiVidual aOOiicants had been discriminated agaii'tst ~ :n
The majority opinion went" on to sa~,
however,·that while race-coriscldus hiring
can sometimes be appropriate;·• rate-cooscious layoffs are another . ·matter.
"Though hiring goals may burden ..tOQ!e
innocent individuals, they simply do not
impose the same kind of injury that layoffs
impose. Denial of a future employment
opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an
existing job," Powell wrote.
The minority opinions were equally
founded in common sense. J1,1stice San<Jta
Day O'Connor, concurring, noted that~
school board was "trapped between the
q>mpeting hazards of liability to minorities
if affrrmative action is tw1 taken to rem~
apparent employment diaqimination •
~abi~ty to ~nminorities ~ ~tiye ~tion u taken.
.
. ..·, .•
Justice Thurgood Marshall. diS&eit · ,
acknowledged that the layoffs~ unf: ,
but said "unfairness ought not be confu
with constitutional injury." He nOted, (J~
pragmatically, that the court .majot:IW
"would nullify years of negotiation and cq!!t
promise designed to solve serious edw:ational problems in the publiC ~~
Jackson. Mich."
··
~
.............. -w... n.....1 ~-. - also in " " -

i'""

~"'d;; ~~~as <D!~SI

"'t

to maintain staff intqtatioo. is one thing.
a white child to be taught by a white
that <Dr, like beauty, is ooly '!!kin deep'; if9s
far mxe coovincing to experience that=
a day-to-<lay basis during the rootine,
·
~process."

.

in

·

In short, the justices, in ways that woh:t
horrify Ed Meese, refused to be bound by
what the Framers of the Constitution or may not have had in mind, ~
instead to view the case before them in
context of what makes sense in the ieal
world. Their conclusion-that affirmatiVe
action rerilains a valid approach but one that
ought to used judiciously, and with a view to
fundamental fairness-makes sense to me.

d/~./~
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Tuesday morning concerning the latest Su··
preme Court decision on affinnative action
·ftfiected the fact that the court is still working its
'way through this issue and is not yet prepared to
·ecme ~ wi~ general ~lines ~ ~~ thi_s
action ~ be .applied. ~ JUStiCes m~an aflirma~e action. plan m Ja~n. Mich.
ic .
caDed for laying off .white teacbex:s wtth tenure
:in order to ~ the .pbs ~ nonwhi~ who were
·atill on ~tion•. But .m do~ 80, it ISSUed five
~te opinions, m which ~ters went beyond the
1icts of the Jackson case to discuss other aspects of
:6mative action. Reading the opinions like tea
leaves, lawyers sought to discern the position of
.ftrious justices on future cases, with special weight
'};eiog given to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,
.~ she is viewed as a critical swing vote on this
. ~As a result, those who oppose numerical
,pis in employment focused on their victory in the
Jacksoo case, while civil rights forces, reading the
more general language of the opinion, quickly
1~ that in losing a battle they had won the war.
•.. This much is clear: 1be court held that there must
·be coovincing evidence of prior discrimination by a
::pablic employer, $UCh as the Jackson school board,
!~ any kind of racial classification can be used to

·etive

tlmt
Fmrr
agree tlmt
racially based layoffs, as opposed to hirings, are in
general too burdensome on a small group of innocent
workers to be justifiable-a view that makes sense
and seems only right to us. Justice O'Connor limited
her agreement to the facts in the jackson case.
This can be inferred: A clear majority of justices
would, in some cases, support the use of goals and
quotas in hiring if this remedy were necessary to
correct past discrimination. And a majority wotild
reject the administration's position that affinnative
action can be used to help only the actual victims of
. . . .
d
~tion an not a ~lass. These were not
questions be~ore the court m the Jackson ca~, but
~ .assumptions based on assertions made m the
opiiUons.
. . .
.
.
Two affinnative-action cases will be decided by
the court this tenn. One involy~ a union's failure to
adhere to a c~-orde:ed hiring plan. 'f!te other
cen~ers on the ~cult JSS~ of ra~onsctous promotions. The p1eces of this complicated puzzle are
slowly being put together in the court, and by july,
more of the picture will be completed. This week's
issue was settled wisely, we believe, for the distinction between layoffs and hiring goals is a valid one, in
human as well as legal tenns.

~------------ Law--------------~

Accent on the Affirmative
The Supreme Court says yes and no on racial preferences
the eight years since the landmark
case, the U.S. Supreme Court
IhasnBakke
tacked back and forth unpredictably

firmative-action plan must be "narrowly
tailored " to achieve its ends, he went on to
signal an inclination to reject race-based
firing schemes for being too harsh on the
innocent, but to look more favorably upon
some hiring plans. A brief separate concurrence by Justice Byron White also
stressed an aversion to layoff plans.

on the issue of affirmative action, prompting Reagan Administration lawyers and
liberal civil rights activists alike to claim
that the results really favored them. Last
week, in what may prove to be a decisive
course marker, the court struck
down by a 5-4 vote a Michigan
school-district plan that sought
to protect minority hiring gains
by laying off white teachers
ahead of blacks with less seniority. It was a decision with a
bit of something for everyone.
The Reagan Administration could, and did , take satisfaction from the majority's view
that the mere fact of discrimination in American life is not
in itself a constitutionally sufficient reason for resorting to
an affirmative-action remedy.
"It is a terrific opinion in our
judgment," said Justice Department Spokesman Terry Eastland . But after reviewing the
splintered opinions, most experts agreed with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. She concluded that the Justices have
"forged a degree of unanimity"
on a key rebuff to a much bruited claim of the Reagan Admin- Plaintiff Wygant back at work In her kindergarten class
istration. It has argued that affirmative action is appropriate only to
The four dissenters were satisfied that
remedy discrimination against specific in- the district's actions were constitutionally
dividual victims. By O'Connor's reading, acceptable. And while the majority was
however, the court is prepared to approve not prepared to go this far, the Justices
"a carefully constructed affirmative-ac- across the board seemed plainly supporttion program ," which " need not be limit- ive of some race-based solutions. Powell
ed to the remedying of specific instances wrote that "in order to remedy the effects
of identified discrimination."
of prior discrimination, it may be necesWhatever it meant in the larger strug- sary to take race into account. " That
gle, the outcome meant victory for Wendy could mean, he added , that "innocent perWygant and the other white teachers who
brought the suit after being laid off in
1981. On hearing the news, she says, "we
whooped it up a little." Most had already
been rehired, but they may now press for
back pay. The layoff plan had been necessary, the Jackson board of education had
contended, to assure enough minority role
models for its minority students. Lewis
Powell , joined by Chief Justice Warren
Burger and William Rehnquist plus
O'Connor, disagreed . In their view, aminority preference plan could have been
justified only by a showing of prior discrimination in the hiring of teachers within the district. "This court never has held
that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification," Pollee aerial shot of Ciraolo's marijuana crop
Powell said. Insisting as well that any af- Bird 's-eye viewing is O.K. , Burger rules.
66

sons may be called upon to bear some of
the burden of the remedy."
The sum of these positions, says Paul
Bender, dean of the law school at Arizona
State University in Tempe, " makes things
better for affirmative action." But for
which plans? The next tests will come
shortly. The Justices have two more major
cases on the subject to decide by July,
one involving fire-department promotions in Cleveland, the other the imposition of a minority-membership goal on a
New York City union. Last week's decision would seem to bode well for those
and other affirmative-action
schemes. But William Bradford
Reynolds, the combative Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights, insisted that he could
still hear the Justices playing
his tune. Because they had required a showing of prior discrimination before the use of
racial preferences, Reynolds
now contends that a 1965 presidential order authorizing minority employment goals for
Government contractors must
be largely abandoned.

• • •
The court last week also
okayed official spying in the
sky. Dante Ciraolo had high
double fences around his backyard in Santa Clara, Calif. Even
so, police acting on a tip were
able to spot the 73 marijuana
plants growing in the yard- by
flying overhead in a chartered
plane. Dow Chemical Co. had
even more elaborate security
precautions at its plant in Midland, Mich.
So the Environmental Protection Agency
also sent up an airplane, to get pictures as
part of an inspection of the site. In two 5-4
decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that
neither search from the skies required a
warrant.
Warren Burger, who wrote both majority opinions, stated in the California
case that although residential yards are
ordinarily fully covered by the privacy
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, it
was unreasonable to expect such protection for activities that are "visible to
the naked eye" by police " traveling in the
public airways." In the Dow case Burger
went further, saying that a factory area
was not comparable to a private yard ,
and that the $22,000 magnifying camera
used by the EPA was not in the
same league as high-tech snooping devices that might require a search warrant.
The majority's course worried Lewis
Powell, who spoke for the dissenters in
both cases. The failure to protect privacy
rights, he said in the Dow decision, "will
permit their gradual decay as technology
advances. "
- By Richard Lacayo.
Reported by Jay Branegan/Washington
TIME, JUNE 2, 1986
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past
to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in
employing more black teachers in the future. Rather than
analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority
teachers have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a
remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe
that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances
the public interest in educating children for the future. If
so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest,
and the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse
effects on the disadvantaged group. 1
I
The Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the use
of race in many governmental contexts. To cite only a few:
the government may not use race to decide who may serve on
'"In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions.
What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being
served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class
that justifies the disparate treatment?"
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. - , (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring).

/
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juries, 2 who may use public services, 3 who may marry, 4 and
who may be fit parents. 5 The use of race in these situations
is "utterly irrational" because it is completely unrelated to
any valid public purpose; 6 moreover, it is particularly pernicious because it constitutes a badge of oppression that is unfaithful to the central promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Nevertheless, in our present society, race is not always irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking. 7 To take
the most obvious example, in law enforcement, if an undercover agent is needed to infiltrate a group suspected of ongoing criminal behavior-and if the members of the group are
Batson v. Kentucky, - - U. S. - - (1986); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U. S. - - (1985); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
3
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967).
5
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
6
Cleburne, supra, at-- (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("It
would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or
weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color"). See also
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according
to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public
concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category").
7
As JUSTICE MARSHALL explains, although the Court's path in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) is tortuous, the path at least reveals that
race consciousness does not automatically violate the Equal Protection
Clause. In those opinions, only two Justices of the Court suggested that
race conscious governmental efforts were inherently unconstitutional.
See id., at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by REHNQUIST, J.). Cf.
id., at 548 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and MR.
JusTICE REHNQUIST, ... I am not convinced that the Clause contains an
absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based on race").
Notably, in this Court, petitioners have presented solely a constitutional
theory, and have not pursued any statutory claims. Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S.
at 408 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that constitutional issue need not be reached because statutory
issue was dispositive).
2
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all of the same race-it would seem perfectly rational to employ an agent of that race rather than a member of a different
racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably
conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a more
effective job of maintaining law and order than a force composed only of white officers.
In the context of public education, 8 it is quite obvious that
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white,
faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land.
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white
teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far
more convincing to experience that truth on a day to day
basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
In this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Union and the Board of Education succinctly stated a
8

The Court has frequently emphasized the role of public schools in our
national life. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982)
(plurality opinion) ("[P]ublic schools are vitally important ... as vehicles
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"'); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979)
("Tne importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions"); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30 (1973) ("'the grave
significance of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be
doubted"); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954)
("[E]ducation ... is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment").
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valid public purpose-"recognition of the desirability of
multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty," and
thus "a policy of actively seeking minority group personnel."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Nothing in the record-not a
shred of evidence-contradicts the view that the Board's attempt to employ, and to retain, more minority teachers in the
Jackson public school system served this completely sound
educational purpose. Thus, there was a rational and unquestionably legitimate basis for the Board's decision to enter into
the collective-bargaining agreement that petitioners have
challenged, even though the agreement required special efforts to recruit and retain minority teachers.
II
It is argued, nonetheless, that the purpose should be
deemed invalid because, even if the Board of Education's
judgment in this case furthered a laudable goal, some other
boards might claim that their experience demonstrates that
segregated classes, or segregated faculties, lead to better academic achievement. There is, however, a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of a minority
race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include
more members of the minority in a school faculty for that
reason.
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that
differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect
real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share
in the blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is
"utterly irrational," Cleburne, supra, at--, and repugnant
to the principles of a free and democratic society. Nevertheless, the fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have
differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is
some significant difference between such persons. The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion
could only tend to foster it. The inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men are created equal; the
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exclusionary decision is at war with that principle. One decision accords with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the other does not. Thus, consideration
of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose
in this case from a race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality. 9

III
Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness,
however, the question that remains is whether that public
purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are
disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given
to its most recently hired minority teachers. In my view,
there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the
procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the
race-conscious action. 10 The second is an evaluation of the
nature of the harm itself.
Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an
infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody"); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81
(1917) (rejecting legitimacy of argument that the "proposed segregation
will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts").
10
Cf. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 548-549 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (a racebased classification "does impose a special obligation to scrutinize any governmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions between citizens on the basis of their race and incidentally also
discriminates against noncitizens in the preferred racial classes. For just
as procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decisionmaking in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving
the impartial character of the legislative process"). That observation is, of
course, equally applicable to a context in which the governmental decision
is reached through a nonlegislative process. Significantly, a reason given
for what this Court frequently calls "strict scrutiny" of certain classifications is the notion that the disadvantaged class is one that has been unable
to enjoy full procedural participation. See United States v. Carotene
Products, Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against dis9
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In this case, there can be no question about either the fairness of the procedures used to adopt the race-conscious provision, or the propriety of its breadth. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has demonstrated, the procedures for adopting this
provision were s<:_rulllllously fair. The U~ents
the petitioners negotiated the provision and a eed t it; the
agreemen was pu o a vo e o the membership, and over- _.,.,
whelmingly approved. Again, not a shred of evidence in the
record suggests any procedural unfairness in the adoption of
the agreement. Similarly, the provision is specifically designed to achieve its objective-retaining the minority teachers that have been specially recruited to give the Jackson 1
schools, after a period of racial unrest, an integrated faculty. 11 I~ ~ ~
Thus, in str~procedural inadequacy and
unjustified breadth of the race-based classification in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), 12 the race-conscious layoff policy here was adopted with full participation of the disadvantaged individuals and with a-naiTowly circumscrffiea6erth for the policy's operation.
Finally, we must consider the harm to the petitioners.
Every layoff, like every refusal to employ a qualified applicrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry"); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77
(1980).
11
The layoff provision states:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be
a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." App. to
Pet. for Cert. 23a.
The layoff provision follows the agreement's statement of the goal of an increased minority presence on the faculty and of the commitment to active
minority recruiting and hiring efforts. ld., at 22a-23a.
12
See 448 U. S. , at 532 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting).
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cant, is a grave loss to the affected individual. However, the
undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that this serious
consequence to the petitioners is not based on any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype. 13
Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to
lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections
intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the
faculty in the Jackson schools. Thus, the same harm might
occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given
special contractual protection because their specialties were
in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced a
fiscal need for layoffs. A Board decision to grant immediate
tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an athletic coach, and a language teacher, for example, might reduce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depression and therefore have precisely the same impact as the
racial preference at issue here. In either case, the harm
would be generated by the combination of economic conditions and the special contractual protection given a different
group of teachers-a protection that, as discussed above, was
justified by a valid and extremely strong public interest. 14
Cf. Mathews v. Lucas , 427 U.S. 495, 520-521 (1976) (STEVENS, J .,
dissenting).
14
The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring
context, has no bearing on the constitutional question. For if the Board's
interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to justify providing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson, Michigan, it is
also sufficient to justify their retention when the number of available jobs
is reduced. JUSTICE PowELL's suggestion, ante, at 11-12, that there is a
distinction of constitutional significance between a racial preference at the
time of hiring and an identical preference at the time of discharge is thus
wholly unpersuasive. He seems to assume that a teacher who has been
working for a few year€ suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the
harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he
is qualified. In either event, the adverse decision forecloses "only one of
several opportunities" that may be available, ante, at 12, to the disappointed teacher. Moreover, the distinction is artificial, for the layoff pro18
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IV
We should not lightly approve the government's use of a
race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers
of such classifications. 15 Our ultimate goal must, of course,
be "to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." 16 In this
case, however, I am persuaded that the decision to include
more minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan, school system served a valid public purpose, that it was adopted with
fair procedures and given a narrow breadth, that it transcends the harm to petitioners, and that it is a step toward
that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

vision at issue in this case was included as part of the terms of the hiring of
minority and other teachers under the collective bargaining agreement.
16
See, e. g., Fullilove , 448 U. S. , at 534, n. 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
16
!d., at 547.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past
to support the conclusion that it has a legi imate interest in
employing more black teachers in the fut re. Rather than
analyzing a case of this kind by askin whether minority
teachers have some sort of special enti ement to jobs as a
remedy for sins that were committe 'n the past, I believe
that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances
the public interest in educating children for the future. If
so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest,
and the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse
effects on the disadvantaged group. 1
I

The Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the use
of race in many governmental contexts. To cite only a few:
'"In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions.
What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being
served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class
that justifies the disparate treatment?"
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. - , (1985)
(STEVENS, J., concurring).

84-1340-DISSENT
2

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

the government may not use race to decide who may serve on
juries, 2 who may use public services, 3 who may marry, 4
and who may be fit parents. 5 The use of race in these situations is "utterly irrational" because it is completely unrelated
to any valid public purpose; 6 moreover, it is particularly
pernicious because it constitutes a badge of oppression that
is unfaithful to the central promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Nevertheless, in our present society, race is not always irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking. 7 To take
the most obvious example, in law enforcement, if an undercover agent is needed to infiltrate a group suspected of ongoVasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. - - (1985); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S.
545 (1979); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
3
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967).
5
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984).
• Cleburne, supra, at - - (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("It
would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or
weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color"). See also
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according
to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public
concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category").
7
As JusTICE MARSHALL explains, although the Court's path in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) is tortuous, the path at least reveals that
race consciousness does not automatically violate the Equal Protection
Clause. In those opinions, only two Justices of the Court suggested that
race conscious governmental efforts were inherently unconstitutional.
See id., at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by REHNQUIST, J.). Cf.
id., at 548 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, ... I am not convinced that the Clause contains an
absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based on race").
Notably, in this Court, petitioners have presented solely a constitutional
theory, and have not pursued any statutory claims. Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S.
at 408 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that constitutional issue need not be reached because statutory
issue was dispositive).
2
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ing criminal behavior-and if the members of the group are
all of the same race-it would seem perfectly rational to employ an agent of that race rather than a member of a different
racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably
conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a more
effective job of maintaining law and order than a force composed only of white officers.
In the context of public education, 8 it is quite obvious that
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white,
faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together in· our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land.
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white
teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far
more convincing to experience that truth on a day to day
basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
8

The Court has frequently emphasized the role of public schools in our
national life. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982)
(plurality opinion) ("[P]ublic schools are vitally important ... as vehicles
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"'); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979)
("The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions"); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30 (1973) ("'the grave
significance of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be
doubted"); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954)
("[E]ducation ... is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment").
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In this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Union and the Board of Education succinctly stated a
valid public purpose-"recognition of the desirability of
multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty," and
thus "a policy of actively seeking minority group personnel."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Nothing in the record-not a
shred of evidence-contradicts the view that the Board's attempt to employ, and to retain, more minority teachers in the
Jackson public school system served this completely sound
educational purpose. Thus, there was a rational and unquestionably legitimate basis for the Board's decision to enter into
the collective-bargaining agreement that petitioners have
challenged, even though the agreement required special efforts to recruit and retain minority teachers.
II

It is argued, nonetheless, that the purpose should be
deemed invalid because, even if the Board of Education's
judgment in this case furthered a laudable goal, some other
boards might claim that their experience demonstrates that
segregated classes, or segregated faculties, lead to better academic achievement. There is, however, a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of a minority
race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include
more members of the minority in a school faculty for that
reason.
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that
differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect
real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share
in the blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is
"utterly irrational," Cleburne, supra, at--, and repugnant
to the principles of a free and democratic society. Nevertheless, the fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have
differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is
some significant difference between such persons. The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inev-
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itably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion
could only tend to foster it. The inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men are created equal; the
exclusionary decision is at war with that principle. One decision accords with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the other does not. Thus, consideration
of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose
in this case from a race-conscious decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality. 9
III
Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness,
however, the question that remains is whether that public
purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are
disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given
to its most recently hired minority teachers. In my view,
there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the
procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the
race-conscious action. 10 The second is an evaluation of the
nature of the harm itself.
9
Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an
infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody"); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81
(1917) (rejecting legitimacy of argument that the "proposed segregation
will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts").
10
Cf. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 548-549 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (a racebased classification "does impose a special obligation to scrutinize any governmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions between citizens on the basis of their race and incidentally also
discriminates against noncitizens in the preferred racial classes. For just
as procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decisionmaking in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving
the impartial character of the legislative process"). That observation is, of
course, equally applicable to a context in which the governmental decision
is reached through a nonlegislative process. Significantly, a reason given
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In this case, there can be no question about either the
fairness of the procedures used to adopt the race-conscious
provision, or the propriety of its breadth. As JUSTICE
MARSHALL has demonstrated, the procedures for adopting
this provision were scrupulously fair. The Union that represents the petitioners negotiated the provision and agreed to
it; the agreement was put to a vote of the membership, and
overwhelmingly approved. Again, not a shred of evidence in
the record suggests any procedural unfairness in the adoption of the agreement. Similarly, the provision is specifically
designed to achieve its objective-retaining the minority
teachers that have been specially recruited to give the Jackson schools, after a period of racial unrest, an integrated faculty.11 Thus, in striking contrast to the procedural inadequacy and unjustified breadth of the race-based classification
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), 12 the raceconscious layoff policy here was adopted with full participation of the disadvantaged individuals and with a narrowly
circumscribed berth for the policy's operation.
for what this Court frequently calls "strict scrutiny" of certain classifications is the notion that the disadvantaged class is one that has been unable
to enjoy full procedural participation. See United States v. Carotene
Products, Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry"); J . Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77
(1980).
The layoff provision states:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be
a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." App. to
Pet. for Cert. 23a.
The layoff provision follows the agreement's statement of the goal of an increased minority presence on the faculty and of the commitment to active
minority recruiting and hiring efforts. Id., at 22a-23a.
12
See 448 U. S., at 532 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
11
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Finally, we must consider the harm to the petitioners.
Every layoff, like every refusal to employ a qualified applicant, is a grave loss to the affected individual. However, the
undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that this serious
consequence to the petitioners is not based on any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype. 13
Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to
lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections
intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the
faculty in the Jackson schools. Thus, the same harm might
occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given
special contractual protection because their specialties were
in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced a
fiscal need for layoffs. A Board decision to grant immediate
tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an athletic coach, and a language teacher, for example, might reduce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depression and therefore have precisely the same impact as the
racial preference at issue here. In either case, the harm
would be generated by the combination of economic conditions and the special contractual protection given a different
group of teachers-a protection that, as discussed above, was
justified by a valid and extremely strong public interest. 14
Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-521 (1976) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
14
The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring
context, has no bearing on the constitutional question. For if the Board's
interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to justify providing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson, Michigan, it is
also sufficient to justify their retention when the number of available jobs
is reduced. JUSTICE POWELL's suggestion, ante, at 13-15, that there is a
distinction of constitutional significance between a racial preference at the
time of hiring and an identical preference at the time of discharge is thus
wholly unpersuasive. He seems to assume that a teacher who has been
working for a few years suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the
harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he
is qualified. In either event, the adverse decision forecloses "only one of
several opportunities" that may be available, ante, at 14, to the disap13

t
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IV
We should not lightly approve the government's use of a
race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers
of such classifications. 15 Our ultimate goal must, of course,
be "to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." 16 In this
case, however, I am persuaded that the decision to include
more minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan, school system served a valid public purpose, that it was adopted with
fair procedures and given a narrow breadth, that it transcends the harm to petitioners, and that it is a step toward
that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

pointed teacher. Moreover, the distinction is artificial, for the layoff provision at issue in this case was included as part of the terms of the hiring of
minority and other teachers under the collective bargaining agreement.
15
See, e. g., Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 534, n. 5 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting).
16
!d. , at 547.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

This case requires us to define and apply the standard required
by the Equal Protection Clause when a governmental agency agrees
to give preferences on the basis of race or national origin in
making layoffs of employees.

The specific question posed is, as

JUSTICE MARSHALL puts it, "whether the Constitution prohibits a

~~~f

union and a local school board from developing a collective-

~,.

bargaining agreement that apportions layoffs between two raciall
determined groups as a means of preserving the effects of an affirmative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is unchallenged
5-6]

[in this litigation]."

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

Post, at

..,

~r.
~J...J-.,-

~

[draft op.

There is no issue here of the

interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act; accordingly, we have only the constitutional issue to reso 1 ve.
The Equal Protection Clause standard applicable to racial classifications that work to the disadvantage of "nonminorities" has

1?'/1-

2.

been articulated in various ways.
[draft op. at 6-7]

See, e. g., post, at

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

now would require that:

JUSTICE POWELL

(1) the racial classification be justi-

fied by a "sufficiently important" state purpose, and (2) the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose be "narrowly
tailored."

Ante, at

[draft op. at 5].

JUSTICES MARSHALL,

BRENNAN, and BLACKMUN, however, seem to adhere to the standard
that they authored, with JUSTICE WHITE, in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265

(1978): "remedial use of race

is permissible if it serves 'important governmental objectives'
and

is 'substantially related to achievement of those objec-

tives.'"

Post, at

[draft op. at 6]

ing) (quoting Bakke, supra, at 359
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.).

(MARSHALL, J., dissent-

(opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE,

The principal point dividing

w~

~

the ~~~

Court in formulating a single standard of review, then, is
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires that a "benign" racial classification be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a sufficiently important state interest or whether the Clause requires
only that the classification be "substantially related" to that
purpose.

c:o:::;c::~:o:: :::T::n:aO:L:~ h:::m:::::::e:::;u::p:;edm:r: ex~ )I~
5

amining racial classifications in other contexts.

In my view,

3

0

"the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not
vary simply because the objective appears acceptable to
individual Members of the Court. While the validity
and importance of the objective may affect the outcome
of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change."
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s.
718, 724 n. 9 (1982).
However, I agree with JUSTICE MARSHALL that ultimately, "[b]oth
tests seek a legitimate remedial purpose and require that the
means chosen to achieve that purpose avoid imposing unnecessary
hardships on the affected persons," or, as I would phrase it,
require that the means chosen cannot impose disproportionate harm
on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of individuals who are not benefitted by a plan's racial preference.
Post, at

[draft op. at 7-8]

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

Respondent School Board argues that the governmental pur pose or
goal advanced here was the School Board's desire to correct apparent prior employment discrimination against minorities while
avoiding further litigation.
15-17.

See, e. g., Brief for Respondent

See also Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss 16 (hereinafter cited as Defendant's Summary Judgment Brief).

The Michigan Civil Rights

Commission determined that the evidence before it supported the
---~

allegations of discrimination on the part

f the Jackson School

Board, though that determination was nev

reduced to formal

~

~

~

4

4.

findings because the School Board, with the agreement of the
Jackson Education Association (Union), voluntarily chose to remedy the perceived violation.

Among the measures the School Board

and the Union eventually agreed were nee essary to remedy the apparent prior discrimination was the layoff provision challenged
here; they reasoned that without the layoff provision, the remedial gains made under the ongoing hiring goals contained in the
collective bargaining agreement could be eviscerated by layoffs.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not focus on the
School Board's unquestionably important interest in remedying its
apparent prior discrimination when evaluating the constitutionality of the challenged layoff provision.

Instead, both courts

reasoned that the goals of remedying "societal discrimination"
and providing "role mooels" were sufficiently important to withstand equal protection scrutiny.

I agree with the Court that a

governmental agency's interest in remedying "societal" discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions,
cannot be deemed sufficiently important to pass constitutional
muster under strict scrutiny.
Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307

See ante, at

(opinion of POWELL, J.).

See also
I also concur

in the Court's assessment that use by the courts below of a "role
model" theory to justify the conclusion that this plan had a legitimate remedial purpose was in error.l

1

The

goal of

providing

See ante, at

"role-models" discussed
(Footnote continued)

by

the

5•

Thus, in my view, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
clearly erred in relying on these purposes and in failing to give

~

greater attention to the School Board's asserted purpose of rectifying its own apparent discrimination.
The error of the District Court and the Court of Appeals can be
explained by reference to the fact that the primary issue argued
by the parties on the cross motions for summary judgment was
whether the School Board, a court, or another competent body had
to have made a finding of past discrimination before or at the
time of the institution of the plan in order for the plan to be
upheld as remedial in purpose.
Mich. 1982).

546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (ED

See also Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment 5-13; Defendant's Summary Judgment Brief 11-15.

The

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty.
Because this latter goal was not urged as such in support
of the layoff provision before the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, however, I do not believe it necessary
to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applicability in this case.
The only governmental interests at
issue here are those of remedying "societal" discrimination, providing "role models," and remedying apparent prior employment di crimination by the School DistriC€ . .. ..--

6.

courts below ruled that a particularized, contemporaneous finding
of discrimination was not necessary and upheld the plan as a remedy for "societal" discrimination, apparently on the assumption
that in the absence of a specific, contemporaneous finding, any
discrimination addressed by an affirmative action plan could only
be termed "societal."
lieve that

thi~

See, e. g., 546 F. Supp., at 1199.

I be-

assumption is false and therefore agree with the
~....,

Court that a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past dis-

--

crimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitutional prerequisite to a public employer's voluntary agreement to
~4--~- ~ ,~~H..a.-~
an affirmative action plan.
See ante, at
[draft op. at 8].
A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements
does not arise with the making of a finding;
wrong is committed.

it arises when the

Contemporaneous findings serve solely as a

means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the governmental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts an affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through general societal discrimination.

u.s.

448, 498

See, e. g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448

(1980) (POWELL, J., concurring) ("Because the dis-

tinction between permissible remedial action and

impermissible

racial preference rests on the existence of a constitutional or
statutory violation, the legitimate interest in creating a race-

7.

conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has found that such a violation has occurred.").
Such findings, when voluntarily made by a public employer, obviously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards
of value both to nonminority employees and to the public employer
itself, should its affirmative action program be challenged in
court.

If contemporaneous findings were required of public em-

ployers in every case as a precondition to the constitutional
validity of their affirmative action efforts, however, the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would dim, for they
could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important
values.
The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they
engage

in affirmative action programs would severely undermine

public employers'

incentive to meet voluntarily their civil

rights obligations.

See, e. g., Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of

BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); cf. Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210-211

(BLACKMUN, J., concurring).

This

result would clearly be at odds with this Court's and Congress'
consistent emphasis on "the value of voluntary efforts to further
the objectives of the law."

Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of

BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); see also Albemarle

8.

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.

405, 417-418

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.

36, 44

(1975): Alexander v.

(1974).

The value of volun-

tary compliance is doubly important when it is a publ i c employer
that acts, both because of the example its voluntary assumption
7

of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmental discrimination is of unique importance.

See S. Rep. No. 92-

415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1971) (accompanying the amendments
extending cove rage of Title VII to the States) ("Discrimination by
government ... serves a doubly destructive purpose.

The exclu-

sion of minorities from effective participation in the bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all
too often hostility toward the entire process of government.").
Imposing a contemporaneous findings requirement would produce the
anomalous result that what private employers may voluntarily do
to correct apparent violations of Title VII, Steelworkers v. Weber, 443

u.s.

193

(1979), public employers are constitutionally

forbidden to do to correct their statutory and constitutional
transgressions.
Such results cannot, in my view, be justified by reference to
the incremental value a contemporaneous findings requirement
would have as an evidentiary safeguard.

As is illustrated by

this case, public employers are trapped between the competing

~

9.

hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not
taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability
to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken.

Where these

employers, who are presumably fully aware both of their duty
under federal law to respect the rights of all their employees
and of their potential liability for failing to do so, act on the
basis of information which gives them a sufficient basis for coneluding that remedial action is necessary, a contemporaneous
findings requirement should not be necessary.
This conclusion is consistent with our previous decisions recognizing the States' ability to take voluntary race-conscious action to achieve compliance with the law even in the absence of a
specific finding of past discrimination.

See, e. g., United Jew-

ish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-166 (1977) (reapportionment); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402
regation).

u.s.

39 (1971) (school deseg-

Indeed, our recognition of the responsible state ac-

tor's competency to take these steps is assumed in our recognition of the States' constitutional duty to take affirmative steps
to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination.
Education, 402
391

u.s.

See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of

u.s.

1, 15 (1971); Green v. County School Board,

430, 437-438 (1968).

Of course, the public employer must discharge this sensitive

I'""-.:::: Jr~---·
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duty with great care; in order to provide some measure of protection to the interests of its nonminority employees and the employer itself in the event that its affirmative action plan is
challenged, the public employer must have a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is war ran ted.

Public employers

are not without reliable benchmarks in making this determination.
For example, demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the
percentage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching staff and
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool
sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice
claim by minority teachers would lend a compelling basis for a
competent authority such as the School Board to conclude that
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment discrimination.
As the Court suggests, such a conclusion is not unassailable.
See ante, at

[draft op. at 8].

If a voluntary affirmative

action plan is subsequently challenged in court by nonminority
employees, those employees must be given the opportunity to prove
that the plan does not meet the constitutional standard this
Court has articulated.

However, to the extent that the Court
-----------~--~--

implies that a public employer bears the burden of convincing the

the court must make an actual finding of prior discrimination

...,. ct

1

~ nc,;

~,.........,.~

~~~

11.

based on the employer's proof before the employer's affirmative
~~--'-~~~~~~------~~--action plan will be upheld, see ante, at
[draft op. at 8], I

-

- ...___.__

--------

must disagree.

In "reverse discrimination" suits, as in any oth-

er suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demonstrating that their rights have been violated.

The findings a

court must make before upholding an affirmative action plan refleet this allocation of proof and the nature of the challenge
asserted.

For instance, in the example posed above, the nonmi-

nority teachers could easily demonstrate that the purpose and
effect of the plan is to impose a race-based classification.

But

when the Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of
its remedial purpose, the nonminority teachers would continue to
bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the Board's
evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and
thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis
of this evidence was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored."

Only

by meeting this burden could the plaintiffs establish a violation
of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the presurnption that the Board's assertedly remedial action based on the
statistical evidence was justified.
In sum, I do not think that the layoff provision was constitu~

tionally infirm simply because the School Board, the Commission
or a

----court had not

----_.,...

made particularized findings of discrimination

. t··.

; ""

~-

.,

'j
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at the time the provision was agreed upon.

But when the plan was

challenged, the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not
make the proper inquiry into the legitimacy of the Board's asserted remedial purpose;

instead,
they relied upon governmental
_ __,
........-c-

I (

purposes that we have deemed insufficient to withstand strict

.

----

\

scrut1ny, and therefore failed to isolate a sufficiently impor4s;i!=4t.-tant governmental purpose that could support the challenged p ro- .,bi£J

------

~

vision .

..----....

There is, however, no need to inquire whether the provision actually had a legitimate remedial purpose based on the record,

such as it is, because the judgment is vulnerable on yet another

~------------------

ground: the courts below applied a "reasonableness" test in evale

~

~-------

uating the relationship between the ends pursued and the means
employed to achieve them that is plainly incorrect under any of
the standards articulated by this Court.

Nor is it necessary to

resolve the troubling questions of whether any layoff provision
could survive strict scrutiny or whether this particular layoff
provision could in the abstract pass the onerous "narrowly tailored"

requirement.

This layoff provision in its operation

clearly is not "narrowly tailored" to achieve its asserted remedial purpose because it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal.
Although the constitutionality of the hiring goal as such is not
before us, it is impossible to evaluate the necessity of the lay-

~

13.

off provision as a remedy for the apparent prior employment discrimination absent reference to that goal.

In this case, the

hiring goal that the layoff provision was designed to safeguard
'

was tied to the percentage of minority students in the school

--

district, not to the percentage of qualified minority teachers
within the relevant labor pool.

The disparity between the per-

centage of minorities on the teaching staff and the percentage of
minorities in the student body is not probative of employment
discrimination; it is only when it is established that the availability of minorities in the relevant labor pool far exceeded
those hired that one may draw an inference of deliberate discrimination in employment. See Hazelwood School District, 433
U.S. 299, 308

(1977).

Because the layoff provision here acts to

maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to remedying employment discrimination, it cannot be adjudged "narrowly
tailored" to effectuate its asserted remedial purpose.
I therefore join in parts I, II, IIIA, and V of the Court's
opinion, and concur in the judgment.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

~

Justice White
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JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
The school board's policy when layoffs are necessary is to
maintain a certain proportion of minority teachers. This policy requires laying off non-minority teachers solely on the
basis of their race, including teachers with seniority, andretaining other teachers solely because they are black, even
though some of them are in probationary status. None of
the interests asserted by the board, singly or together, justify this racially discriminatory layoff policy and save it from
the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause. Whatever the
legitimacy of hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of
white teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has
been shown to be a victim of any racial discrimination, is
quite a different matter.
I cannot believe that in order to
integrate a work force, it would be permissible to discharge
whites and hire blacks until the latter comprised a suitable
percentage of the work force. None of our cases suggest
that this would be permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, our cases look quite the other way. The
layoff policy in this case-laying off whites who would otherwise be retained in order to keep blacks on the job-has the
same effect and is equally violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. I agree with th
·
·
licy is unconstitutional and he e concur in its judgment.
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WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON ~
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986)

JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
When this Court seeks to resolve far-ranging constitutional
issues, it must be especially careful to ground its analysis
firmly in the facts of the particular controversy before it.
Yet in this significant case, we are hindered by a record that
is informal and incomplete. Both parties now appear to realize that the record is inadequate to inform the Court's decision. Both have lodged with the Court voluminous "submissions" containing factual material that was not considered by
the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Petitioners have
submitted 21 separate items, predominantly statistical
charts, which they assert are relevant to their claim of discrimination. Respondents have submitted public documents
that tend to substantiate the facts alleged in the brief accompanying their motion for summary judgment in the District Court. These include transcripts and exhibits from two
prior proceedings, in which certain questions of discrimination in the Jackson schools were litigated, Jackson Education
Association v. Board of Education, No. 4-72340 (ED Mich.
1976) (Jackson 1), and Jackson Education Association v.
Board of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson Cty. Cir.
Ct. 1979) (Jackson 11).
We should not acquiesce in the parties' attempt to try their
case before this Court. Yet it would be just as serious a mis-
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take simply to ignore altogether, as the plurality has done,
the compelling factual setting in which this case evidently has
arisen. No race-conscious provision that purports to serve a
remedial purpose can be fairly assessed in a vacuum.
The haste with which the District Court granted summary
judgment to respondents, without seeking to develop the factual allegations contained in respondents' brief, prevented
the full exploration of the facts that are now critical to resolution of the important issue before us. Respondents' acquiescence in a premature victory in the District Court
should not now be used as an instrument of their defeat.
Rather, the District Court should have the opportunity to develop a factual record adequate to resolve the serious issue
raised by the case. I believe, therefore, that it is improper
for this Court to resolve the constitutional issue in its current
posture. But, because I feel that the plurality has also erred
seriously in its legal analysis of the merits of this case, I write
further to express my disagreement with the conclusions that
it has reached.
I, too, believe that layoffs are unfair. But unfairness
ought not be confused with constitutional injury. Paying no
heed to the true circumstances of petitioners' plight, the lfttlt\1..~\,l~ jePity 8as Hl:llH§ed years of negotiation and compromise designed to solve serious educational problems in the public
schools of Jackson, Michigan. Because I believe that a public employer, with the full agreement of its employees, should
be permitted to preserve the benefits of a legitimate and constitutional affirmative-action hiring plan even while reducing
its work force , I dissent.
I

The record and extra-record materials that we have before
us persuasively suggest that the plurality has too quickly assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate, even
under the plurality's own view, for affirmative action in the
Jackson schools. The first black teacher in the Jackson Pub-

'

'·

·~
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lie Schools was hired in 1954. 1 In 1969, when minority
representation on the faculty had risen only to 3.9%, the
Jackson branch of the NAACP filed a complaint with the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission, alleging that the Board
had engaged in various discriminatory practices, including
racial discrimination in the hiring of teachers. Respondents'
Lodging No. 6 (complaint). The Commission conducted an
investigation and concluded that each of the allegations had
merit. 2
In settlement of the complaint, the Commission issued an
order of adjustment, under which the Jackson Board of Education (Board) agreed to numerous measures designed to improve educational opportunities for black public-school students. Among them was a promise to "[t]ake affirmative
steps to recruit, hire and promote minority group teachers
and counselors as positions bec[a]me available .... " Respondents' Lodging No. 1-B, p. 3. As a result of the Board's
efforts to comply with the order over the next two years, the
percentage of minority teachers increased to 8.8%.
In 1971, however, faculty layoffs became necessary. The
contract in effect at that time, between the Board and the
'Unless otherwise indicated, the historical facts herein recited have
been taken from the Defendants' Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment before the District Court, Record, Doc. No.4, pp. 1-6.
1
The Commission concluded that "[r)acial tension continues to be a part
of the entire Jackson School System from the elementary level through
high school. It would appear, therefore, that each of the allegations as
stated in the complaint can be substantiated based upon organizational
records , court files , school records, special committee reports and the appraisal conducted by the Superintendent of Schools." Respondents' Lodging No. 1-B, p. 11 (order of adjustment). This conclusion is supported by
extra-record materials suggesting that the shortage of minority teachers
was the result of past discrimination in teacher hiring. For example, the
then-Superintendent of Schools testified that "an administrator . . . told
me she had tried to get a position in Jackson in the early 1950's and was
told that they didn't hire colored people." This was the "type of thing," he
stated, that led to adoption of Article XII. Respondents' Lodging No. 3,
pp. 22-23.

'.
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Jackson Education Association (Union), provided that layoffs
would be made in reverse order of seniority. Because of the
recent vintage of the school system's efforts to hire minorities, the seniority scheme led to the layoff of a substantial
number of minority teachers, ''literally wip[ing] out all the
gain" made toward achieving racial balance. Respondent's
Lodging No. 3, p. 24 (deposition of Superintendent of
Schools). Once again, minority teachers on the faculty were
a rarity.
By early 1972, when racial tensions in the schools had escalated to violent levels, school officials determined that the
best course was full integration of the school system, including integration of the faculty. But they recognized that,
without some modification of the seniority layoff system, genuine faculty integration could not take place. See App. 41;
Respondents' Lodging No. 3, p. 69 (deposition of Superintendent of Schools); Respondents' Lodging No. 2, pp. 16-20
(testimony of Union Executive Director, Jackson 1). The
Minority Affairs Office of the Jackson Public Schools submitted a questionnaire to all teachers, asking them to consider
the possibility of abandoning the "last hired, first fired" approach to layoffs in favor of an absolute freeze on layoffs of
minority teachers. The teachers overwhelmingly voted in
favor of retaining the straight seniority system. Negotiations ensued between the two camps~n the one hand, the
Board, which favored a freeze of minority layoffs and, on the
other, the Union, urging straight seniority-and the negotiators ultimately reached accord. One union leader characterized the development of the layoff compromise as the most
difficult balancing of equities that he had ever encountered.
Record, Doc. No.4, p. 5.
The compromise avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority
teachers as a group. Instead, each group would shoulder a
portion of that burden equal to its portion of the faculty.
Thus, the overall percentage of minorities on the faculty

I
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would remain constant. Within each group, seniority would
govern which individuals would be laid off. This compromise
was the provision at issue here, subsequently known as Article XII:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. . . . Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions
for which he is certified maintaining the above minority
balance." App. 13.
The Board and the Union leadership agreed to the adoption
of Article XII. The compromise was then presented to the
teachers, who ratified it by majority vote. Each of the six
times that the contract has been renegotiated, Article XII
has been presented for reconsideration to the members of the
Union, at least 80% of whom are white, and each time it has
been ratified.
To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among
white teachers, fell the lot of bearing the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that became necessary in 1982.
Claiming a right not to lose their jobs ahead of minority
teachers with less seniority, petitioners brought this challenge to Article XII under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II
From the outset, it is useful to bear in mind what this case
is not. There has been no court order to achieve racial balance, which might require us to reflect upon the existence of
judicial power to impose obligations on parties not proven to
have committed a wrong. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971). There is
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also no occasion here to resolve whether a white worker may
be required to give up his or her job in order to be replaced
by a black worker. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S.
193, 208 (1979). Nor are we asked to order parties to suffer
the consequences of an agreement that they had no role in
adopting. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, - (1984). Moreover, this is not a case in which a party to a collective-bargaining agreement has attempted unilaterally to
achieve racial balance by refusing to comply with a contractual, seniority-based layoff provision. Cf. Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 350, 352 (1977).
The sole question posed by this case is whether the Constitution prohibits a union and a local school board from .
developing a collective-bargaining agreement that apportions
layoffs between two racially detennined groups as a means of
preserving the effects of an affinnative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is unchallenged. s
•JuSTICE O'CONNOR rests her disposition of this case on the propriety of
the hiring plan, even though petitioners have not challenged it. She appears to rely on language in the preamble to the collective-bargaining
agreement, which suggests that the "goal of such [affirmative action] policy
shall be to have at least the same percentage of minority racial representation on each individual staff as is represented by the student population of
the Jackson Public Schools." Article VII.D.l, App. to Pet. for Cert. la.
Believing that the school system's hiring "goal" ought instead to be the percentage of qualified minorities in the labor pool, JUSTICE O'CoNNOR concludes that the challenged layoff provision itself is overly broad. Ante, at
. Among the materials considered by the District Court and Court of
Appeals, however, there is no evidence to show the actual proportion of
minority teachers in the Jackson schools, either in relation to the qualified
minority labor force or in relation to the number of minority students. If
the distinction between the two goals is to be considered critical to the constitutionality of the affirmative-action plan, it is incumbent on petitionersplaintiffs below-to demonstrate that, at the time they were laid off, the
proportions of minority teachers had equaled or exceeded the appropriate
percentage of the minority labor force, and that continued adherence to affinnative action goals, therefore, unjustifiably caused their injuries. This
petitioners have failed to do. Outside of the First Amendment context, I
know of no justification for invalidating a provision because it might, in a
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A
Agreement upon a means for applying the Equal Protection Clause to an affirmative-action program has eluded this
Court every time the issue has come before us. In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978),
four Members of the Court concluded that, while racial distinctions are irrelevant to nearly all legitimate state objectives and are properly subjected to the most rigorous judicial
scrutiny in most instances, they are highly relevant to the
one legitimate state objective of eliminating the pernicious
vestiges of past discrimination; when that is the goal, a less
exacting standard of review is appropriate. Nevertheless,
we eschewed the least rigorous, "rational basis" standard of
review, recognizing that any racial classification is subject to
misuse. We determined that remedial use of race is permissible if it serves "important governmental objectives" and is
"substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
/d., at 359 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and
BLACKMUN, JJ.); see also id., at 387 (opinion of MARSHALL,
J.); id., at 402 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). This standard is
genuinely a "strict and searching" judicial inquiry. !d., at
362. The only other Justice to reach the constitutional issue
in Bakke suggested that, remedial purpose or no, any racial
distinctions "call for the most exacting judicial examination."
/d., at 291 (opinion of POWELL, J.).
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), the Court
again disagreed as to the proper standard of review. Three
Justices, of whom I was one, concluded that a statute reserving 10% of federal funds for minority contractors served imhypothetical case, apply improperly to other potential plaintiffs. Petitioners have attempted to fill the gap in their case by supplying statistical
charts to this Court. See, e. g., Petitioners' Lodging, pp. 56-62.
Clearly, however, we are not equipped for such factfinding, and if the hortatory ceiling of the affinnative-action plan is indeed to be considered a significant aspect of the case, then that would be an appropriate subject of
inquiry on remand.
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portant governmental objectives and was substantially related to achievement of those objectives, surviving attack
under our Bakke test. 448 U. S., at 519 (MARSHALL, J.,
joined by BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment). Three other Justices expressly declined to adopt any
standard of review, deciding that the provision survived judicial scrutiny under either of the formulae articulated in
Bakke. 448 U. S., at 492 (opinion of BURGER, C. J., joined
by WHITE and POWELL, JJ.).
Despite the Court's inability to agree on a route, we have
reached a common destination in sustaining affirmative action against constitutional attack. In Bakke, we determined
that a state institution may take race into account as a factor
in its decisions, 438 U. S., at 326, and in Fullilove, the Court
upheld a congressional preference for minority contractors
because the measure was legitimately designed to ameliorate
the present effects of past discrimination, 448 U. S., at 520.
B

Paying little heed to the significant division on the Court
with respect to a standard of review, the plurality asserts a
new test for constitutional analysis: a "racial classification
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose"
and "the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose
must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal,'"
ante, at 5 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, supra, at 480
(opinion of BURGER, C. J.))-a standard not found as such in
any other case. The scope and application of this newly
minted two-part test are not explained in JUSTICE POWELL's
opinion. We are not informed how compelling a state purpose will have to be to be considered "sufficient." And JusTICE PoWELL does not explain what he means by ''narrowly
tailored," except to say that interference with senioritybased layoffs, by definition, is not. Despite the plurality's
allusions to strict scrutiny, its new test shares at least some
attributes with the standard that I endorsed in Bakke. Both

\
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tests seek a legitimate remedial purpose and require that the
means chosen to achieve that purpose avoid imposing unnecessary hardships on the affected persons.
In this case, it should not matter which test the Court applies. What is most important, under any approach to the
constitutional analysis, is that a reviewing court genuinely
consider the circumstances of the provision at issue. The
history and application of Article XII, assuming verification
upon a proper record, demonstrate that this provision would
pass constitutional muster, no matter which standard the
Court should adopt.
III
The principal state purpose supporting Article XII is·the
need to preserve the levels of faculty integration achieved
through the affirmative hiring policy adopted in the early
1970's. Brief for Respondents 41-43. Justification for the
hiring policy itself is found in the turbulent history of the effort to integrate the Jackson Public Schools-not even mentioned in the majority opinion-which attests to the bona
fides of the Board's current employment practices.
The record and lodgings indicate that the Commission, endowed by the State Constitution with the power to investigate complaints of discrimination and the duty to secure the
equal protection of the laws, Mich. Const., Art. V, §29,
prompted and oversaw the remedial steps now under attack. • When the Board agreed to take specified remedial action, including the hiring and promotion of minority teachers,
the Commission did not pursue its investigation of the appar• The Commission currently describes its participation in the Jackson
matter as follows : "[T]he Commission investigated the allegations and
sought to remedy the apparent violations by negotiating an order of adjustment with the Jackson Board . ... [T]he out-of-line seniority layoff provisions in the Jackson Board of Education's employment contracts with its
teachers since 1972 are consistent with overall desegregation efforts undertaken in compliance with the Commission's order of adjustment." Brief
for Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights as
A.micus Curiae 14 (emphasis added).

84-1340-DISSENT
10

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

ent violations to the point of rendering fonnal findings of
discrimination.
Instead of subjecting an already volatile school system to
the further disruption of formal accusations and trials, it appears that the Board set about achieving the goals articulated
in the settlement. According to the then-Superintendent of
Schools, the Board was aware, at every step of the way, that
"[t]he NAACP had its court suit ready if either the Board
postponed the [integration] operation or abandoned the attempts. They were willing t~they were ready to go into
Federal court and get a court order, as happened in Kalamazoo." Respondents' Lodging No. 3, p. 44. Rather than
provoke the looming lawsuit, the Board and the Union
worked with the committees to reach a solution to the racial
problems plaguing the school system. In 1972, the Board
explained to parents why it had adopted a voluntary .integration plan:
''Waiting for what appears the inevitable only flames
passions and contributes to the difficulties of an orderly
transition from a segregated to a desegregated school
system. Firmly established legal precedents mandate a
change. Many citizens know this to be true.
''Waiting for a court order emphasizes to many that we
are quite willing to disobey the law until the court orders
us not to disobey the law. . . . Further, court orders cost
money for both the school system and the litigants."
Respondents' Lodging No. 1, pp.1-2 (Exhibit No.8,
Jackson 1).
An explicit Board admission or judicial determination of culpability, which the petitioners and even the Solicitor General
urge us to hold was required before the Board could undertake a race-conscious remedial plan, see Brief for Petitioners
27-29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, would
only have exposed the Board in this case to further litigation
and liability, including individual liability under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, for past acts. It would have contributed nothing to

.''
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the advancement of the community's urgent objective of integrating its schools.
The real irony of the argument urging mandatory, formal
findings of discrimination lies in its complete disregard for a
longstanding goal of civil rights reform, that of integrating
schools without taking every school system to court. Our
school desegregation cases imposed an affirmative duty on
local school boards to see that "racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch." Green v. County School
Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968); see Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955). Petitioners would
now have us inform the Board, having belatedly taken this
Court's admonitions to heart, that it should have delayed fur=
ther, disputing its obligations and forcing the aggrieved parties to seek judicial relief. This result would be wholly inconsistent with the national policies against overloading
judicial dockets, maintaining groundless defenses, and impeding good-faith settlement of legal disputes. Only last
Term, writing for the Court, THE CHIEF JUSTICE reaffirmed
that civil rights litigation is no exception to the general policy
in favor of settlements: "Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not be penalized for 'helping to
lessen docket congestion' by settling their cases out of court .
. . . In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the
interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants." Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U . S . - , - (1985). It would defy equity to
penalize those who achieve harmony from discord, as it would
defy wisdom to impose on society the needless cost of superfluous litigation. The Court is correct to recognize, as it
does today, that formal findings of past discrimination are not
a necessary predicate to the adoption of affirmative-action
policies, and that the scope of such policies need not be limited to remedying specific instances of identifiable discrimination. See ante, at 8 (opinion of POWELL, J.); ante, at 6 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) .

....

.

.
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Moreover, under the apparent circumstances of this case,
we need not rely on any general awareness of "societal discrimination" to conclude that the Board's purpose is of sufficient importance to justify its limited remedial efforts.
There are allegations that the imperative to integrate the
public schools was urgent. Racially motivated violence had
erupted at the schools, interfering with all educational objectives. We are told that, having found apparent violations of
the law and a substantial underrepresentation of minority
teachers, the state agency responsible for ensuring equality
of treatment for all citizens of Michigan had instituted a settlement that required the Board to adopt affirmative hiring
practices in lieu of further enforcement proceedings. That
agency, participating as amicus curiae through the Attorney
General of Michigan, still stands fully behind the solution that
the Board and the Union adopted in Article XII, viewing it as
a measure necessary to attainment of stability and · educational quality in the public schools. See n. 4, supra. Surely '
this supplies the "[e]videntiary support for the conclusion
that remedial action is warranted" that the plurality purports
to seek, ante, at 8.
Were I satisfied with the record before us, I would hold
that the state purpose of preserving the integrity of a valid
hiring policy-which in turn sought to achieve diversity and
stability for the benefit of all students-was sufficient, in this
case, to satisfy the demands of the Constitution.
IV
The second part of any constitutional assessment of the disputed plan requires us to examine the means chosen to
achieve the state purpose. Again, the history of Article
XII, insofar as we can determine it, is the best source of
assistance.

A
Testimony of both Union and school officials illustrates that
the Board's obligation to integrate its faculty could not have
been fulfilled meaningfully as long as layoffs continued to

.,
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eliminate the last hired. See App. 41; Respondents' Lodging
No. 3, p. 69 (deposition of Superintendent of Schools); Respondents' Lodging No. 2, pp. 16-20 (testimony of Union Executive Director, Jackson[). In addition, qualified minority
teachers from other States were reluctant to uproot their
lives and move to Michigan without any promise of protection
from imminent layoff. The testimony suggests that the lack
of some layoff protection would have crippled the efforts to
recruit minority applicants. ld., at 20, 55, 56. Adjustment
-of the layoff hierarchy under these circumstances was a necessary corollary of an affirmative hiring policy.
..--·'"'- .. .-

B
Under JusTICE PoWELL's approach, the community of
Jackson, having painfully watched the hard-won benefits of
its integration efforts vanish as a result of massive layoffs,
would be informed today, simply, that preferential layoff protection is never permissible because hiring policies serve the
same purpose at a lesser cost. See ante, at 13-14. As a
matter of logic as well as fact, a hiring policy achieves no purpose at all if it is eviscerated by layoffs. JUSTICE PowELL's
position is untenable.
JUSTICE POWELL has concluded, by focusing exclusively on
the undisputed hardship of losing a job, that the Equal Protection Clause always bars race-conscious layoff plans. This
analysis overlooks, however, the important fact that Article
XII does not cause the loss of jobs; someone will lose a job
under any layoff plan and , whoever it is, that person will not
deserve it. Any per se prohibition against layoff protection,
therefore, must rest upon a premise that the tradition of basing layoff decisions on seniority is so fundamental that its
modification can never be permitted. Our cases belie that
premise.
The general practice of basing employment decisions on
relative seniority may be upset for the sake of other public
policies. For example, a court may displace innocent workers by granting retroactive seniority to victims of employ-

,;.

'

f •

\

\

J

84-1340-DISSENT
14

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

ment discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 775 (1976). Further, this Court has long
held that "employee expectations arising from a seniority
system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a
strong public policy interest." Id., at 778. And we have
recognized that collective-bargaining agreements may go further than statutes in enhancing the seniority of certain employees for the purpose of fostering legitimate interests.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339-340
(1953). Accordingly, we have upheld one collectively bargained provision that bestowed enhanced seniority on those
who had served in the military before employment, id., at
340, and another that gave preferred seniority status to
union chairmen, to the detriment of veterans. Aeronautical
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521,
529 (1949).
In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), we specifically addressed a departure from the seniority principle designed to alleviate racial disparity. In Weber, a private employer and a union negotiated a collective agreement that
reserved for black employees one half of all openings in a
plant training program, replacing the prior system of awarding all seats on the basis of seniority. This plan tampered
with the expectations attendant to seniority, and redistributed opportunities to achieve an important qualification toward advancement in the company. We upheld the challenged plan under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it was
designed to "eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation" in the industry and did not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white employees." ld., at 201, 208. Werequired no judicial finding or employer admission of past discrimination to justify that interference with the seniority hierarchy for the sake of the legitimate purposes at stake.
These cases establish that protection from layoff is not altogether unavailable as a tool for achieving legitimate societal
goals. It remains to be determined whether the particular

(]
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fonn of layoff protection embodied in Article XII falls among
the permissible means for preserving minority proportions on
the teaching staff.

c

Article XII is a narrow provision because it allocates the
impact of an unavoidable burden proportionately between
two racial groups. It places no absolute burden or benefit on
one race, and, within the confines of constant minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selection of individuals for layoff. Race is a factor, along with seniority, in determining which individuals the school system
will lose; it is not alone dispositive of any individual's fate.
Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 318 (opinion of POWELL, J.). Moreover, Article XII does not use layoff protection as a tool for
increasing minority representation; achievement of that goal
is entrusted to the less severe hiring policies. 6 And Article
XII is narrow in the temporal sense as well. The very bilateral process that gave rise to Article XII when its adoption
was necessary will also occasion its demise when remedial
measures are no longer required. Finally, Article XII modifies contractual expectations that do not themselves carry
any connotation of merit or achievement; it does not interfere
with the "cherished American ethic" of "[f]airness in individual competition," Bakke, supra, at 319, n. 53, depriving individuals of an opportunity that they could be said to deserve.
In all of these important ways, Article XII metes out the
hardship of layoffs in a manner that achieves its purpose with
the smallest possible deviation from established nonns.
6
JUSTICE WHITE assumes that respondents' plan is equivalent to one
that deliberately seeks to change the racial composition of a staff by firing
. That asand hiring members of predetennined races. Ante, at sumption utterly ignores the fact that the Jackson plan involves only the
means for selecting the employees who will be chosen for layoffs already
necessitated by external economic conditions. This plan does not seek to
supplant whites with blacks, nor does it contribute in any way to the number of job losses.

,,
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The Board's goal of preserving minority proportions could
have been achieved, perhaps, in a different way. For example, if layoffs had been determined by lottery, the ultimate
effect would have been retention of current racial percentages. A random system, however, would place every
teacher in equal jeopardy, working a much greater upheaval
of the seniority hierarchy than that occasioned by Article
XII; it is not at all a less restrictive means of achieving the
Board's goal. Another possible approach would have been a
freeze on layoffs of minority teachers. This measure, too,
would have been substantially more burdensome than Article
XII, not only by necessitating the layoff of a greater number
of white teachers, but also by erecting an absolute distinction
between the races, one to be benefited and one to be burdened, in a way that Article XII avoids. Indeed, neither petitioners nor any Justice of this Court has suggested an alternative to Article XII that would have attained the stated goal
in any narrower or more equitable a fashion. Nor can I conceive of one.

v

It is no accident that this least burdensome of all conceiv-

able options is the very provision that the parties adopted.
For Article XII was forged in the crucible of clashing interests. All of the economic powers of the predominantly white
teachers' union were brought to bear against those of the
elected Board, and the process yielded consensus.
The concerns that have prompted some Members of this
Court to call for narrowly tailored, perhaps court-ordered,
means of achieving racial balance spring from a legitimate
fear that racial distinctions will again be used as a means to
persecute individuals, while couched in benign phraseology.
That fear has given rise to mistrust of those who profess to
take remedial action, and concern that any such action ''work
the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing
for the benefit." Bakke, supra, at 308 (opinion of POWELL,
J.). One Justice has warned that ''if innocent employees are

\
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to be made to make any sacrifices ... , they must be represented and have had full participation rights in the negotiation process," Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S., at 588, n. 3
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring), and another has called for a
"principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent stigmatic
classification .... " Bakke, supra, at 294-295, n. 34 (opinion of POWELL, J. ). This case answers that call.
The collective-bargaining process is a legitimate and powerful vehicle for the resolution of thorny problems, and we
have favored "minimal supervision by courts and other governmental agencies over the substantive terms of collectivebargaining agreements." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 76-77 (1982). We have also noted that
"[s]ignificant freedom must be afforded employers and unions
to create differing seniority systems," California Brewers
Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598, 608 (1980). 6 The perceived
dangers of affirmative action misused, therefore, are naturally averted by the bilateral process of negotiation, agreement, and ratification. The best evidence that Article XII is
a narrow means to serve important interests is that representatives of all affected persons, starting from diametrically
opposed perspectives, have agreed to it-not once, but six
times since 1972.

VI
The narrow question presented by this case, if indeed we
proceed to the merits, offers no occasion for the Court to
issue broad proclamations of public policy concerning the
controversial issue of affirmative action. Rather, this case
calls for calm, dispassionate reflection upon exactly what has
been done, to whom, and why. If one honestly confronts
each of those questions against the factual background sug• This deference is warranted only if the union represents the interests
of the workers fairly; a union's breach of that duty in the fonn of racial discrimination gives rise to an action by the worker against the union. See
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 823 U.S. 192, 207 (1944).

f.
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gested by the materials submitted to us, I believe the conclusion is inescapable that Article XII meets, and indeed surpasses, any standard for ensuring that race-conscious
programs are necessary to achieve remedial purposes.
When an elected school board and a teachers' union collectively bargain a layoff provision designed to preserve the effects of a valid minority recruitment plan by apportioning
layoffs between two racial groups, as a result of a settlement
achieved under the auspices of a supervisory state agency
charged with protecting the civil rights of all citizens, that
provision should not be upset by this Court on constitutional
grounds.
The alleged facts that I have set forth above evince, at the
very least, a wealth of plausible evidence supporting the
Board's position that Article XII was a legitimate and necessary response both to racial discrimination and to educational
imperatives. To attempt to resolve the constitutional issue
either with no historical context whatever, as the plurality
has done, or on the basis of a record devoid of established
facts, is to do a grave injustice not only to the Board and
teachers of Jackson and to the State of Michigan, but also to
individuals and governments committed to the goal of eliminating all traces of segregation throughout the country.
Most of all, it does an injustice to the Fourteenth Amendment itself. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions that the case be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the views I have expressed. 7

\

7

I do not envy the District Court its task of sorting out what this Court
has and has not held today. It is clear, at any rate, that from among the
many views expressed today, two noteworthy results emerge: a majority
of the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that an aftirmative-action
plan must be preceded by a fonnal finding that the entity seeking to institute the plan has committed discriminatory act.s in the past; and the Court
has left open whether layoffs may be used as an instrument of remedial
action.
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Rlllilove, we have had no occasion to consider whether a
fixed quota of hiring preference comports with the Equal
Protection Clause.

Such a

quota

is to be distinguished

from hiring goals adopted as a means of achieving a fairer
and more balanced work force.
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WYG9 SALLY-POW
The term "narrowly tailored" so frequently used in our
cases, has acquired a secondary meaning.

More

specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may
be used to require consideration whether lawful
alternative means could have been used.

Or, as Professor

Ely has noted (see below), the classification at issue
must "fit" with greater precision alternative means.

In

this case, for example, the use of hiring goals that do
not involve the laying off of innocent individuals is now
widely used.

2.

Note to Mike:
You may recall that Justice O'Connor does not
like our use of the term "narrowly tailored" in this case.
She thinks it can be fairly argued that the plan adopted
by the Board was narrowly tailored.

Although 1 disagree

with her, 1 think it is desirable to have her concern in
mind.

1 have never liked the term "narrowly tailored"

because it reminds me that 1 have had my trousers
"narrowly tailored" when they were 20 inches at the bottom
rather than the fashionable 16 inches.

The above

language, with appropriate changes, could be worked into
footnote 6 - possibly as the leading sentences, and with
appropriate changes in what we now have in footnote 6.
This is quite an important note.
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We therefore hold that, as a means of accomplishing
purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the Board's
layoff plan is unnecessarily burdensome. 9

Other, less

burdensome means of accomplishing similar goals - such as
the adoption of hiring goals on indeed the Board's hiring
program in this case - are available.

Note to Mike:
1 suggest the foregoing - or similar language as a substitute for the second and third sentences on p.
12.

1 would retain footnotes 9 and 11 as 1 have lightly

2.

edited them.

I am inclined either to omit footnote 10 or

move it to another place in the opinion.

It seems

unnecessary as a footnote to the final paragraph in our
opinion.
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The inclusion of "Orientals" and "persons of Spanish
dissent" as "minorities" illustrates the undifferentiated
nature of the Board's rule.

The term "Orientals" includes

more than a billion people, including many of ancient
civilizations who have never been discriminated against in
this country.

Similarly, to brand all "persons of Spanish

dissent" as minorities who have suffered societal
discrimination is without foundation in fact.

Perhaps the

intention was to focus on immigrants and possibly
undocumented aliens from Spanish-American countries in his
hemisphere.

But to imply that all persons of Spanish

dissent have been the victims of societal discrimination

2.

is unsupportable and could well be offensive.

There is no

explanation of why the Board chose to include these
extremely broad categories, or how members of some of the
categories could ever be identified.

Moreover,

respondents have never suggested - much less formally
found - that the Board ever engaged in prior, purposeful
discrimination against members of each of these groups.
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WYGANT V. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

--~

JUSTICE

opinion of the

co'firJ;;.A~~~
trj ~
~
v ,---...,_;.,_,_(_

<JJ In

1972 the Jackson School

Board,~

f>art

~ ~
~1-d_

an overall e£.fo..r-t- -t-o--alleviate problems it was enpet'i">
eRC±ng

~~~~{'~ensior{ ~s~ .:nsidered

adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining

( c 13~)

Agreement between the Board and the Jackson Education
1\

(~~)

Association that would protect certain minorities
'\

against layoffs.

Prior to

~e

bargaining on

~~{;/)
~' the Minority Affairs Office of the Jackson

Public Schools issued a questionnaire to all teachers,
soliciting their views as to

a..

~

layoff policy.

Two

"'
alternatives were proposed; continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority

~ ~~
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/ . ~ble,.Vk ~
layoffs to ensure ret ntion of minority teachers in
exact ratio to the

inority student population.

Nine-

the teachers expressed a preference
for the straight
9. !\

~~
~n agreemen

eniority system.

§

'$"/.h-.

8£ief fer Resp. at

~tuall~ worked

out that re-

sulted in approval of a new provision, Article XII of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, covering layoffs.
It stated:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
throught layoff from employment by the
Board, teachers with the most seniority in
the district shall be retained, except that
at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the
current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff.

In no

event will the number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the number of
positions to be eliminated.

Each teacher so

affected will be called back in reverse
order for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance.
J. A. at 13.
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ln the layoffs of 1973, the contract language
was followed.

When layoffs became necessary in 1974,

it was evident that adherence to the contract would
result in the layoff of tenured nonminority teachers
while minority teachers on probationary status were
f

retained.

The Board retained the tenured teacher
and
,..,

failed to maintain the percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of the layoff.

~

The J..«.e-k /\

)

teachers laid off as a result of the Board's noncompliance with Article Xll, brought suit in federal
~~~

court, Jackson Education Association v. Board of Edu'1

that
the Board's failure to adhere to the layoff provision
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title Vll.

They also urged the district

court to take pendent jurisdiction over state law
breach of contract claims.

In that action, the ~

o~t~~ vr JJw ~
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~1

.

/

Board denied that it had engaged in dis-

criminatory employment practices that caused the alleged underemployment of minority.

The district court

held that the evidence of a de facto statistical imbalance submitted by plaintiffs was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over that claim, citing washington
v. Davis, 426

u.s.

229 (1976).

The court also found

that plaintiffs had not fulfilled the jurisdictional

)~~Ld..

prerequisite to a Title VII

cla~t~y tid

not demon-

strate that discrimination charges were filed with the
EEOC.

Without jurisdiction over the federal claims,

the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law breach of contract claims.
Instead of appealing to the CA6, the same
plaintiffs instituted a suit in state court on the
state law claims, Jackson Education Association v.
Board of Education, No. 77-0011484CZ (Jackson County

(~JI) .

Circuit Court, 1979)A

The trial judge found that the

page 4.
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Board had breached its contract with the plaintiffs,
and _that Article XII did not violate the Michigan
Teacher Tenure Act.

The state trial court did note

that it "had not been established that the board had
discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices.

The minority representation on the faculty was

the result of societal racial discrimination."
43.

N~·e~~ela~,~e

J.A.

court held that Article XII did

not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Board thereafter adhered to Article XII.
As a result, one group of petrs was laid off during
the 1976-1977 school year, and another group~

(J

of~ during the 1981-1982 school year.

~

Petitioners are
1\

nonminority teachers who were displaced by minority
teachers with less seniority.

Petitioners brought

suit in federal district court, alleging violations
the equal protection clause, Title VII, §1983 and var-
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ious other federal and state statutes.

page 6.

On cross mo-

tions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all of petitioners' claims.
protection claim is now before this

~

Court~On

that

claim, the district court held that a finding of prior
discrimination was not a prerequisite for the racial
preferences granted by the
agLeem~at.

!J tt-~

~olleetive

bar~aining

Instead, the court held that the Equal
,(.

Protection Clause was satisfied if

<J> there is a

~d4,
ss~nd basis for concluding that minority underrepre-

1

lj))
sentation is substantial and chronic and (2f the affirmative action plan meets a test of reasonableness.
The court found substantial and chronic underrepresentation by comparing the percentage of minority teachers with the percentage of minority students in the

~

student body.

Based on -th-is "role model" theory the
1\

court upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision.

DRAFT
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The Court of Appeals affirmed.

It adopted

the reasoning of the district court and extensively
quoted from the district court's opinion.

Because of

the importance of the issue of the constitutionality
of race-based layoffs by public employers, we granted
certiorari.

*********

We now reverse.

II.

Petitioners' central claim is that they were
laid off solely because of their race in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.2footnote on CBA's as state
action.

"Decisions based on race or ethnic origin by

faculties and administrators of [public schools) are

(opinion of POW

J. ,

joined by

"[A)ll

..

~~-~
r:x-of~

~-~-~

WHITE, J.) but "not ..• all racial or ethnic classifications are per se invalid," id.,

r10/~r

IA/1-11._ ~

reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment," Bakke,
supra, at ___ ,

11uk- ~ ;J

~/4.~

~ !" f'Z-1.

4....,<

~.A
~~~
c~~

~~~~
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legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect.

That is

not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.

It is to say that courts must subject them to

the most rigid scrutiny."

Korematsu, 323 US at 216.

That is because "[dJistinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality."

Hirabayashi, 320 us

"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort

~~-~

~~~

t.t_ wz:l4
~

~qr_
'..£~.(_

are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
(opinion of POWELL, J

:J
"\

Bakke, supra, at

rJ r(

~-

vJ

~

While judicial review of racial classifica-

clear that the

~t

~

levels of equal protec-

~ ~ ~~- ~lr- a.+<. aA~
tion scrutiny are useful in the context of public
1\

-

~
c. y ~
~

tions necessarily must be "rigid" or "exacting," it

i~ot

lk
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They a-£e uooer

"~~~~,;@_

<\
stri~t obligatio~ starting with. this Court's decision

"

u.s.

in Brown v. Board of Education, 349

294 (1955)

(Brown II); to remedy the last vestiges of racial segregation and discrimination.

This remedial task takes

on added importance in schools because they are "a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment."

483, 493 (1954)

Brown v. Board of Education, 347
(Brown II) •

u.s.

In addition, compulsory

attendance laws lend added support to the idea that
the school environment should be free of the slightest
vestige of state-sponsored discrimination.

- ~ ~ c;~~-'-L
On the other hand, public schools-'\ also are
/ - ~~- under the costitutional command not to "make distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry."

Hirabayashi, 320

u.s.

at 100.

~

A public

~

· ~r

?~

----·

~, .... ~~ ~ ...

..........-~

~~ r--"' &--""~e .
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~
school's good faith effort to balaAce these

~duties

is entitled to some deference so as not to inhibit the

~~kily
remedial process.
~

At the same time this

Cour~ r~-

~~

7~~

that the "ultimate goal must be to eliminate

entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race."
US 448 at

(Stevens, J., dissenting).

Fullilove, 448

r~ hJ

,,

~-G~

5'~~
.t:!...~

In public

school cases we must interpret the Equal Protection
Clause with the view of assuring to all persons "the
protection of equal laws," Yick wo, supra, at 369,
while at the same time "confonting a legacy of slavery

~~~

and racial discrimination."

Bakke, supra, at 294 . .---

In the context of affirmative action, it has
previously been stated that "[a]ny preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a
most searching examination to make sure that it does
not conflict with constitutional guarantees."
Fullilove v. K1utznick, 448

u.s.

448, 491 (1980)

/2.~
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There are two prongs

First, the State's purpose behind

the racial classification must be sufficiently important to justify the race-based action.

Second, the

means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose
must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal."

ld., at 480.

Whether the layoff provision is

supported by a sufficiently important State purpose,
and whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored are the issues presented by
this case.
111.

A.
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning of the District Court, held that the Board's interest in providing minority role models for its minority students was sufficiently important to satisfy
the "purpose" prong

of equal protection analysis.

~
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~lAA--1
w~

trict Court

/rA_
the role model

theory)~

~ conclud~that
I'\

underrepresented on the faculty.

the Dis-

minorities were

It reasoned that

some showing of underrepresentation was necessary in
order to "'permit the court to determine that the purpose of the affirmative action plan is legitimate.'"
Pet. App. 7a, quoting Valentine v. Smith, 654 .F.2d
503, 508 (CA8), cert. denied, 454

u.s.

1124 (1981).

llLI~ U~
hrn
e'E comparing the percentage of

e~ad-

~

~

~

~or i ty

facul-

ty to the percentage of minority applicants in the

~~ t'~ ~
relevant

labort~l,

..1\..

t\

/2-&.J. •

t- ~k ~ ~-

the District Court found under-

representatio~~mparing
1\

the percentage of minority

faculty to the percentage of minority students.

It

~~~~-

justified this unusual departure from

~1

'\

sta-

"'\

12-.-,-.~aet!u~.
-~
tistical analysis

a-~~~~~~~e-~~n

)

by noting that
teachers "are role models for their students," and

e-(.;u)/
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that "societal discrimination has often deprived minority children of other role-models."

29a

~~~
This "role model" theory is an insufficiently
1"\

~~

strong State interest to lend constitutional validity
1\

to the Board's race-based layoff plan.

As expounded

by the District Court, it has two aspects; first,

it

is an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal

discrimination, second,

i~~~d~al

theory

As an attempt to alleviate the effects of
societal discrimination, the role model theory runs
afoul of the principle that requires identified prior
discrimination by the government unit involved before
the State's remedial action can be constitutionally

r

~ ff'~/l.4.~ ~~~
qualified to

justified.~ focal fo"chool _.,Boards ar~

engage in the task of remedying the effects of societal discrimination--"an amorous concept of injury
that may be ageless in its reach into the past" and

7
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timeless in its ability to affect t

page 14.

~~~~

/

~)

e future, Bakke,

1~

supra, at 307. A

The~c

~
nature o

"societal discrimina-

~w-JA+i_~J
tion'\as

~basis

There are

for race-co

state action is

)rnumer~~reaso

the percentage of minority
of minority faculty,

tudents and the percentage
them completely unrelated

~

to discrimination of any ki d.

~0~
~ ~~

In fact, there is no

·.

~
if/~

~ ~ ft--1, ~ ~ u.~d<<·-R ~c~.~
~raa~ily apparent connection ~1 between the two
groups.

~

IJ ~
~"\
~;·'

The statistical comparison made by the Dis-

~~ ;

~~'(
4tr ~;Sd_~

trict Court demonstrates that there are few if any
limits to the ability to stretch cause and effect in

0;

/2~

~(~
relating some harm to the evil of societal discrimination.

,.

""1A'
1''-VY"" ~

f

/)

~

.)~~~

~ ~ ~-- ~at:J

~)/
·~

~/

A1he role model theory)~ be justified as

~ educational~Y·

~ ~

'4!

I~,jt

stands on even weaker ground, unrelated either to pri-

... ~~1/
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or discrimination by the Board or to societal discrimination.

A State's interest in implementing

~

educational theories, even if the theories are
valid attempts to improve education, are simply insufficient to overcome the constitutional prohibition
agains;r t
color of their skin,

B
~

Respondents contend that the State purpose
J\

behind the layoff provision can be viewed more broadly, as an attempt to provide for a diverse faculty.
Brief of Respondents at 27-31.

Respondents cite

~

school desegregation cases stating that
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a
~

~,

~It"

~
~

~·

desirable component of sound education."
Board of Education v. Penick, 443
(POWELL,

~~.
~/L

~dissenting) ,

u.s.

Columbus

449, 486 (1979)

These cases c~ rec-
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ognize that the state has a valid interest in a racially diverse student body, and respondents make the
plausible argument that the state has an equally valid
interest in a racially diverse faculty.

Of course,

~~

the context here is ~Y dif'ferent from the
1\

cases cited by respondents.

While those cases recog-

nized the state's interest in a racially diverse

d-d~f~l-

classroom, they

o~~i~a~r~Io~t~~a± w~~the

question whether

that interest would support race-conscious action that
deprived

~

a benefit

~y

person's race: No students were

•
order to

accompli~
. 1

because of that

~cPs~~

"""'

~~-~~1-L·~~ ·
In addition,

racial diversyty.
'\

the racial classifications in the school desegregation
cases "were designed as remedies for the vindication
of Constitutional entitlement," while respondents suggest that the Board's interest in diversity is valid
even in the complete absence of prior discrimination.
Brief of Respondents at 28.

DRAFT
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Respondents also cite to the diversity interest recognized as constitutionally legitimate in

~
~
~yAinteres~in Bakke was not

BAKKE.

ed to racial or ethnic diversity.

limit-

In fact, its le-

~~~~
~n

gitimacy was premised on the

that a person's

1\

-

race would simply be one factor among many in an at___,_
tempt to identify those individual characteristics
that contribute to a richer learning environment.
In
).
that way, no individual's oportunity to compete for
the relevant benefit would be foreclosed simply be-

9JuJu.cause of race.

in "educational diversi-

~

L--1-

~~

ty" was recognized as a "constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education," Bakke,
supra, at 311-312, because it was grounded on this

rCourt's
tN:J

orWfii~h

longstanding respect for academic freedom,

~~
~~--.--- 5

A_·_

-r~

'~.

PU-1~~

~~
~

is viewed as "a special concern of the First

L-t..t... 4 -

~Amendment," id., at 312.

When Justice Frankfurter

summarized the "four essential freedoms" that form the
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core of academic freedom, he described a principle
that only has direct application in the university
setting:
It is the business of a university
to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation.

It is an atmosphere in which

there prevail "the four essential freedoms"
of a university--to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.
shire, 354

u.s.

Sweezy v. New Hamp-

234, 263 (1957)

(Frankfurt-

er, J., concurring in the result).
~

Secondary and elementary schools do not seek to create
an atmosphere of speculation and experimentation to
the same extent that universities do, nor are they as
inclined to to promote a "robust exchange of ideas,"
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
(1967).

u.s.

589, 603

The First Amendment, on which this Court's

recognition of the State's interest in diversity is
founded, simply does not have the same force in public
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interest asserted here and the
interestin racial diversity recognized

"
n cases such as Washington v. Seattle School District
• 1, 458

u.s.

457 (1982), and the legitimate inter-

in educational diversity recognized in Bakke, we
ecline to decide whether the Board has an interest in
acial diversity in the faculty that will support
programs that are not premised on remeprior discrimination.

we reserve this question
our

~~~

J:i-S.salnti~

1\

o:f the

qYQS-

this asserted

~~state intere

diversity are

~

narrowly

""'
tJ()__,(~h_ ~.Lz.

c

_ft.-..~~

4

~-A.~~~ ~L,.-r~ze, ~

~~~~)~~~~
~ ~ ~~ ~~~-~-~-~
~L-J-r n- 4-<'< ... € ~~.)~ ~ ~
~~7~~
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~ l.l.~ ~ ~ 1-uvv ~ ~
Respondents also argue that the
sion was necessary to provide protection against lay-

~;~

~~

"'~ rtw.. ~·

off;fin order to accomplish the legitimate goal of

~

prior~scrimination.cite***

remedying

~h ~

.

hiring program instituted to

Get

Lain~, ;;J.

~~~~

~.~
~k

~----·~ ~~~~~

remedy~ discrimina-

~

tC

tion ~ould be a constitutionally legitimate purpose

~~

under even the most exacting scrutiny.

~14Ul

In order to

/.~

demonstrate that the Board's

OYer~l

~
~~-

plan in fact

qualifies as a remedial effort, it would be necessary

~
~
Tk~

to demonstrate the existence of the following condi-

~~:

~~~ ·

tions.
~r--~

First, the overall hiring

~n

must have as

~~

,8~· ~

1\

its purpose the remedying of prior discrimination by
the Jackson School Board against an identified minority group.

That necessarily requires

~ae

point, at least when the validity of the

~skf-

ab-se~

~is

~-~~
challenged in court, a determination be made that

~~

there was prior discrimination.

'1.

Here, no such finding
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has ever been made, despite the fact that this provision has been the subject of prior litigation.

77

~1

~,~.

In fact, in the prior state court trial, the Board
denied the existence

of~crimination~a~that
"1

.,

court

attributed the statistical disparity to societal dis-

crimina~ fhe lack of any determination
action is premised on
prior discrimination can in part be attributed to the
unusual procedural history of this case.••••Note how
said prepared to show
a determination, the bare assertion that a race-based
program is "remedial" is insufficient to provide the
required constitutionally legitimate state purpose.
The Board also must be able to demonstrate
that its legitimate goal of remedying prior discrimination has not already been accomplished.

0~

~ce the goal has been ~ accomplished, the
Board's purpose loses its remedial character and is no

llj26j85: 5:00 PM
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In the context of

employment discrimination, the goal of remedying the
discrimination is accomplished when the discriminatory
practices are eliminated and when the percentage of

~

I

victimized minorities in the affected workforce equals
the percentage of qualified applicants in the relevant
labor market.

Racial classifications enforced past

the time of accomplishment of the remedy "reinforce
habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes instead
of individuals," Fullilove at 547 (stevens) and "delay
the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or
at least insignificant, factor," Id at 545.
In this case, the DC made no finding of
whether the percentage of minority faculty in the
Jackson School District had reached the level of minority applicantsin the relevant labor market.

Thus,

the DC did not deal with or answer the question
whether the goal of the Board's legitimate interest in
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remedying identified prior discrimination had been
accomplished.

Before us now, the parties hotly dis-

pute this very issue, and submit statistics and arguments in support of both conclusions.

But it is not

for us at this stage to decide this essentially factu(.

al question.

At any rate, we need not do so because

of our resolution of the "narrowly tailored" prong of
analysis.

chosen to accomplish the race-conscious

11
"reasonablenes."

~f ~ UA ~~4·~~

That standarc;< pi inly

T

incorrect.

av~~,.......p~~x) .

uf

~~
~ ~

and

~e>j~/-LJt.d-..4~-<~~~ c~ ~
1s

0 a p h e l d so long
1

a~

they are reasonable.

c
Much more

es

V1

tZ-· ..e.A

Ad..
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H-.-_ A_ ~b ~~.~1~~~. ...c,.f.~~.-"V1s(
is required efore'\ rac1a class1 1Cat1or;.~

by the State can

pos~oiy

pes

~
enga~eu ~n

1

satisfy the demands of the

Equal Protection Clause.
The second prong of analysis in ;{qual ¥rotection

~e

cases requires that, whatever the purpose

asserted, the means chosen must be narrowly tailored
to the accomplishment of that purpose . .Fullilove at
480.

"Racial classification are simply too pernicious

to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification."
VENS, J.,

!d., at 537 (STE-

dissenting)~

(r.h ~r eq u ire men t

that.

"'\

~

lfte'a·fH't -efts.s e-R--fftl:l

~~

-Se

o---nar!Oe\Tly tailQ.,J;e-Q ha\ been held to mean that the meth-

od of accomplishing the State's valid purposes must be
no more intrusive on other interests than necessary to
accomplish the purpose.

Cite~ see also Bakke, supra,
""'

at

, stating that judicial oversight "assures that

[the racial classification] will work the least haarm

DRAFT
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possible to the innocent persons competing for the
benefit."
We have recognized that in order to remedy

~

the effects of prior discrimination, it may be neces~

sary to take race into account.
actually require that race be taken into
account, see North CArolina Board of Education v.
Swann, 402

u.s.

43, 46 (1971 •

As part of this Na-

tion's fundamental dedication to eradicating racial
discrimination, some innocent

persons~

be called

upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.

"When

effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a
'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not
impermissible."
Franks
(1976).

Fullilove, supra, at 484, quoting

v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424

u.s.

747

The ability of Congress in its remedial ca-

pacity to require a limited "sharing of the burden"

11/26/85; 5:00 PM
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allowed the remedy to stand in Fullilove, where THE
CHIEF JUSTICE concluded that the "actual burden shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light."

!d.,

f-tu_ ~

at 484.

In part for that same reason,

~approved

the

d.. 14, ____..
J2?'
u

J

lcJ7fA--

~a~
hiring program in United Steelworkers of America v.

tu~

c-~~r,.

Weber, 443 u.S. 193, 208 ( 1979)

("the plan does not

unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white em-

~

ployees").

But those cases all involved valid hiring
goals.

In this case, the particular means chosen to

achieve

~

the purposes discussed supra is that of

laying off innocent

.Hu. 12.:,~ ~ ~ ~

teachers~with

greater seniority in

order to retain minority teachers with less seniority.
e have

pr:e¥-H;)~sJ..y

that must be borne by innocent parties when the chosen
means is layoffs, see Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 104 s.ct. 2576,

2586, 2588 (1984);
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the discharge of white workers and their
placement with new black
~

valid

nJJ.~~~

goals, the burden to be borne by innocent
().-~

individuals is diffused

toAaome~

extent among society

~~-
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generally, ana wfienJt does fall on specific individ.aA--

uals' it
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does
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la¥offs it~~~e. 3

Denial of a future opportunity sim-

~;-u.v;-f,
ply is not as intrusive as ~y an existing

benefit or right.
burden an innocent person is asked to bear when
_.-7

state~him
1\.

at a disadvantage at the hiring

~~wz...u...~~

and when the state takes away h1s job,
orarily.
Many of our cases involve union seniority
plans with wage earners heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living.

Loss of their jobs even tern-

porarily means a consequent loss of dignity and selfrespect.

A worker may invest many productive years in

~~
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one job and one city with the expectation of earning
the stability and security of seniority.

"At that

point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital
asset that the worker "owns," worth even more than the
current equity in his home."

.Fallon and Weiler, Con-

flicting Models of Racial Justice, The Supreme Court
Review, 1984. 4quote Douglas on work

In addition, lay-

offs disrupt settled expectations of innocent workers
in a way that hiring goals do not.

.Finally, as a

1~
~o
~aci~ prejudice, layof~' far

-

goals,
~feet ~f

~

1\

~

exacerbat~

aeeua~ly

~
eooT~

more than

may

~avo~the

~-

~v
tension between the races.

/\

While the hiring goals involve a diffuse burden that in some cases may mean only that one of several opportunities is foreclosed, layoffs focus the
entire burden on select, innocent individuals who become scapegoats for our collective guilt, resulting in

~~

~~-(7k J127
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almost total disruption of their lives.

Layoffs im-

pose too intrusive a burden on innocent persons.

As a

means to accomplish otherwise legitimate State purposes, a layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.5

For these reasons, the Roard's selection of

layoffs as the means of accomplishing even arguably
valid purposes cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal
Protection Clause. 6

mwm 11/26/85

lThe Solicitor General arg~es that in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416

u.s.

312 (1974), petr Defunis, "a Se-

phardic Jew from a relatively poor background" was
called upon by society to "sacrifice his aspirations
for a legal career to serve the greater public good."
Brief for the United States at 9.

The reality demon-

strates the diffuse nature of the "burden" that innocent persons bear in cases involving hiring goals-DeFunis actually was accepted at the Oregon, Idaho,
Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools, 82 Wash. 2d at 30
n.ll, 507 P.2d at 1181 n.ll.

Defunis' harm is not of

the same kind or degree with the harm that would
resulted from removing someone from law school in
their third year.

Even that may not approximate the

harm to a union member from being laid off.

~;

2"Presumably no one would suggest taking a white

~~ ~
J.

:.

~

home or pension benefits, either to fund a
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program of affirmative action or to promote racial
equality in post retirement income."

Fallon and

Weiler, The Supreme Court Review, 1984.

lwe have previously recognized that in order to provide make-whole relief to the actual, identified vic-

~a-...~~
tims of individual discrimination, a court may iA aome
t\

~

award competitive seniority.

Bowman Transportation Co., 424

u.s.

See Franks v.
747 (1976).

4 Further evidence that the layoff provision is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored is the Board's definition of minority, which included Blacks, Orientals,
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent.
There is no explanantion for why this particular
grouping of minorities was favored over other, perhaps

.

11/26/85; 5:01 PM

DRAFT

equally deserving groups.

page 3.

Nor does the Board explain

why it is that innocent nonrninorities must lose their

~/d4_.,~
jobs in order to benefit "persons of Spanish descent."
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1340
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a school board
may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of
its employees because of their race or national origin.
I
In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial tension
in the community that extended to its schools, considered
adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education
Association (the Union) that would protect employees who
were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 The
Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision,
Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis1
Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layOff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight seniority system.
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trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance." Joint App. 13.
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers
who had been laid off, brought suit.in federal court, id., at 30,
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education,
(Jackson I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims.
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Following trial, the
District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over the case, in part because there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id., at 35, and in
part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled the jurisdictional
prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing discrimination
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
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sion. After dismissing the federal claims, the District Court
declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law
contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board
of Education, No. 77-0011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found
that "[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the ·
parties to this contract." I d., at 49. Nevertheless, the
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination.
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-:1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect
to the equal protection claim, 2 the District Court held that
the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
2

Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.
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court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority' schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), to
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of racebased layoffs by public employees. We now reverse.
II
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 While this
Court has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between
citizens· solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943),
"[t]hat not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214,
216 (1944). "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination." Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
joined by WHITE, J.)
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic

is

3
School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).
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criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491
(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE). There are two
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose.
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal." I d., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that
purpose are narrowly tailored.

III
A
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746
F . 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more
minority faculty role models by finding that the percentage of
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority
students. I d., at 1156.
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon proven instances of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. In Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U. S. 299 (1977), this Court reasoned that, absent employment discrimination by the school board, "hiring practices [would have] result[ed] in a work force more or less repr.esentative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which the employees are
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hired." !d., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431
U. S. 324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the
Court held that the proper comparison for determining the
existence of actual discrimination by the school board was
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308.
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on proven prior
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a
state's adoption of race-based remedies.
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point.
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1,
31-32 (1971):
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small
percentage of black students.
See United States v.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287

. . . . . -f

84-134~0PINION

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

7

(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd andremanded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea
that black students are better off with black teachers could
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for finding race-conscious state action and for imposing
a racially classified remedy. The role model theory annunciated by the District Court and the resultant holding typify
this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations for a
disparity between the percentage of minority students and
the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely
unrelated to discrimination of any kind. 4 In fact, there is no
apparent connection between the two groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons between these two groups with an indisputable statement that
there has been societal discrimination, and upheld state action predicated upon racial classifications. No one doubts
that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, it is insufficient and
over expansive: without any particularized findings, a court
can uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
B
Respondents argue that the State purpose behind the layoff provision can be viewed more broadly as an attempt to
provide for a diverse faculty. Respondents cite school desegregation cases for the proposition that all children "benefit
from exposure to 'ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom."' Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458
U. S. 457, 472 (1982), quoting Columbus Board of Education
' Such explanations include influx of new minority
ift 4lhe stt engot;h of eel'tftift iBEh:tst:P~

group~Md

•

char see cz
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v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting). These decisions recognize that the state has a valid interest in a racially diverse student body, and respondents
make the plausible argument that the state has an equally
valid interest in a racially diverse faculty. But the racial
classifications in the desegregation cases were designed to
remedy identifiable prior unconstitutional discrimination,
while respondents suggest that the Board's purpose to
achieve diversity is valid even in the absence of prior discrimination. Brief for Respondents 28.
We need not decide if this purpose is sufficiently important
to justify the Board's adoption of the racial classification because, as we conclude below, the means selected are not narrowly tailored toward that end. We leave open the question
whether the state's interest in diversity, if pursued through a
less intrusive means, ever could be sufficiently important to
satisfy the demand of the Equal Protection Clause. 5

c
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally
valid, a factual determination must have been made, either
by the Board or by a court, that the Board engaged in purposeful discrimination. Without such a finding, an appellate
~ As further support for their asserted interest in a diverse faculty, respondents rely on Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
311-312 (opinion of POWELL, J.), which recognized that the state has alegitimate interest in the diversity of the student body at its colleges and universities. Unlike respondents asserted interest, the interest identified in
Bakke was not limited to racial or ethnic diversity. The interest was legitimate because it was premised on the far broader view that a person's
race would simply be one factor among many in an attempt to identify
those individual characteristics that contribute to a richer learning environment. I d., at 318. Thus, development of that interest did not foreclose
any opportunity to compete for the relevant benefit simply because of race.
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court reviewing a challenge to such action cannot determine
if the the race-based action is justified as a remedy for prior
discrimination. In this case, despite the fact that Article
XII of the CBA has spawned years of litigation and three
separate lawsuits, no such finding ever has been made. Although the litigation position of the Board was different in
Jackson I and Jackson II, it has previously denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. This precise
issue was litigated in both those suits. Both courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the
Board. The Board now contends either that a finding of
prior discrimination is unnecessary, or that, given another
opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior dis- ·
crimination. As to its first argument, the Board is mistaken. While its second argument is belated, we need not
consider the question since we conclude below that the layoff
provision was not a narrowly tailored means of achieving
even a valid purpose. 6
IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
"reasonableness." That standard has no suppo~ in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF Jus6

Similarly, the record does not disclose whether or not the Board's asserted goal of remedying prior discrimination already has been accomplished. Even iflegitimate at the outset, such a purpose loses its remedial
character once the initial goal is accomplished. Racial classifications enforced beyond this point "reinforce habitual ways of thinking in terms of
classes instead of individuals," Fullilove v. Klutznick , 448 U. S. 448, 547
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) and "delay the time when race will become
a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor" id., at 545.
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TICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation
to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal"); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opinion
of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., requiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose asserted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must
be narrowly tailored to the accomplishment of that purpose.
Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification."
I d., at 537 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
7
Several commentators have insisted, no matter what the weight of the
asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish the
purpose be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for even
more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of less
onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
559, 565 (1975). Professor Ely has suggested that "special scrutiny in the
suspect classification context has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but
rather in insisting that the classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater precision than any available alternative."
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev.
723, 727 n. 26 (1974). Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of
legislative means is more appropriate than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolv-

ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protec. tion, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972).
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"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." I d., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). In Fullilove, the challenged statute required at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises.
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. Similarly, the
Court approved the hiring program in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because
the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees." 8
Significantly, the cases discussed above all involved hiring
goals. Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the qi,:3charge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. De8
Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the
validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case,
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in Weber. Absent a finding of discrimination as in Fullilove, we
have had no occasion to consider whether a fixed quota of hiring preference
comports with the Equal Protection Clause. Such a quota is to be distinguished from hiring goals adopted as a means of achieving a fairer and
more balanced workforce.
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nial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as
loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse psychological as well as financial effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler,
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 9 layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
means of accomplishing otherwise legitimate State purposes,
a layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 10 Other,
less intrusive means of accomplishing the same goals-such
9

For example, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (197.4) while petitioner's complaint alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11.
The injury to Defunis' was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that
he would have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third
year. Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a
union member who is laid off.
10
We have previously recognized that, in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).

84-1340-0PINION
WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

13

as the Board's hiring program in this case-are available. 11
For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs as the
means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the
demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 12

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.

11
"[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative
expense." Greenawalt, supra, at 578-579.
12
Further evidence that the layoff provision is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored is the Board's definition of minority, which included Blacks, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent. There is no
explanantion for why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities.
Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally foundthat they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of these minority groups.
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SUPREMEC
No. 84-1340
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a school board
may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of
its employees because of their race or national origin.

I
In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial tension in the community that extended to its schools, considered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education Association (the Union) that would protect employees
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1
The Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It
stated:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
1

Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight seniority system.

)
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the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance." Joint App. 13. 2
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30,
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education,
(Jackson I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims.
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Joint App. 33.
Following trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not
2
Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those .\
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish
descendancy." Joint App. 15.
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fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by
filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Mter dismissing the federal
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found
that "(t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the
parties to this contract." Id., at 49. Nevertheless, the
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination.
Mter Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect
to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held that
3
Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.
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the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), to
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of racebased layoffs by public employees. We now reverse.
II

Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 While this
Court has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943),
"[t]hat is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United, States, 323 U. S. 214,
216 (1944). "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination." Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U. 8. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.,
joined by WHITE, J.)
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).
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In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491
(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE). There are two
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose.
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal." Id., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that
purpose are narrowly tailored.

III
A

The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746
F . 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more
minority faculty role mode1s by finding that the percentage of
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority
students. I d., at 1156.
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon a showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.
This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School District v. (
United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of discrimination
by statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that dem-
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onstrate such prior governmental discrimination.
In
Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent employment discrimination by the school board, "nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which the employees are hired."
Id., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the Court
held that the proper comparison for determining the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was "between the racial composition of [the sch~ol's] teaching staff
and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308.
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a state's
adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. Char-\
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971).
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood , the role model theory
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point.
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in· discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann,
supra, at 31-32:
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them 'Should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I . . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
See also id., at 24.
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Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small
See United States v.
percentage of black students.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CAS 1976), rev'd and
remanded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea
that black students are better off with black teachers could
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for finding race-conscious state action and for imposing
a racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the District Court and the resultant holding
typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations
for a disparity between the percentage of minority students
and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In fact,
there is no apparent connection between the two groups.
Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons between these two groups with an indisputable
· statement that there has been societal discrimination, and
upheld state action predicated upon racial classifications.
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, it is
insufficient and over expansive: without any particularized
findings, a court can uphold remedies that are ageless in their
reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the (
future.
B
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
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against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally
valid when it involves State action, a factual determination
must be made, either by the Board or by a court, that the
Board engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of the
Constitution or an applicable federal statute. Such aJinding
need not be contemporaneous with the instigation br the affirmative action program. But in the absence of a finding of
discrimination, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to
such action cannot determine if the the race-based action is
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination. In this case,
despite the fact that Article XII of the CBA has spawned
years of litigation and three separate lawsuits, no such finding ever has been made. Although the litigation position of
the Board was different in Jackson I and Jackson II, it denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices.
Joint App. 33. This precise issue was litigated in both those
suits. Both courts concluded that any statistical disparities
were the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior
discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends
either that a finding of prior discrimination is unnecessary, or
that, given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior discrimination. As to its first argument, the
Board is mistaken. While its second argument is belated,
we need not consider the question since we conclude below
that the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means 1
of achieving even a valid purpose. 5
Similarly, the record does not disclose whether or not the Board's asserted goal of remedying prior discrimination already has been accomplished. Even if legitimate at the outset in 1972, supra, at 1, such a purpose loses its remedial character once the initial goal is accomplished.
Racial classifications enforced beyond this point "reinforce habitual ways of
thinking in terms of classes instead of individuals," Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U. S. 448, 547 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) and "delay the time
when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor"
id., at 545.
6
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IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation
to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal") 6; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
requiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose asserted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF
JUSTICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious
6
The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter
Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt).
7
Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish
the purpose be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate
scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial classifi-
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to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification." Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimimp:.ion, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As •part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). In Fullilove, the challenged statute required at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises.
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. Similarly, the
Court approved the hiring program in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because
the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees." 8
cations call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for even
more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of less
onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely has
suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context has in
fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater precision than any available alternative." Ely 727 n. 26. Professor Gunther
argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate than
judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972).
8
Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the
validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case,
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in Weber. Absent a finding of discrimination as in Fullilove, we
have had no occasion to consider whether a fixed quota of hiring preference
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Significantly, the cases discussed above all involved hiring
goals. Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as
loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typicaliy heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse psychological as well as financial effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler,
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
comports with the Equal Protection Clause. Such a quota [requiring that (
only specified minorities be employed until the quota is reached and maintained] is to be distinguished from hiring goals adopted as a means of
achieving a fairer and more balanced workforce.
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While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 9 layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives .
.• That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
, ~ means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. 10 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are \
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 11

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
9

For example, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) while petitioner's complaint alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington Law School because of his race, he also had been
accepted at the Oregon, Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11.
The injury to Defunis' was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that
he would have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third
year. Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a
union member who is laid off.
10
We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).
11
Further evidence that the layoff provision is not a legitimate means is
the Board's definition of minority to include Blacks, Orientals, American
Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, supra, at - - n. 2. There is no
explanantion for why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities
or how in fact members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that
they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of
each of these minority groups.
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~ JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

1
This case presents the question whether a school board
~I may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of
its employees because of their! race or national origin.

In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial tension
in the community that extended to its schools, considered
adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education
Association (the Union) that would protect employees who
were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 The
Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision,
Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis1

.

Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight seniority system.

\
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trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance." Joint App. 13. 2
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30,
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education,
(Jackson I) (mem. op.))', claiming that the Board's failure to
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims.
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment qjscrimination and argiie"'"ct that the layoff provisiOn conflicted
w1tiit'i1e Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Joint App. 33.
Following trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by
• Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish
descendancy." Joint App. 15.
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filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated
against minOrities m · s irr--- actices. - The mi~ority
r presentation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found
that "[t]here is no histor}l of o:t~t discrimination by the
parties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination.
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause,
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect
to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held that
the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.
3
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grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), to
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of racebased layoffs by public employers. We now reverse.
II
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943).
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.)
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).
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(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JuSTICE). There are two
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose.
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal." Id., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that
purpose are narrowly tailored.

III
A
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746
F. 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more
minority faculty role models by finding that the percentage of
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority
students. I d., at 1156.
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon a showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. ,('
This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of discrimination by
statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimination.
In
Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent employment discrimination by the school board, "nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
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tion in the community from which the employees are hired."
!d., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the Court
held that the proper comparison for determining the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was "between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching staff
and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308.
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a state's
adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971).
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point.
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann,
supra, at 31-32:
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
See also id., at 24.
Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small
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percentage of black students.
See United States v.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and
remanded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433
, U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea
that black students are better off with black teachers could
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The r.
model theory announced by the District Court and the
tant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are
explanations for a disparity between the percenta of minority students and the percentage of minority fac ty, many of
them completely unrelated to discrimination of ny kind. In
fact, there is no apparent connection bet een the two
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court c mbined irr.
vant comparisons between these two group with a ndisle statement that there has been so etal d · crimination, a
upheld state action predica d
cla, ifications. No one doubts that there
racial discriJ\!nat
in this country. Bu ~~~
posing discriminator legal remedies that
centpeople , i ~
· ~·~~~
· ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

particularized findings a court : rphold
: remedies that are
ageless in their reach into the pas and timeless in their abil~
ity to affect the future.
B
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally
valid when it involves State action, a factual determination
must be made, either by the Board or by a court, that the
Board engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of the
Constitution or an applicable federal statute. Such a finding
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need not be contemporaneous with the instigation of the affirmative action program. But in the absence of a finding of
discrimination, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to
such action cannot determine if the the race-based action is
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination. In this case,
despite the fact that Article XII of the CBA has spawned
years of litigation and three separate law_wits, no such finding ever has been made. Although its litigation position was
diffe~ in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the
existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. Joint
App. 33. This precise issue was litigated in both those suits.
Both courts cone u e that any s a IS 1cal disparities were
the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends either
that a finding of prior discrimination is unnecessary, or that,
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of
prior discrimination. As to its first argument, the Board is
mistaken. While its second argument is belated, we need
not consider the question since we conclude below that the
layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of
achieving even a valid purpose. 5
JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action in
the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals below is
--~~
i!tiltl&~l"t~li~ttg enough by itself.
Even relying on these non-record materials,
~ .. ~~r' .. JUSTICE M ARSHALL's argument IS
. re duce d to assertions without citations
..,....for key points; see, e. g., post at 4 ("without some modification of the seniority layoff system, genuine faculty integration could not take place").
The Court's disagreement with JuSTICE MARSHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the heretofore unquestioned rule
that this Court decides cases based on the record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by "legitimate factual predicate," nor
does he demonstrate the relationship of these non-record materials to his
undefined predicate. If, for example, his dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual predicate, then there is no need
5
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IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation
to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its own employment history. Noone disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country. If
that fact alone can justify race-conscious action by the State, despite the
Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent need not rely on non-record materials to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand,
JusTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the necessary factual predicate is
prior discrimination by the Board, there is no escaping the need for a factual finding below-a finding that does not exist.
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If the
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that racebased state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires
that a factfinder make a finding of prior discrimination. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself from this key constitutional question
by conceding that is has discriminated in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the
requirement of a finding is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's
opm10n. Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that racebased state action be remedial.
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JuSTICE MARSHALL has
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II. In that case the
court concluded that it "had not been established that the Board had discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices." I d., at - - .
Rather than being the result of any employment discrimination by the
Board, the court concluded that "[t]he minority representation on the faculty was the result of societal discrimination." /d., at--." Moreover,
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had
engaged in employment discrimination.
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to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal") 6 ; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
requiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose asserted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF
JUSTICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious
to permit any but the most exact connection between justifi6
The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter
Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt).
7
Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727 n. 26. Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972).
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cation and classification."
at 537 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." I d., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute reOf course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of
one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JuSTICE MARSHALL repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a majority vote of the Union somehow val\dates this plan. He sees this case not in
terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens
"between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a
political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on
either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a group."
Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the white teachers
as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim
that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In view of the way
union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a straight freeze on
minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually
was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most
junior union members. The more senior union members simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 ("To petitioners, at the
bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, fell the lot of bearing
the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that became necessary in
1982.") The fact that such a painless accomodation was approved by the
more senior union members six times since 1972 is irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc
grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights.
8
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quired at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises.
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. 9
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved (
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the disJUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selection of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. "WftHe .that phrase ii bigl:l•
liQ'mding, in reality it merely expresses the tautology that layoffs are
based on seniority except as to those nonminority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority. This is really nothing
more than group-based analysis: "each group would shoulder a portion of
[the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty." Post, at 4. The
constitutional problem remains: the decision that petitioners would be laid
off was based on their race.
9
Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan
did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees."
Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case,
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was pre- C
sented in Weber.
10
There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see,
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they do
not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it implements a layoff plan based on race.

J
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charge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as
loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler,
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as I
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) while petitioner's complaint alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon,
Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11. The injury to Defunis'
was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year. Even this
analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union member who
is laid off.
11

.,
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means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.

We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).
13
The Board's definition of minority to include Blacks, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, supra, at - - n. 2, further
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation
for why the Board chose to favor these particular
or how in fact
members of some of the categories can be identified.
oreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of these
minority groups.
12
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1340

WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON
BOARD OF E DUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a school board,
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, may extend
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employees because of their race or national origin.
I
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial
tension in the community that extended to its schools, considered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education Association (the Union) that would protect employees
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1
'l'he Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
' Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionpaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight seniority system.
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the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
. than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certificated maintaining the above
minority balance." App. 13. 2
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30,
(Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jackson
I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere to
the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to take
pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In its
answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted with the
Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. Following trial,
the District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was insufficient
evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had
engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id.,
at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled
2
Article VII of t~e CBA defined "minority group personnel" as ''those
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish
descendancy." App. 15.
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the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing
discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal claims, the
District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
the state law contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a
suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of
Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the parties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the court
held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to remedy
the effects of societal discrimination.
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and
state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment,
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With
respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held
3
Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.

•

84-134(}..-0PINION
4

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471
U. S. - - (1985), to resolve the important issue of the c.onstitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. We
now reverse.
II
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. • This Court
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943).
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
Regents of University ofCalifornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.)
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).

C ")
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(1980) (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). There are two prongs to
this examination. First, the racial classification must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose. Second, the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be
"narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." I d., at
480. We must therefore decide whether the layoff provision
is supported by a sufficiently important state purpose and
whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are
narrowly tailored.
III
A
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 746 F. 2d, at
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority
teachers was less than the percentage of minority students.
I d., at 1156.
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of discrimination by statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimination. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent
employment discrimination by the school board, "'nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which the em-

.. ~ ·'.·
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ployees are hired."' ld., at 307, quoting Teamsters v.
. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See also
Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concurring)
("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant labor
market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black teachers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I believe
this court may well have been required to reverse . . . . ")
Based on that reasoning, the Court held that the proper comparison for determining the existence of actual discrimination
by the school board was "between the racial composition of
[the school's] teaching staff and the racial composition of the
qualified public school teacher population in the relevant
labor market." 433 U. S., at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates
this Court's focus on prior discrimination as the justification
for, and the limitation on, a State's adoption of race-based
remedies. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971).
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory
employed by the District Court. has no logical stopping point.
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just-the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402
U. S., at 31-32:
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
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See also id., at 24.
Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small
percentage of black students.
See United States v.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off with black
teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown
/).

Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role
model theory announced by the District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous
explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of
them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In
fact, there is no apparent connection between the two
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons between these two groups with an indisputable statement that there has been societal discrimination, and upheld state action predicated upon racial
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, it is insufficient and over expansive: without any
particularized findings, a court can uphold remedies that are
ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
B

Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
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against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, operate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), to eliminate
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial action may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 104
S. Ct. 1879, 1881-1882 (1984). These related constitutional
duties are not always harmonious; reconciling them requires
public employers to act with extraordinary care. In particular, a public employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is,
it must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that
there has been prior discrimination.
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case,
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial
program-Article XII-had the purpose and effect of instituting a racial classification that was not justified by a remedial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative action program. But unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees
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cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified \
as a remedy for prior discrimination.
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of litigation and three separate lawsuits, no such determination
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was different, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33.
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were.. the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends that, given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior C -::1
discrimination. Although this argument seems belated at
this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the question since we conclude below that the layoff provision was not
a legally appropriate means of achieving even a valid
purpose. 5

C1

6

JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action in
the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals below is
unusual enough by itself. Even relying on these non-record materials,
JUSTICE MARSHALL's argument is reduced to assertions without citations
for key points; see, e. g., post at 4 ("without some modification of the seniority layoff system, genuine faculty integration could not -take place").
The Court's disagreement with JuSTICE MARSHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the heretofore unquestioned rule
that this Court decides cases based on the record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by "legitimate factual predicate," nor
does he demonstrate the relationship of these non-record materials to his
undefined predicate. If, for example, his dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual predicate, then there is no need
to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its own employment history. Noone disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country. If
that fact alone can justify race-conscious action by the State, despite the
Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent need not rely on non-record materials to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand,
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IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.)
("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal") 6 ; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opinJUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the necessary factual predicate is
prior discrimination by the Board, there is no escaping the need for a factual determination below-a determination that does not exist.
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If the
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination--that is, that racebased state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in instituting a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion.
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state
action be remedial.
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court
concluded that it ''had not been established that the Board had discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices." /d., at--. Moreover,
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had
engaged in employment discrimination.
8
The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful al-
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ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
requiring a "strict and searching" judicial inquiry even at the
intennediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose asserted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER,
C. J.). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to
pennit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification."
I d., at 537 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
ternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974)
(hereinafter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to
whether a nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable
administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt).
7
Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, ''while benign racial
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972).

84-1340-0PINION
WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

12

called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
''When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." !d., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute re8

Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on
• some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of
one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a majority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case not in
terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens
"between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a
political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on
either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a group."
Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the white teachers
as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim
that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In view of the way
union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a straight freeze on
minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually
was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most
junior union members. The more senior union members simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 ("To petitioners, at the
bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, fell the lot of bearing
the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that became necessary in
1982.") The fact that such a painless accomodation was approved by the
more senior union members six times since 1972 is irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc
grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights.
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selection of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonminority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority.
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty."

.. ~,,•\
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quired at least 10 percent of federal public works funds to be
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises.
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by
nonminority firms is relatively light." 448 U. S., at 484. 9
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U. S. 561, 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9,
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as
loss of an existing job.

I

Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petition- L
ers would be laid off was based on their race.
• Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v.,
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which involves a
state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in Weber. C ~
10
There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see,
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they do
not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it implements a layoff plan based on race.

r
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Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58.
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs
"The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint
alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon,
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year.
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union
member who is laid off.
12
We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).
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as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. '3

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.

18
The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals, American Indians , and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation of
why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of these
minority groups.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1340
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and
JusTICE REHNQUIST joined, and which JusTICE O'CONNOR
joined in parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and V of the opinion.
This case presents the question whether a school board,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, may extend
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employees because of their race or national origin.
I
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial
tension in the community that extended to its schools, considered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education Association (the Union) that would protect employees
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1
The Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated:
' Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight
seniority system.
·
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"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off
than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certificated maintaining the above
minority balance." App. 13. 2
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30,
(Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jackson
/) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere to
the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to take
pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In its
answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted with the
Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. Following trial,
the District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was insufficient
evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had
2
Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish
descendancy." App. 15.
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engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id.,
at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled
the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing
discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal claims, the
District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
the state law contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted
a suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of
Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the parties to this contract." I d., at 49. Nevertheless, the court
held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to remedy
the effects of societal discrimination.
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and
state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment,
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With
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respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held
that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the
layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471
U. S. - - (1985), to resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. We
now reverse.
II
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943).
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.)
The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny does
not change merely because the challenged classification operPetitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).
3

I
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ates against a group that historically has not been subject to
governmental discrimination. Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); Bakke, 438
U. S., at 291-299; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22
(1948); see also A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133
(1975). In this case, Article XII of the CBA operates
against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and therefore constitutes a classification based on race.
"Any
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it
does not conflict with constitutional guarentees." Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of BURGER,
C. J.). There are two prongs to this examination. First,
any racial classification "must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429,
432 (1984); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); cf.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage).
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its
purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal." Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480. We must decide
whether the layoff provision is supported by a compelling
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish
that purpose are narrowly tailored.
III
A
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 746 F. 2d, at
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority
teachers was less than the percentage of minority students.
!d., at 1156.
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This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of
discrimination by statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimination. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent employment
discrimination
by
the
school
board,
" 'nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which the employees are hired."' !d., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See
also Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concurring) ("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the
percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant
labor market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black
teachers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I
believe this court may well have been required to reverse .... ") Based on that reasoning, the Court in )
Hazelwood held that the proper comparison for determining
the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant labor market." 433 U. S.,
at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a
State's adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1
(1971).
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point.
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The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402
U. S., at 31-32:
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
See also id., at 24.
Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to
escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying
the small percentage of black teachers by reference to the
small percentage of black students. See United States v.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CAS 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical
extreme, the idea that black students are better off with
black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954)
(Brown 1).
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role
model theory announced by the District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous
explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many
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of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.
In fact, there is no apparent connection between the two
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons between these two groups with an indisputable statement that there has been societal discrimination, and upheld state action predicated upon racial
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for
· imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discriminat~on is ~nsuffici~mt and over
expansive. In the absence of particularized findmgs, a court
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
B

Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, operate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), to eliminate
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial action may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U. S., at 432. These related constitutional duties. are not
always harmonious; reconciling them requires public employers to act with extraordinary care. In particular, a public
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks
on an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence
that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have

I
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sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has
been prior discrimination.
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case,
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial
program-Article XII-had the purpose and effect of instituting a racial classification that was not justified by a remedial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative action program. But unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees
cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified
as a remedy for prior discrimination.
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of litigation 'and three separate lawsuits, no such determination
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was different, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33.
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the
result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends that,
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of
prior discrimination. Although this argument seems belated
at this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the
question since we conclude below that the layoff provision
was not a legally appropriate means of achieving even a
compelling purpose. 5
I
5
JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly
assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action
in the Jackson schools," post, at . In support of that assertion, he

.,

.
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IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that
respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual
materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals
below is unusual enough by itself. My disagreement with JUSTICE MARSHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the
heretofore unquestioned rule that this Court decides cases based on the
record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by
"legitimate factual predicate," nor does he demonstrate the relationship of
these non-record materials to his undefined predicate. If, for example, his
dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual
predicate, then there is no need to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its
own employment history. No-one disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country. If that fact alone can justify race-conscious
action by the State, despite the Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent
need not rely on non-record materials ·to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand, JUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination by the Board, there is no
escaping the need for a factual determination below-a determination that
does not exist.
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is
disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If
the necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that racebased state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in instituting a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion.
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state
action be remedial.
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court
concluded that it "had not been established that the Board had discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices." Id., at--. Moreover,
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had
engaged in employment discrimination.

C '1
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"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432 ("to pass constitutional
muster, [racial classifications] must be necessary ... to the
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose") (quoting
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964); Fullilove,
448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) ("We recognize
the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any . . .
program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish
the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal"). 6 Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448
U.S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 7 "Racial classifica6

I

The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has
acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful
alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975)
(hereinafter Greenawalt).
7
Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context

C~
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tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification."
Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharrks funds
to be used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers of Congress in part because the "actual burden
shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light. 'ing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972).
8
Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis
of one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL
repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a majority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case
not in terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens "between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of
layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a
group." Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the
white teachers as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and .other individuals who claim that they were fired from their jobs because of their race.
That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In
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required at least 10 percent of federal public wo' 448 U. S.,
at 484. 9
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
view of the way union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a
straight freeze on minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most junior union members. The more senior union members simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5
("To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers,
fell the lot of bearing the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that
became necessary in 1982. ") The fact that such a painless accomodation
was approved by the more senior union members six times since 1972 is
irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be
distributed like bloc grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does,
petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners'
rights.
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selection of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonminority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority.
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty."
Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petitioners would be laid off was based on their race.
9
Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber
involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the
hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in
Weber.
0
' There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see,
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they
do not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it
implements a layoff plan based on race.
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Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U. S. 561,· 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9,
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.
Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58.
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the
The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint
alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon,
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
11
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entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be
legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored.' 2 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing
similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot
satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.

Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year.
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union
member who is laid off.
12
We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).
13
The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals,
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation
of why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have
engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of
these minority groups.
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WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 19, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined, and which JUSTICE O'CONNOR
joined in parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and V.
This case presents the question whether a school board,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,. may extend
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employees because of their race or national origin.

I
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial
tension in the community that extended to its schools, considered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education Association (the Union) that would protect employees
who were members of certain minority groups against layoffs. 1 The Board and the Union eventually approved a new
'Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives:
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight
seniority system.
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provision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It
stated:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the
number of teachers through layoff from employment by
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the
district shall be retained, except that at no time will
there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid
off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher
so affected will be called back in reverse order for
positions for which he is certificated maintaining the
above minority balance." App. 13. 2
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probationary status were retained. Rather than complying with
Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid
off probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain
the percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time
of the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at
30, (Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jackson I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere
to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to
take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In
its answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. FollowArticle VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish
descendancy." App. 15.
2
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ing trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by
filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law contract claims.
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted
a suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In rejecting the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the
parties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discriminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination.
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years,
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminority teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and
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state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment,
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With
respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held
that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minority schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the
layoff provision.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471
U. S. - - (1985), to resolve the important issue of the
constitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers.
We now reverse.
II

Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality,'" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943).
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265,
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.)
3
Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause.
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977).
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The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny does
not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to
governmental discrimination. Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); Bakke,
438 U. S., at 291-299; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1,
22 (1948); see also A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent
133 (1975). In this case, Article XII of the CBA operates
against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and
therefore constitutes a classification based on race. "Any
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it
does not conflict with constitutional guarentees." Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of BURGER,
C. J.). There are two prongs to this examination. First,
any racial classification "must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429,
432 (1984); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); cf.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage).
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its
purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal." Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480. We must decide
whether the layoff provision is supported by. a compelling
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish
that purpose are narrowly tailored.
III
A
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and language of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's
interest in providing minority role models for its minority
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal
discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 746 F. 2d, at
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority
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teachers was less than the percentage of minority students.
ld., at 1156.
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of
discrimination by statistical disparity focuses on those
disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimination. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent
employment discrimination by the school board, "'nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which the
employees are hired."' Id., at 307, quoting Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See also
Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concurring)
("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the
percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant
labor market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black
teachers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I
believe this court may well have been required to reverse .. . . ") Based on that reasoning, the Court in Hazelwood held that the proper comparison for determining the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant labor market." 433 U. S.,
at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a
State's adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1
(1971).
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Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point.
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402
U. S., at 31-32:
"At some point these school authorities and others like
them should have achieved full compliance with this
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the
system."
See also id., at 24.
Moreover, because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to
escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying
the small percentage of black teachers by reference to the
small percentage of black students. See United States v.
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical
extreme, the idea that black students are better off with
black teachers could lead to the very system the Court
rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954) (Brown 1).
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role
model theory announced by the District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous
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explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many
of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.
In fact, there is no apparent connection between the two
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons between these two groups with an indisputable statement that there has been societal discrimination, and upheld state action predicated upon racial
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over
expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
B

Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, operate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955); to eliminate
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial action may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U. S., at 432. These related constitutional duties are not
always harmonious; reconciling them requires public employers to act with extraordinary care. In particular, a public
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks
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on an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence
that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have
sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has
been prior discrimination.
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case,
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial
program-Article XU-had the purpose and effect of instituting a racial classification that was not justified by a remedial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative action program. But unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees
cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified
as a remedy for prior discrimination.
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of litigation and three separate lawsuits, no such determination
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was different, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33.
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the
result of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends that,
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of
prior discrimination. Although this argument seems belated
at this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the
question since we conclude below that the layoff provision
was not a legally appropriate means of achieving even a

•·
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compelling purpose. 5
IV
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to accomplish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of
JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly
assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action
in the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he
engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that
respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual
materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals
below is unusual enough by itself. My disagreement with JUSTICE
MARSHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the
heretofore unquestioned rule that this Court decides cases based on the
record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by
"legitimate factual predicate," nor does he demonstrate the relationship of
these non-record materials to his undefined predicate. If, for example, his
dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual
predicate, then there is no need to refer to respondents' lodgings as to
its own employment history. No-one disputes that there has been race
discrimination in this country. If that fact alone can justify race-conscious
action by the State, despite the Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent
need not rely on non-record materials to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand, JUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination by the Board, there is no
escaping the need for a factual determination below-a determination that
does not exist.
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is
disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If
the necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that racebased state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in instituting a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion.
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state
action be remedial.
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court
6
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"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the decisions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our
decisions always have employed a more stringent standardhowever articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See,
e. g., Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432 ("to pass constitutional
muster, [racial classifications] must be necessary ... to the
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose") (quoting
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964); Fullilove,
448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) ("We recognize
the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any ...
program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish
the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that
goal"). 6 Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448
U.S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 7 "Racial classificaconcluded that it "had not been established that the Board had discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices." /d., at--. Moreover,
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had
engaged in employment discrimination.
6
The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has
acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful
alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial ;lpproach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975)
(hereinafter Greenawalt).
7
Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of
the asserted governmental purpose, that the 'TIUlans chosen to accomplish
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, ''while benign racial
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tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification."
Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting).
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1; 20-21 (1972).
8
Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis
of one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL
repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a majority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case
not in tenns of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens "between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of
layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a
group." Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the
white teachers as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim that they were fired from their jobs because of their race.
That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In
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required at least 10 percent of federal public works funds to
be used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers of Congress in part because the "actual burden
shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light." 448
U. S., at 484. 9
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the
view of the way union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a
"straight freeze on minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most junior union members. The more senior union members simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5
("To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers,
fell the lot of bearing the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that
became necessary in 1982. ") The fact that such a painless accomodation
was approved by the more senior union members six times since 1972 is
irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be
distributed like bloc grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does,
petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners'
rights.
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that
has no real invidious effect, stating that ''within the confines of constant
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniot:ity in the selection of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonminority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority.
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty."
Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petitioners would be laid off was based on their race.
'Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber
involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the
hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which
involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in
Weber.
10
There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see,
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical

84-1340--0PINION
14

WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION

Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U. S. 561, 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9,
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.
Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as loss of an existing job.
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker
may invest many productive years in one job and one city
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58.
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that
general hiring goals do not.
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they
do not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The
Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it
implements a layoff plan based on race.
11
The "school admission" cases, which involve the same basic concepts as
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint
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entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be
legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing
similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot
satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13

v
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.

alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, ·
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year.
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union
member who is laid off.
12
We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976).
11
The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals,
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation
of why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have
engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of
these minority groups.

